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ABSTRACT 
 
Leonard Wood and the American Empire.  (May 2011) 
James Herman Pruitt II, B.A., King College; M.A., The University of Kentucky 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Brian M. Linn 
 
During the ten years following the Spanish American War (1898 to 1908), Major General 
Leonard Wood served as the primary agent of American imperialism.  Wood was not 
only a proconsul of the new American Empire; he was a symbol of the empire and the 
age in which he served.  He had the distinction of directing civil and military 
government in Cuba and the Philippines where he implemented the imperial policies 
given to him by the administrations of William McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt.  In 
Cuba, he labored to rebuild a state and a civil society crippled by decades of 
revolutionary ferment and guided the administration’s policy through the dangerous 
channels of Cuban politics in a way that satisfied – at least to the point of avoiding 
another revolution – both the Cubans and the United States.  In the Philippines, Wood 
took control of the Moro Province and attempted to smash the tribal-religious leadership 
of Moro society in order to bring it under direct American rule.  His personal ideology, 
the imperial policies he shepherded, and the guidance he provided to fellow military 
officers and the administrations he served in matters of colonial administration and 
defense shaped the American Empire and endowed it with his personal stamp.   
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  1  
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Due to the success of the Spanish American War, President William McKinley’s 
administration unexpectedly found itself in possession of insular territories in the 
Caribbean and the Far East.  Unlike the smaller coaling stations scattered around the 
globe, or even the Hawaiian Islands with their substantial community of American 
expatriates, the Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico were large islands inhabited almost 
exclusively by indigenous populations.  Under McKinley and the later administration of 
Theodore Roosevelt, the United States struggled to develop an imperial policy to govern 
these new territories and to bolster its recently acquired status as a world power.  During 
those first ten years (1898 to 1908) of the American Empire, the primary agent of 
American imperialism was Major General Leonard Wood. 
Wood was not only a proconsul of the American Empire; he was a symbol of the 
empire and the age in which he served.  He had the distinction of directing civil and 
military governments in Cuba and the Philippines where he implemented the imperial 
policies given to him by the McKinley and Roosevelt administrations.  In Cuba, he 
labored to rebuild a state and a civil society crippled by decades of revolutionary ferment 
and guided the administration’s policy through the dangerous channels of Cuban politics 
in a way that satisfied – at least to the point of avoiding another revolution – both the 
Cubans and the United States.  In the Philippines, Wood took control of the Moro 
____________ 
This dissertation follows the style of The Journal of Military History. 
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Province and attempted to smash the tribal-religious leadership of Moro society in order 
to bring it under direct American rule.  His personal ideology, the imperial policies he 
shepherded, and the guidance he provided to fellow military officers and the 
administrations he served in matters of colonial administration and defense shaped the 
American Empire and endowed it with his personal stamp. 
Due to his prominence, Wood’s imperial career provides a window into the post-
1898 American empire and to the progressive forces that shaped imperial policy in a 
number of substantial ways.  First, as the executive branch’s chosen instrument of 
imperial governance, Wood’s colonial administration of Cuba and the Moro Province 
provides an excellent opportunity to trace the development and implementation of 
imperial grand strategy in the new possessions.  Second, Wood’s career opens an avenue 
from which to study the U.S. Army’s role in occupation, pacification, military 
government, and imperial defense.  Third, an examination of Wood’s imperial 
experience highlights the importance of individuals in determining and implementing 
American foreign policy.  An assessment of Wood’s service in Cuba and the Philippines 
offers new insights on colonial administration, the demands of imperial service, and the 
larger impact of the Progressive Movement. 
Although often consigned to the realm of military or diplomatic history, the 
American Empire and General Wood’s tenure as a colonial administrator is crucial to 
understanding the Progressive Era of which it was a major part.  With few exceptions, 
historians have separated American overseas expansion from domestic Progressivism 
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but their influence upon one another is incalculable.1  The same forces that gave rise to 
Progressivism on the national level gave the United States the ends, ways, and means to 
project its power abroad and to expand beyond its continental limits.  The remarkable 
economic growth and technological advancements, and the resulting problems of 
industrialization, immigration, and labor, not only called forth the progressive reformer 
but gave the country sufficient military and economic means to turn its interest overseas.  
The centralization of political and military power onto the national level, the result of the 
Progressive crusade to bring order out of the chaos of industrialization and unregulated 
capitalism, gave the federal government the ability to project its power beyond the 
continental bounds of the nation.  Within the government, progressive reformers 
sharpened the instruments of American expansion, the U.S. military and diplomatic 
services, through efforts aimed at professionalization and efficiency.  Progressive 
theories on education, government, public health, economic organization and the 
structure of civil society often provided the methods of imperial governance.  The quest 
for sustained economic growth, the development of foreign markets and even the 
progressive’s commitment to social progress provided some of the ends to expansion 
and inspired those who wanted to carry the blessings of civilization and progress to the 
less fortunate around the world. 
The military occupation and governance of Cuba and the Philippines provided a 
showcase for the progressive experiment.  Military and civil governors and military/civil 
                                                 
1 For the Progressive-Imperial connection, see:  James L. Abrahamson, America Arms for a New Century: 
The Making of a Great Military Power (New York: Free Press, 1981) and John Morgan Gates, 
Schoolbooks and Krags: The United State Army in the Philippines, 1898-1902 (Westport, CT: Greenwood 
Press, 1973). 
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commissions provided strong executive leadership and furnished the necessary 
personnel, usually soldiers, needed to gather information and process it in a systematic 
fashion that could be effectively utilized by policy makers.  In addition, both nascent 
native democracy and the more traditional conservative forces proved too weak to hinder 
progressive executive policy.  In short the empire was a fertile field for the progressive 
plant to grow and nurture.  Many of the movement’s breakthroughs came within the 
empire.   
Wood’s military government implemented many of the reforms valued by 
progressives in the United States.  The military government pioneered efforts at 
sanitation and public health that led to the creation of the yellow fever commission under 
Major Walter Reed, U.S. Army.  Through extensive research partially funded by the 
military government, the commission discovered the mosquito as the primary carrier of 
the disease and implemented effective means to control the frequent epidemics of the 
disease for the first time.  Cuba also became a testing ground for the practicality of 
Progressive educational theory and the insular government worked closely with Harvard 
to train native teachers in those methods.  In public works Governor Wood adopted an 
extensive program in Cuba to not only build an infrastructure and lay the ground work 
for economic progress but to solve problems of unemployment; a progressive reform not 
adopted in the United States until Franklin Roosevelt and the Great Depression.  Similar 
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efforts occurred to one degree or another in the Philippine and in most of the American 
interventions in Central America and the Caribbean.2 
 Leonard Wood’s imperial service has been the subject of three scholarly 
biographies: Herman Hagedorn’s Leonard Wood: A Biography (1931), Jack C. Lane’s 
Armed Progressive: General Leonard Wood (1978), and Jack McCallm’s Leonard 
Wood: Rough Rider, Surgeon, Architect of American Imperialism (2006).3 
Hermann Hagedorn was a colleague of Wood and the “official biographer” with 
unlimited access to the Wood papers and the cooperation of Wood’s confidantes and 
contemporaries.  He portrayed Wood as the model colonial administrator, a benevolent 
autocrat who undertook the difficult task of reconstructing both Cuba and the Moro 
Province and defending the Philippines against Japanese aggression.  His overly 
favorable portrayal of the general and uncritical treatment of Wood’s many controversial 
actions is the primary drawback to his work. 
Jack Lane’s biography argued that Wood’s activities in Cuba and the Philippines 
reflected Progressive efforts in the United States – the drive for efficiency and the 
reform of schools, hospitals, charitable institutions, the judiciary, and even government.  
Wood was a proponent of a new model army, which valued managerial, administrative, 
and diplomatic talents as much as experience in troop command.  As Commanding 
                                                 
2 Andrew J. Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941 
(Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1998); Howard Gillett, Jr., “The 
Military Occupation of Cuba, 1899-1902: Workshop For American Progressivism,” American Quarterly 
25 (October 1973); and David F. Healy, The United States in Cuba, 1898-1902: Generals, Politicians, and 
the Search for Policy (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1963). 
3 Hermann Hagedorn, Leonard Wood: A Biography 2 vols. (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 
1931); Jack C. Lane, Armed Progressive: General Leonard Wood (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978); 
and Jack McCallum, Leonard Wood: Rough Rider, Surgeon, Architect of American Imperialism (New 
York: New York University Press, 2006). 
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General of the Philippine Division, he proved an ardent champion of American 
expansion and relished the possibility of military action against China and Japan.  If 
Hagedorn’s work suffered from hagiography, Lane’s dislike for his subject prevented 
him from providing a balanced assessment of Wood’s role as imperial administrator.   
Lane viewed Wood as a capable administrator, but also a ruthless self-promoter obsessed 
with personal advancement and glory. 
Jack McCallum made an important distinction between the actions of Wood as 
imperial proconsul in Cuba and the Philippines.  He argued that in Cuba, Wood served 
as the model colonial administrator who sought to rebuild a nation from the ruins of civil 
war.  But in the Moro provinces, Wood served as an enforcer of American rule and paid 
little attention to nation building.  McCallum attributed the difference in approach to the 
vicious confirmation hearings over Wood’s promotion to major general that occurred in 
the interim between the two assignments.  The attacks upon his character and military 
abilities led him to seek glory on Philippine battlefields at the cost of nation building.  
Although a more balanced overall portrayal, McCallum overemphasizes Wood’s 
personal experiences but failed to place him in the broader context as agent of American 
empire. 
For a number of reasons, including the shortcomings in the previously mentioned 
biographies, Wood’s career as a colonial administrator and instrument of American 
expansion deserves a fresh examination.  With the exception of McCallum’s biography, 
all biographies of Wood are over three decades old.  Lane and many of the other military 
biographers of the period wrote within the context of Progressivism as defined by the 
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organizational theories of Robert Wiebe’s The Search for Order, 1877-1920 (1967).4  
Following the organizational approach outlined by Wiebe, these studies focused on the 
professionalization and bureaucratization of the American military as it mirrored those 
efforts in other professions.  
In addition to the potential for further research into Progressivism, the American 
empire also raises topics relevant to current policy debates. Cuba and the Philippines 
both provide an excellent opportunity to study nation-building, what the U.S. Army now 
terms as Phase 4 operations, the inherent tension in civil-military relations, and the 
cultural problems of working with those of a different political, ideological, and 
religious heritage.  It is also an opportunity to observe how the U.S. Army, operating in a 
climate of persistent conflict and in a volatile strategic environment, transformed itself 
from a frontier constabulary to a modern army capable of full spectrum readiness.  In 
Cuba, Leonard Wood, as military governor, sought to use the personnel and structure of 
the U.S. Army, a highly centralized, hierarchical organization, to create a democracy and 
launch a stable and independent country.  In the Philippines, initially in an effort to battle 
an insurgency, the Army assumed political control and responsibility for individual 
                                                 
4 Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order, 1877-1920 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967).  For the 
Progressive-U.S. Army connection, see:  James L. Abrahamson, America Arms for a New Century: The 
Making of a Great Military Power (New York: Free Press, 1981) and John Morgan Gates, Schoolbooks 
and Krags: The United State Army in the Philippines, 1898-1902 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1973). 
Other exceptions to the compartmentalization of the American empire and the most common medium for 
exploring its interconnectedness with the Progressive Movement has been through the biographies of 
imperial policymakers.  Such biographies include: Philip C. Jessup, Elihu Root 2 vols. (New York: Dodd, 
Mead & Company, 1938); Donald Smythe, Guerrilla Warrior: the early life of John J. Pershing (New 
York: Scribner, 1973); Heath Twichell, Jr., Allen: The Biography of an Army Officer, 1859-1930 (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1974); Allan R. Millett, The General: Robert L. Bullard and 
Officership in the United States Army, 1881-1925 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975); A.J. Bacevich, 
Diplomat in Khaki: Major General Frank Ross McCoy and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1949 
(Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1989). 
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towns and villages. Only gradually did the military occupation give way reluctantly to a 
civil commission and eventually a civil governor.  When Wood took control of the Moro 
Provinces, the War Department gave the reins of both civil and military government to 
him, as it had in Cuba.  Unlike Cuba, however, many Filipino Muslims [Moros] had not 
yet submitted to American authority and Wood had to use a combination of military 
force, diplomacy, and progressive reform to achieve that goal. The opportunities and 
challenges encountered by Wood in both areas are precursors to the international 
environment of the 21st Century where the United States once again attempts to use the 
military to bring stability, democratic progress, and security to parts of the world. 
The following account of Leonard Wood’s career examines the first years of 
American government in Cuba and the Philippines and places his administration 
squarely in the milieu of the progressive reform.  While acknowledging the previous 
work on the development of colonial policy in Washington D.C. and the interactions 
between the colonial administrators and the federal government, the narrative expands to 
include the actual implementation of policy on the ground and the impact of that 
implementation on the formation of policy from above.  The larger distinction between 
implementation of policy and the initiation of policy on the policy formation process and 
the administration level will also be discussed.  Six major administrative policy areas 
pursued by the U.S. Army in both areas are considered:  sanitation and public health, 
public works, economic development, education, law and order, and imperial defense.  
The goal is a comprehensive analysis of Wood’s career as a proconsul that demonstrates 
the interconnectedness of the American empire, the Progressive Era, and the U.S. Army. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE ROAD TO SANTIAGO 
 
By the time of his death in 1927, Leonard Wood had risen to the rank of major general, 
held the office of Army Chief of Staff, just missed becoming the Republican nominee 
for President in 1919, been Governor General of the Philippines, and had otherwise 
served his country with distinction for over forty years.  His military career began 
humbly enough on June 17, 1885, when, as a recent graduate of Harvard Medical 
School, he entered the employ of the U.S. Army as a contract surgeon for $100.00 a 
month.  Wood had originally hoped for an appointment as a commissioned officer in the 
regular Army’s Medical Department.5  However, the War Department had no vacancies 
at the time and the young doctor accepted a contract position with the hope of securing a 
commission in the future.  From these modest beginnings, Wood steadily built a solid 
military career by seizing opportunity, overcoming challenges, and by making powerful 
friends.  Eager to eventually make the transfer from the Medical Department to the 
combat branches, Wood also became an avid student of military science.  Many of the 
lessons he learned on the frontier influenced his response to the situations in Cuba and 
against the Moros.6 
 
5 The term regular, as well as regular army or regular troops, refers to individuals or groups who have 
chosen the army as their career.  The term excludes those whose career is in a different profession but who 
have joined or been drafted into the army for a limited time or purpose – citizen soldiers, the National 
Guard, or volunteer units. 
6 Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine; and Brian McAllister Linn, 
“The Long Twilight of the Frontier Army,” The Western Historical Quarterly 27, no. 2 (Summer 1996), 
141-167.  Birtle, Linn, and others trace the continuity between the U.S. Army’s experience on the 
American frontier and its experience on the imperial frontier.  
  10
The Education of a Frontier Officer 
As his first assignment, the War Department sent Dr. Wood to Fort Huachuca in 
the Department of Arizona.  He arrived at his new post on July 4, 1885, and immediately 
went on an expedition against the illusive Apaches who often left the reservation to raid 
the surrounding countryside and into Mexico.  Unlike many of his contemporaries, 
Wood eagerly embraced the often grueling life on a frontier post and routinely 
volunteered for field service.  Assigned to Troop B, commanded by Captain Henry W. 
Lawton, a noted Indian fighter and veteran of the Red River War, Wood participated in 
many of the last major campaigns against the Apaches in the southwest.  In these 
campaigns, Wood served with two of the most notable general officers in the Indian 
Wars:  General George Crook and General Nelson A. Miles.7 
George Crook commanded the Department of Arizona from September 4, 1882 
to April 12, 1886.  Known for his unconventional approach, he introduced several 
tactical innovations that proved successful in countering the guerrilla warfare waged by 
the Indians.  To solve the problem of mobility in often broken country, Crook abandoned 
the use of supply wagons and instead relied upon pack mules.  He became especially 
noted, sometimes derisively, for his careful selection and care of the mules and for his 
elevation of their packing to a science.  In several campaigns he cut loose from his 
supply trains altogether and attempted to emulate his adversaries by living off the 
countryside.  Crook also relied heavily upon Indian allies – often members of the same 
                                                 
7 Robert M. Utley, Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1891 (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1973); and Lane, Armed Progressive.  The following description of Crook 
and Miles relies heavily upon Utley and Lane. 
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tribe that he pursued – as his chief tactical arm.  His tenacity in pursuit, his general 
forthrightness in negotiations with the hostiles, his concern for their well-being once 
peace had been achieved and his record of patient administration made him one of the 
most successful campaigners in the U.S. Army. 
Nelson A. Miles, Crook’s rival and an accomplished Indian fighter known for his 
campaigns against the Sioux and the Nez Perce, took command of the Department of 
Arizona when General Crook asked to be relieved because of conflict with General 
Philip H. Sheridan, the Army’s commanding general, over how to deal with Geronimo.  
Although considered at the time a repudiation of Crook and his methods, Miles utilized 
the same tactical innovations with only one important difference.  Whereas Crook relied 
upon his Indians allies supported by regulars, Miles fielded an expedition of handpicked 
regulars assisted by Indian scouts to pursue Geronimo and his followers.  He chose 
Lawton and his command to form a lightly equipped long-range striking force.  After a 
personal interview with Dr. Wood, Miles “selected him for the difficult and important 
service of accompanying Capt. Lawton’s command in the Geronimo’s campaign on 
account of his intelligence enterprise and strong physique and directed him to make a 
study of the differences between the Indian and white man as to power, endurance, 
courage, etc.”8 
 The grueling four month campaign, in which the expedition hounded Geronimo 
and his followers as they crisscrossed between Arizona, New Mexico, and northern 
                                                 
8 Nelson A. Miles to Stephen Field, 2 November 1889, Box 26, Leonard Wood Papers, Manuscript 
Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC; and Leonard Wood, The Journal of Leonard Wood, May-
September, 1886 ed. Jack C. Lane (Albuquerque; University of New Mexico Press, 1970), 26. 
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Mexico, finally induced Geronimo to surrender.  In the process, Wood, who with the 
exception of Lawton was the only officer to serve for the duration, gained valuable 
experience as he often functioned as Lawton’s second in command and even exercised 
independent field command on occasion.  At one point, when it looked like Wood might 
have to return due to an infected tarantula bite, Lawton wrote to his wife that: “It not 
only leaves the command without a medical officer, but no one to look after him, and he 
has always been my warmest friend and supporter.  I don’t know what I shall do without 
him.”9  Miles, who became a personal friend and early mentor to Wood, later 
commented that “in case of war I should expect him [Wood] to excel as a leader in the 
line of the army rather than in following his profession as I think he would prefer the 
more serious duties of the line of the army than of his profession.”10 
After the successful completion of the Geronimo campaign, Miles adopted Wood 
as a protégé and, when he assumed command of the Division of the Pacific in 1888, had 
the young doctor appointed to division headquarters.  For the next five years, Wood 
served closely with the general and availed himself of every opportunity to study and 
apply military science.  As at Fort Huachuca, Wood continued to volunteer for active 
field service.  He supplemented these outings with the few readings on military science 
he could find and by participating in the annual camp of instruction at Monterey.  
According to Miles, he devoted “a good portion of his time to study, much to physical 
exercises and a small percentage to the usual amusements and recreations.”11  In his 
                                                 
9 Henry W. Lawton to Mary “Mame” Lawton, 14 July 1886, Henry W. Lawton Papers, Manuscript 
Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. 
10 Nelson Miles to Stephen Field, 2 November 1889, Box 26, Wood Papers. 
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spare time, Wood met, courted, and eventually married Louise Condit-Smith, the ward 
and niece of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen Field.  “Lou” became a life-long 
partner in Wood’s military career, a staunch promoter of his interests in Washington, and 
a defender of his legacy after his death. 
In September 1895, after serving two uneventful years at Fort McPherson, 
Georgia, the War Department ordered Wood to Washington D.C. as an assistant 
attending surgeon to the president and members of his administration.  Wood served 
both Grover Cleveland and William McKinley and became friends with each.  When 
McKinley became president, Wood became the personal physician to his chronically ill 
wife and had personal contact with the president on a daily basis.  In June of 1897, 
Wood met and soon became close friends with Under-Secretary of the Navy Theodore 
Roosevelt.  Roosevelt recruited Wood into his inner-circle and the latter became a 
proponent of Roosevelt’s large policy.  Eager for military glory and advancement, Wood 
and Roosevelt watched the Cuban revolution and the growing tension between the 
United States and Spain anxiously. 
 
The Spanish-Cuban-American War 
The Cuban Revolution of 1895 followed decades of revolutionary ferment that 
had sporadically flared into open rebellion, most notably in the Ten Year’s War from 
1868 to 1878.  Such widespread discontent stemmed from economic and societal forces 
which rocked Cuba in the latter half of the nineteenth century and to which the Spanish 
government of the island proved unwilling or unable to cope.  Although the Cuban 
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economy during that period remained predominately agricultural, sugar became the 
primary staple crop and shifted the agricultural base away from the large cattle ranches 
and a more diversified crop base.  The seasonal nature of sugar production combined 
with the complete emancipation of the slave labor force in 1880 generated massive 
amounts of unemployed workers who either lingered in the countryside or migrated to 
the cities in search of work.  The continued mechanization of sugar cultivation added to 
their numbers.  The landowners faired little better as the Ten Year’s War resulted in 
substantial destruction, led to increasing indebtedness to Spanish financiers, and made it 
difficult to secure capital.  In the face of these difficulties, Spanish authorities resisted 
appeals by indigenous leaders and steadfastly maintained an archaic form of 
mercantilism that kept Cuba from expanding its exports and importing cheaper finished 
goods from abroad.  The end of a reciprocity trade agreement with the United States on 
sugar was the final blow that opened the door to revolution.12 
The discontent with and eventual insurrection against Spain witnessed the 
development of three distinct power centers in the Cuban revolution.  Their relations to 
one another, to Spain, and eventually to the United States impacted the course of the war 
and the American occupation that followed.  The theoretical head of the Cuban 
insurrection was the Cuban Provisional Government, also known as the Council of 
Government, which proclaimed the establishment of the Republic of Cuba and adopted a 
constitution on September16, 1895.  The Cuban Junta, headquartered in New York, dealt 
                                                 
12 Healy, The United States in Cuba; Ernest R. May, Imperial Democracy: The Emergence of America as 
a Great Power (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1961); and Louis A. Perez, Cuba Between 
Empires, 1878-1902 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1983). All three of these authors offer a 
detailed account of the buildup to the Spanish-American War and the Cuban revolutions that preceded and 
helped to shape that war. 
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almost exclusively with the United States government and handled the public relations 
campaign designed to enlist American support for Cuban independence.  The junta 
raised funds, purchased supplies, enlisted volunteers, lobbied governmental officials and 
fed sensational stories to the American media that helped to generate the move toward 
intervention.  The Cuban Liberation Army led by Maximo Gomez and controlled 
through various regional leaders constituted the third power center.  By 1898 the Cuban 
Liberation Army and Spanish military forces had reached a stalemate, with the Spanish 
in control of the major towns and the insurgents in control of the countryside.  Due to 
their geographical isolation from one another, the lack of a reliable communication 
system, and to competing interests, the three power centers often worked at cross-
purposes in their efforts to achieve Cuban independence. 
The lack of coordination among the Cubans became starkly apparent when 
President McKinley bowed to growing public and congressional pressure and asked 
Congress for permission to forcibly intervene in Cuba.  After Congress passed the 
declaration of war on April 25, 1898, Estrada Palma, head of the Cuban Junta in New 
York, immediately pledged Cuban support of the American war effort and placed the 
Cuban Liberation Army under American command without consulting either the army or 
the home government.  When the Cuban Provisional Government learned of Palma’s 
actions, it dispatched Vice-President Domingo Mendez Capote to the United States to 
supersede Palma as the ranking Cuban delegate in Washington.  Nevertheless, it 
endorsed his decision and on May 12, 1898, ordered the Liberation Army to submit to 
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American authority.  Consulted by neither Palma nor the home government, Cuban 
military leaders denounced the decision but complied. 
Prior to the declaration of war, McKinley called for 125,000 volunteers to 
supplement the regular army for a possible campaign in Cuba.  As part of the expansion, 
the War Department appointed Wood Colonel and Roosevelt served as the Lieutenant-
Colonel of the First United States Volunteer Cavalry, better known as Roosevelt’s 
Rough Riders.  The American forces sailed from Tampa, Florida on June 14, 1898, and 
cooperated with forces of the Cuban Liberation Army in the Oriente province under 
General Calxto Garcia for an attack on Santiago.  Roosevelt and Wood served together 
throughout the Santiago campaign until the surrender of the Spanish army on July 16, 
1898. 
 
Preventing a Humanitarian Catastrophe 
As the Fifth Corps of the U.S. Army advanced from its landing site at Daiquiri 
toward Santiago de Cuba, the devastation wrought by the war and the depth of the 
humanitarian crisis that threatened to engulf the island became increasingly apparent.  
Almost from the beginning the Fifth Corps struggled with what to do with the refugees 
who flocked to their ranks in search of food and medicine.  The problem intensified 
when the capture of El Caney and the San Juan Heights opened the door for an assault 
on Santiago. With the investment of the city and preparations underway for a prolonged 
siege, a delegation of the British, Portuguese, Chinese and Norwegian consuls asked 
Major General William R. Shafter to postpone the artillery bombardment of the city so 
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they could evacuate between 15,000 and 20,000 people to the town of El Caney.  They 
also petitioned the general to provide the refugees with enough food to survive. Shafter, 
with inadequate docking facilities at Daiquiri and Siboney and a supply train that could 
barely meet the needs of the Fifth Corps, denied the request.  In a telegraphic report to 
the Secretary of War, Shafter expressed his dismay at the situation and submitted the 
matter to the President for review.  He explained the logistical difficulties of supplying a 
town fifteen miles from his landing and  pointed out that the “little town of Caney will 
not hold one thousand people and great suffering will be occasioned to our friends, as we 
must regard the people referred to; and it is now filled with dead and wounded, the dead 
unburied.”13 
Despite Shafter’s inability to assist the refuges and the refusal of the Spanish 
authorities to allow them to evacuate with sufficient food, by the second week of the 
siege an estimated “20,000 starving people” had fled Santiago.14  Conditions in El 
Caney, the destination of many of the refugees, went from bad to worse.  The only 
humanitarian aid came from the Red Cross and a handful of military personal who found 
time to volunteer as the siege and corresponding negotiations between Spain and the 
United States continued.  Frank Norris, a soldier willingly impressed into service with 
the Red Cross, helped to feed close to three thousand starving children on corn mush 
cooked in kettles borrowed from the British consul on the second day of the truce. 
Unfortunately, supplies ran out before all the children could be fed and before any of the 
                                                 
13 William Shafter to Secretary of War [hereafter SecWar], 4 July 1898, in “Report of the Secretary of 
War,” 29 November 1898, 55th Cong, 3d Sess, H. Doc. No. 2, 105-106. 
14 Nelson Miles to SecWar, 13 July 1898, in “Report of the Secretary of War,” 29 November 1898, 118. 
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adults could eat. Norris later wrote that the scenes of depravation haunted him and the 
other volunteers, especially the incessant cry for “comida” that rose from those who 
filled the town square and by the sight of those “in rows double and triple rows, on the 
edge of the square, prone and inert amidst the white bundles of their household effects 
exhausted, listless, stunned and stupefied by the terrific clamor.”15 
As demonstrated by the inability to effectively deal with the refuge problem, the 
United States came to Cuba largely unprepared to handle the humanitarian crisis it found 
there.  Despite Congressional approval on May 18, 1898, to supply “large quantities of 
subsistence stores, ordnance and ordnance stores, medicines and medical supplies, and 
engineer property,” none of the supplies reached Cuba in time for the war effort or the 
early days of the occupation.16  It was not until July 2, 1898, that the Secretary of War 
directed the Commissary-General of Subsistence “to arrange for a supply of food for 
prisoners and indigent citizens that may come under control of Maj. Gen. W.R. Shafter. 
To this end one large ship containing not less than 1,500 tons should be provided at the 
earliest possible day.”17  By that time, the refugee problem had become acute. With the 
surrender of Santiago on July 16, 1898, the United States assumed responsibility for the 
destitute inhabitants of the city and the surrounding countryside.  As Leonard Wood later 
noted to his wife, “The Red Cross has saved the army here; without them thousands 
would have died.”18 
                                                 
15 Frank Norris, “Comida: An Experience in Famine,” Atlantic Monthly 83 (March 1899): 343. 
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18 Leonard Wood to Louise Wood, 20 August 1898, Box 190, Wood Papers. 
  
  19
In addition to the refugee problem, the biggest challenge for the U.S. Army in 
Cuba was the lack of realistic guidance from the McKinley administration on how the 
early occupation should proceed.  On July 18, 1898, McKinley provided the broadest 
possible guidelines to Shafter in the form of an official proclamation intended for 
publication in both English and Spanish.  The proclamation first heralded the end of 
Spanish rule in the conquered territory and asserted the right of the United States to 
govern.  It then assured the Cubans that “the inhabitants, so long as they perform their 
duties, are entitled to security in their persons and property, and in all their private rights 
and relations.”19  “Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and 
supreme,” McKinley promised, the United States would rule through the existing 
municipal laws and legal structure, including the local constabularies and judges.20  
Although these could be “suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent … in 
practice they are not usually abrogated but are allowed to remain in force.”21  The rights 
of the Cubans and the structure of their local governments would only be altered if it 
became necessary to insure that law and order prevailed.  
As indicated by his proclamation, McKinley initially assumed that a military 
occupation would occur with only a minimal of interference at the local level.  The 
United States would, for a time, simply replace Spain at the top of the governmental 
structure and the existing insular government would continue to function under 
American auspices.  Shafter operated under the same assumption as McKinley.  As he 
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reported to the War Department: “In taking charge of the civil government, all officials 
who were willing to serve were retained in office and the established order of 
government was preserved as far as consistent with the necessities of military rule.”22  
When Shafter ordered Wood, recently commissioned a brigadier general in the 
Volunteer establishment, to take charge of the city on July 20, 1898, his instructions to 
“see that order and quiet are observed against all disturbers of the peace, and prevent no 
armed men to enter the city except such of our own men as come on duty,” mirrored 
those of his commander in chief and limited the occupations role to merely keeping law 
and order.23  
McKinley and Shafter’s vision of a limited occupation proved unrealistic in the 
immediate aftermath of the war as it underestimated the devastation and overestimated 
the ability of the local government to handle the crisis.  The problem in Santiago was far 
larger than simply maintaining the peace. As Ray Stannard Baker later described the 
situation for McClure’s Magazine in 1900: 
 
Santiago was thronged with starving and destitute people; it was agitated 
by the disbanding Spanish army, and surrounded without by 
undisciplined hordes of Cubans. There were 15,000 sick in a population 
of 50,000 and people were dying at the rate of 200 a day.  The streets 
were knee-deep in mud and filth, and thousands of dead animals festered 
in the areaways, so that the air above was black with buzzards.  Of 
government and police there were none, or of courts or schools. The jails 
were choked with prisoners, the hospitals were full, and, to cap the sum 
of woe, yellow fever was raging.24 
 
                                                 
22 “Report of the Major General Commanding the Army,” 5 November 1898, 55th Cong, 3d Sess, H. Doc. 
No. 2, 159. 
23 E.J. McClenland to Leonard Wood, 20 July 1898, Box 26, Wood Papers. 
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These problems proved too much for the local Cuban government, which already 
suffered under several handicaps.  The previous Spanish regime and the insular elites 
had viewed local government offices as a way of rewarding political support rather than 
as a position for effective government.  Thus, despite the excessive number of 
officeholders, few proved useful in the early day of the occupation.  Shafter found it 
necessary to pare their numbers to cut costs and Wood, once he became military 
governor of Santiago, either ignored or replaced them.25  In addition, these initial 
officeholders, often carry-overs from the hated Spanish administration, had little 
legitimacy with the Cuban people and often incited hostility rather than inspiring law 
and order.  Even had the Cuban officeholders been effective, the extent of the needs of 
the Cuban people overwhelmed the limited resources available to the local government 
and left local officials powerless.  For these reasons the task of governance fell entirely 
upon the U.S. Army. 
Wood accepted the responsibility and plunged enthusiastically into the work of 
revitalizing Santiago.  The office of military governor soon became the central civil and 
military authority for the city and eventually the province.  To prevent the widespread 
loss of life and the further devastation of the Cuban population, Wood abandoned the 
limited role envisioned my McKinley and Shafter and took the occupation government 
into the void created by the collapse of the local government and the economy to provide 
basic necessities to the residents of the city.   
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The first work undertaken was feeding the starving, taking care of the 
sick, cleaning up and removing the dangerous material in the city. In 
addition to correcting these local conditions, it was necessary to send 
food and medicine throughout the province, maintain order, re-establish 
municipal governments, reorganize the courts, and do the thousand and 
one things incident to re-establishing the semblance of government in a 
stricken and demoralized community.26 
 
 
Rather than simply a matter of just keeping the peace, Wood had to find and distribute 
food and clean water, provide medical care, “cleanse” the city and institute basic 
sanitation practices to prevent any further epidemic, and dispose of the dead. 
In the pursuit of these goals, Wood also abandoned McKinley’s assertion that the 
U.S. would rule through the established laws and civil office holders and began to issue 
a long stream of directives from the office of military governor.  As he wrote at the time, 
“all law here is subordinate to the military and all kinds of work come under my 
supervision.”27  Operating under these premises, he took control of the police, the 
prisons, the hospitals, and even charitable institutions.  He appointed Major George M. 
Barbour to supervise the process of street cleaning and sanitation.28  He also ignored 
McKinley’s guarantee of the personal and property rights and commandeered all 
serviceable vehicles to remove garbage and dead animals from the streets and to 
transport the human dead east of the city where they were stacked and burned.  To 
prevent an epidemic, he mobilized local doctors and organized sanitation squads to 
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perform house to house inspections.  The squads kicked in the doors of homeowners 
who resisted the intrusion and forcibly sanitized those dwellings.  They filled in polluted 
cisterns and removed garbage and debris.  To assist these squads, Wood mobilized the 
citizenry and used public punishment, including the lash, to enforce sanitation and 
compliance.  As Robert Porter, McKinley’s special envoy to Cuba reported: 
 
The resistance on the part of the native population [to sanitation 
measures] was even more stubborn than that of the Spanish soldiers to 
our forces around Santiago.  The doors of houses had to be smashed in; 
people making sewers of the thoroughfares were publicly horsewhipped 
in the streets of Santiago; eminently respectable citizens were forcibly 
brought before the commanding general [Wood] and sentenced to aid in 
cleaning the streets they were in habit of defiling.  The campaign has 
ended in the complete surrender to the sanitary authorities and the 
inhabitants of Santiago, regardless of class, have had their first object-
lesson in the new order of things inaugurated by the war.29 
 
 
When the crews on some of the transports in the harbor threatened to mutiny, Wood 
ordered them “put in irons and kept on bread and water, etc.”30 Although Wood 
exceeded what McKinley and Shafter had in mind, they made no effort to rein him. 
To feed the starving population, Wood eventually divided the city into districts 
and established a food distribution station in each.  For supplies he relied upon the 
provisions captured from the Spanish army, from those increasingly provided by the 
U.S. Army, from aid shipments from the United States, and from what the Red Cross 
and some of the foreign consuls contributed.  As the Spanish army gradually withdrew 
from the province to their ports of disembarkation, the U.S. Army extended their control 
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into the interior.  To aid the Cubans in the province, Wood organized pack trains 
containing food and medicine and sent them into the countryside.  He also organized a 
committee of reliable citizens in each ward of the city to conduct house visits to make 
sure everyone had enough food to eat.  By September, when the crisis had finally ebbed, 
the military government issued about ten thousand rations a day and three thousands 
pounds of fresh beef.31 
From the initial planning stage for offensive operations in Cuba, fear of an 
epidemic from yellow fever or some other tropical disease dominated the thoughts of the 
Fifth Army Corps and many of the political leaders in Washington.  Although later 
experiments conducted by the army and the military government of Cuba proved that the 
mosquito transmitted yellow fever, medical experts knew little about how to prevent the 
disease at the time.  Then accepted medical knowledge attributed the spread of the 
disease to microbes and prescribed various sanitation measures to stamp it out.  With the 
advance to Santiago, the number of yellow fever patients increased and Shafter grew 
increasingly concerned.  The day after the surrender of Santiago, the War Department 
ordered him to adopt radical measures designed to stave off an epidemic: 
 
immediate isolation of those affected by the disease of yellow fever from 
the commands; … frequent change of camp, and in all cases the selection 
of fresh ground, uncontaminated with the disease, … the command must 
be kept away from all habitations, blockhouses, huts, and shanties of 
every description that have been occupied by Spanish or Cuban people; 
… the establishment of guards and a rigid quarantine, to keep all native 
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or Spanish inhabitants out of any of the camps and away from any 
intercourse of whatever description with the troops.32 
 
 
In addition to these measures, the War Department urged Shafter to transfer the bulk of 
his command to the mountains above what many at the time erroneously considered the 
“fever belt.”  
When these measures failed to arrest the spread of yellow fever, several officers 
in Cuba decided to write a letter to Secretary of War Russell A. Alger expressing in no 
uncertain terms the precarious situation.  Too weakened to move to the high ground, 
they demanded the troops be evacuated to the United States.  The War Department, 
afraid that such a move would bring the epidemic to American shores, had hesitated.  
The officers wanted to force the War Department to proceed and at their urging, Wood 
dictated what became known as the “Round Robin” and presented it to Shafter.  
However, before it reached the War Department, someone leaked the Round Robin and a 
letter from Colonel Roosevelt to the press.  The leak caused a national sensation that 
embarrassed the War Department and forced the evacuation.  Immediately, everyone 
involved began to obfuscate their role in the affair.  Wood and Roosevelt attributed the 
leak to Shafter. Shafter implied that the leak occurred prior to the letters reaching his 
desk and stated that he considered the whole affair overblown.  Wood’s fellow officers 
placed the responsibility for the language of the draft on him while he contended that it 
was a group effort and had met with everyone’s approval.  However, regardless of 
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ultimate responsibility, the fact remains that the situation appeared so dire that army 
officers risked their careers to push for an evacuation of the Fifth Corps. 
In response to these fears, Wood made excellent use of his medical training and, 
by the time of the “Round Robin,” had already launched the systematic sanitation 
program he hoped would eradicate the disease from Santiago and thus prevent the highly 
anticipated loss of life among the occupying forces.  Initially Wood believed his task 
would take two weeks, but it was two months before he wrote to Lou that the “old town 
is at last clean and we are down so to speak to modern dirt which while not attractive is 
of a less offensive character than that of 1520.”33 
Although the adopted measures stamped out individual cases and prevented an 
epidemic of yellow fever in the city, the situation in the hospitals proved grim enough as 
the effects of others diseases, starvation, and poor sanitation took their toll on the 
population.  On August 20, 1898 Wood wrote, “the conditions here are something 
frightful, and in the civil hospital … crowded.  Small children may be seen any day 
striving to waken their mother already dead or dying.  The amount of work is very great 
and very trying.”34  A delegation of twelve nuns from a nursing order, offered to help, he 
sent them to the Civil Hospital where they worked for one night and then promptly left 
the next day.35  
Wood’s energy and managerial ability gradually improved conditions, as did the 
cessation of hostilities between the United States and Spain.  Santiago began to receive a 
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steady supply of food and together with improved sanitation, the crisis passed by mid-
September. Wood and the Army now began to shift to long range planning for Cuba.  
The military nature of the occupation also changed as the combat elements of the Fifth 
Corps and the defeated Spanish army, numbering 22,864, departed from the island.  The 
Fifth Corps embarked for their isolation camps in the United States from August 4 to 25 
and the War Department replaced them with new occupation troops.  The United States 
also provided transportation for the removal of Spanish prisoners from August 9 until 
September 17, 1898.  Upon Shafter’s recommendation, Wood remained in charge of 
Santiago.  Wood’s old Apache campaign friend, now promoted to a Volunteer major 
general, Henry W. Lawton took command of the District of Santiago.  Shafter wrote to 
the War Department that “General Wood is by far the best man to leave in command of 
this Post and perhaps the whole district. If he is not to have the entire command I would 
suggest Lawton as the only other man here in very way equipped for the position.”36  
With the war over, the humanitarian crisis adverted, and the postwar occupation taking 
shape, the United States began to face squarely the question of what to do with Cuba. 
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CHAPTER III 
PROGRESSIVE IMPERIALISM:  THE SANTIAGO MODEL 
 
The American occupation of Cuba lasted from July 17, 1898, until the United States 
transferred control to the newly elected Cuban government under President Estrada 
Palma on May 20, 1902.  In the immediate aftermath of the American intervention, 
policymakers in Washington and within the occupational government deliberated over 
how to proceed with the occupation.  Minimalists embraced the initial strategy endorsed 
by President McKinley in his official proclamation and envisioned a U.S. occupation 
with only a nominal amount of interference by the U.S. government beyond the insular 
level.  They preferred to leave the transformation of Cuba to the private sector and only 
sought to provide a stable insular government that would attract outside capital.  
Progressives supported the policies of Leonard Wood and wanted a more activist role in 
which the U.S. Army – through the office of military governor – fundamentally reshaped 
Cuba in accordance with progressive principles as a prerequisite for independence.  
During the first year and a half, July 17, 1898 to December 20, 1899, proponents of the 
two strategies competed for control over occupation policy and for the support of the 
administration. 
The American occupation of Cuba went through three distinct periods.  The 
initial phase of occupation, July 17, 1898 to January 1, 1899, witnessed the divergence 
between the minimalist approach espoused by Washington and the activist approach 
pursued by Wood in Santiago.  After his initial proclamation, McKinley did little to 
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interfere with the actual occupation and instead focused on the pressing geopolitical 
questions raised by the victory in the Spanish-American War and the new status of the 
United States as a world power.  Wood considered the absence of direct oversight an 
opportunity to push his progressive reforms and to persuade the administration to adopt 
his course of action when the U.S. Army assumed complete control of the island on 
January 1, 1899.  The debate over strategy lasted until McKinley’s appointment of Major 
General John R. Brooke as military governor seemingly settled the question in favor of 
the minimalists.  However, Brooke proved unable to rein in his subordinates and lost 
control of the direction of occupation policy by June 1899.  When it became clear that 
his administration would not produce a free, independent, and self-governed Cuba or 
even chart a potential path to that objective, the McKinley administration reversed 
course and adopted the progressive model. The appointment of Elihu Root as Secretary 
of War and his elevation of Wood to the position of military governor on December 20, 
1899, initiated the third and final phase of the U.S. occupation.37 
 
Geopolitical Considerations 
Although the United States declared war upon Spain for the sole purpose of 
liberating Cuba, combat operations against Spanish forces soon spread from Cuba to 
Puerto Rico and eventually beyond the Caribbean to the Philippines in the Far East.  The 
rapid and unexpected expansion of the war and the subsequent transformation of the 
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United States from a regional to a global power generated large and unexpected 
geopolitical and domestic challenges that impacted American policy toward Cuba.  Most 
of the pressing challenges for the administration stemmed from the extension of the 
conflict into the Philippine archipelago where the defeat of the Spanish brought 
questions as to the future of the Philippines and the role the United States would play in 
that region.38 
While combat operations in Cuba effectively ended with the surrender of the 
Spanish army on July 16, 1898, operations in the Philippians continued until the fall of 
Manila on August 13.  Even then the potential for conflict remained as the United States 
and their former allies, the Filipino nationalists led by Emilio Aguinaldo, maintained an 
uneasy truce while the latter waited for the McKinley administration to make its position 
clear on the future of the Philippines.  According to Brian McAllister Linn, “McKinley 
was persuaded that abandoning the islands would result in internecine war and draw the 
imperialist powers into a potentially explosive struggle.” 39  Concerned over such a 
conflict and with its national interest clearly on its mind, the United States went to the 
Paris Peace Conference intent on retaining control over the Philippines.  The Philippine 
nationalists, unwilling to trade one colonial master for another, soon challenged 
American authority.  On February 4, 1899, an American outpost and a Filipino patrol 
clashed on the outskirts of Manila.  The altercation launched the Philippine War, which 
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lasted until the Roosevelt Administration declared victory on July 4, 1902.  Regional 
pacification campaigns dragged on until 1913. 
At the Paris Peace Conference, which lasted from October 1 to December 10, 
1898, two major issues dominated the deliberations: the status of the Philippines and 
responsibility for the Cuban debt.  Although the United States, the undisputed victor, had 
little problem officially ratifying its control over the Philippines, the Spanish proved 
more determined on the issue of Cuban debt.  A construct of Spanish imperial 
accounting, the Cuban debt included the expense of the Spanish civil administration and 
military forces in Cuba, part of the expenditure of transporting Spanish officials to and 
from the island, and on occasion the cost of lifetime pensions for those officials, their 
widows and their daughters.40  The debt also incorporated the cost entailed by Spain in 
suppressing previous Cuban revolts and independence movements in Mexico, San 
Domingo, and Peru.  Spain had long held its Cuban colony responsible for these debts, 
estimated at over $500,000,000.  After the cessation of hostilities, Spain wanted the 
United States to assume responsibility for the debt or to at least guarantee Cuban 
responsibility.  To the dismay of the Spanish delegation, American representatives 
steadfastly refused either to accept that responsibility or to saddle it on any future Cuban 
government.  In compensation, and to also lessen the loss of the Philippines, the United 
States agreed to pay Spain $20,000,000.  The Senate of the United States, after much 
debate over the acquisition of the Philippines, approved the Treaty of Paris by a vote of 
57 to 27 on February 6, 1899. 
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The Emergence of Leonard Wood 
As the McKinley administration and the War Department grappled with the 
larger challenges it faced in the aftermath of the war, responsibility for the direction of 
the occupation in Santiago increasingly descended upon the U.S. Army.  Surprisingly, 
Wood, who only a couple of months earlier had been a little known captain, emerged as 
an early architect of American occupation policy.  After the postwar humanitarian crisis 
had passed, Wood did not return to the minimalist position of McKinley but instead 
boldly ignored official policy and pressed his progressive agenda forward.  That a doctor 
from the U.S. Army’s Medical Department, scheduled to revert back to his prewar rank 
with the official end of hostilities, became a leading voice on occupation policy spoke 
volumes about the preoccupation of the administration with other issues and about 
Wood. 
A controversial figure throughout his military career, Wood inspired intense 
devotion among his supporters and an equally passionate dislike, bordering on hatred, 
from his detractors.  He collected both friends and foes with equal rapidity.  As a 
commanding officer, he actively mentored junior officers who showed aptitude and 
promise and eventually assembled a team of imperial minded protégés whom he relied 
upon in both Cuba and the Philippines.  After his death, these officers eulogized their 
chief and sought to honor and protect his memory and service.  They regarded him not 
only as a senior officer but as a father figure and a patron who took a dynamic interest in 
their career and advancement.  Frank McCoy, the best example of this cadre of young 
officers, served with Wood in both Cuba and the Philippines and eventually rose to the 
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rank of major general.  He married Wood’s daughter, collaborated with Hagedorn on his 
biography of Wood, and was buried next to the general in Arlington National Cemetery.  
On the other extreme, Wood also made substantial enemies who dogged his career and 
often threatened to rain ruin down upon his head.  Powerful enemies from his days of 
imperial service included John Brooke, James Wilson, Joseph H. Dorst, and Senator 
Mark Hanna.  Ironically, Wood’s ability to engender such hatred rose from the same 
character traits and leadership style that endeared him to others. 
Wood had a strong, forceful personality and a high degree of innate talent when 
it came to leadership and organization.  These talents brought success and gave him 
confidence and the capacity to work without direct supervision.  His ability to quickly 
grasp the essentials of most situations and to conceive and organize an appropriate 
response made him a powerful administrator and a force to be reckoned with in the early 
days of occupation.  He liked to see things for himself and frequently traveled 
throughout his command to observe situations first hand and to access local leadership 
and resources.   
Along with the confidence came great ambitions and a desire for advancement 
and recognition, which he relentlessly pursued regardless of the personal costs.  Ray 
Stannard Baker, a reporter for McClure’s Magazine, characterized Wood as “a man 
always ready for the opportunity.”41  He enjoyed military service and turned down 
several lucrative business opportunities to remain in the army.  He spent long periods of 
time away from his family and the comforts of civilization in some of the most grueling 
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military posts imaginable.   Without any formal training in the military arts, he became 
an intense student of the subject while still keeping abreast of developments in the 
medical field.  He studied the native languages of the places he served and encouraged 
his subordinates to do the same.  On the way to his command in the Philippines, he made 
a careful study of European colonial rule.  Wood also prided himself on being able to 
perform the same physical regimen he demanded of his command.  He possessed 
remarkable physical strength and enormous powers of endurance, as he had proven 
during the Geronimo campaign.  He could work long hours in the tropics, withstand the 
ravages of disease, and persevere against almost overwhelming odds. 
Wood also held strong convictions, which governed his conduct and reinforced 
his domineering personality.  Committed to the progressive ethos, he believed in the 
active use of government for the betterment of society.  He took pride in the United 
States and its mission, according to the expansionists, to bring civilization to the 
uncivilized.  He especially gloried in his role within that mission.  In many ways, Wood 
modeled his administration after an enlightened despotism.  By right of conquest, the 
United States held absolute power in the island and the military governor, as the direct 
representative of the United States, exercised that power to the benefit of the people, 
whether or not the people agreed.  He considered those who did not agree as either 
ignorant children who had to be taught or corrupt scoundrels who had to be disciplined.  
He adopted the progressive model of a rule by experts and surrounded himself mostly 
with younger officers possessing specific expertise or talents and delegated to them the 
important tasks of the administration.  They reported directly to him and he maintained 
  
  35
overall supervision of the government.  Those who disagreed substantially with Wood 
and did not show proper loyalty found themselves excluded from power or replaced.  
Although often insubordinate and disloyal himself, he could not tolerate even the hint of 
insubordination or disloyalty in others. 
Wood’s confidence in his own ability and in his personal convictions about the 
right course to follow often led him to exceed his orders and to act independently.  If his 
immediate superior circumscribed his field of action or stifled his pursuit of what he 
considered the proper course, then Wood did not hesitate to circumvent the chain of 
command and appeal to a higher authority.  He made powerful political friends 
throughout his career and he willingly appealed to those friends to push his agenda and 
to overcome obstacles in his way.  If Baker considered Wood “ready for the 
opportunity,” many considered him a ruthless and treacherous opportunist bent upon 
advancing his own career. 
During the first few months of the occupation, Wood received a free hand from 
Shafter and functioned almost autonomously in matters involving the revitalization of 
the city of Santiago.  All of that changed however when the 5th Corps began to evacuate 
from Cuba.  In General Order 118, issued on August 10, 1898, the War Department 
created the Department of Santiago and placed Major General Henry Lawton in charge.  
The War Department left the command of the city of Santiago to Wood, who operated 
under the supervision of the department commander.  Initially, the two former comrades 
got along fine as their respective duties and responsibilities were distinct from one 
another.  On September 21, 1898, Lawton even appointed Wood as the Civil Governor 
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of the province.  However, as the initial crisis passed and Wood continued to press his 
progressive reforms, especially the costly public works projects, Lawton began to balk at 
their cost and refused to approve many of the expenses.  Wood, dependent on the custom 
duties that Lawton controlled, wrote to Lou that “Lawton is simply an obstructionist.”42  
The two seemed to be headed toward a potential showdown over occupation policy. 
The clash never came because Lawton, always a heavy drinker, went on a six-
day drunken tear through the city of Santiago.  In the process, he made a public spectacle 
of himself, assaulted the chief of police and destroyed private property.  A reporter from 
The New York Evening Sun witnessed the incident and reported it to the editor, William 
Laffan.  Laffan, aware that the matter would embarrass the administration and end 
Lawton’s career, graciously chose not to print the story but instead passed it on to 
McKinley.  McKinley quietly relieved Lawton as department commander but took no 
further disciplinary action.43  Instead he brought Lawton back to the United States, 
praised him publicly for his work, and then sent him to his next assignment in the 
Philippines.  Although Wood, who McKinley appointed to replace Lawton, advanced 
because of Lawton’s drunkenness, he played no part in the event and expressed serious 
concerns about his old friend.  As he told Mrs. Wood, 
 
Lawton, poor chap, leaves tomorrow morning on steamer for N.Y.  
Ordered home on 60 days’ leave as a result of his little spree.  I don’t 
know that I have felt worse.  He has done so well down here and poor 
little Mrs. Lawton was on her way east to meet some friends coming 
down and all this will be such a shock to her.  Of course there is no 
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excuse for Lawton’s going off in this way but he was disgusted at 
several getting recommendations for promotion before him and let go.  
Of course it is a great thing for me but I don’t want a rise at poor old L. 
expense but do want to hang onto the command here as it gives one a 
great chance.44 
 
 
Allegations that Wood betrayed his friend for advancement dogged the general for years 
and provided more fuel for his detractors.  The fact that Lawton soon died in combat in 
the Philippines only made Wood’s alleged betrayal worse. 
 
Progressive Imperialism – The Vision of Leonard Wood 
Wood pursued a progressive imperialism in Santiago because he felt that 
fundamental changes had to occur within Cuba before it could prosper and survive as an 
independent nation.  As Wood saw it, if a paternalistic military government gave the 
Cubans the example of good and efficient government, provided the framework for 
democracy, and elevated the standard of living through improved public health and 
sanitation, public education, and economic development, then a stable functioning 
democracy would emerge and all rational Cubans would embrace and sustain it.  Imbued 
with such a vision Wood worked for the next year and a half to construct an 
occupational government and implement a series of vigorous reforms designed to make 
Santiago a model for all of Cuba.  Although Wood encountered strong opposition once 
Brooke assumed the office of military governor, he consistently labored to make his 
progressive vision for Santiago a reality. 
                                                 
44 Leonard Wood to Louise Wood, 11 October 1898, Box 190, Wood Papers. 
  
  38
As the foundation of his progressive plan for the rehabilitation of the province, 
Wood envisioned a large and systematic program of public works.  Immensely valuable 
in its own right, public work projects under Wood’s direction advanced all of his major 
policy areas.  Initial projects centered on relieving the humanitarian crisis caused by the 
war and dealt with basic matters of sanitation and public health.  These projects provided 
jobs for the destitute and gave them a sense of purpose and ownership in the 
rehabilitation of the province.  After the initial crisis had passed, Wood expanded his 
projects to include road construction and harbor improvements.  Although the immediate 
relief of unemployment continued as a goal, Wood’s long term vision saw infrastructure 
improvements as raising the standard of living and preparing the way for future 
economic prosperity and the creation of private sector jobs.  In short, Wood considered 
public work projects the primary tool for rehabilitating the island and for relieving 
destitution among the Cubans.45 
Due to the destructive nature of the Spanish-Cuban War, the first problem the 
military government encountered, whether in the city of Santiago or the smaller towns, 
always dealt with issues of sanitation, famine, and public health.  During the conflict, in 
an attempt to deny resources to the other side, both Cuban and Spanish forces destroyed 
rural farmlands and much of the existing infrastructure.  For personal safety and to attain 
the basic necessities of life, most of the rural population moved to the cities.  Once in the 
cities, the refugees overwhelmed the limited amount of medicine, food, and water 
available.  The War Department’s 1899 report noted that Cubans were living in 
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overcrowded conditions without the infrastructure needed for proper sanitation and with 
none “of the precautions against disease known to modern sanitary science.” 46  Disease 
soon became rampant and along with malnutrition began to claim a heavy toll.  By the 
time of the American intervention, most of the cities and larger towns mirrored the 
conditions the army had found in Santiago.  As the American occupation extended its 
control into the province, Wood repeated the steps he had previously taken to relieve the 
humanitarian crisis. 
The situation found in the city of Holguin when the U.S. Army took possession 
of it from the Cubans proved typical.  Under Spanish control, a smallpox epidemic had 
raged within the city and the surrounding countryside for over three years.47  The 
Holquin district had 9,000 reported cases of smallpox with 3,000 of a “virulent type.”48  
Wood sent elements of the Second U.S. Volunteer Infantry into the region to establish an 
American presence there and to assist the local population.  They established a large 
isolation hospital and immediately began the process of cleansing the city and providing 
for basic sanitation.  As in Santiago the whole process took around two months to 
complete.  As Wood reported to the War Department, the “work they were called upon 
to perform was arduous and dangerous.  ….  So complete was the infection that many of 
the houses had to be burned.  The exact loss of life among the natives will never be 
known, but it must have amounted to a thousand or more, as in some instances entire 
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villages were depopulated.”49  Due to the precautions taken by the medical authorities, 
who had vaccinated the troops twice, the Americans did not experience a single case of 
small pox even though their duty required them to work closely with infected villagers.50   
The U.S. Army found similar conditions in cities like Manzanillo and throughout 
the entire province of Santiago.  Alger concluded in the War Department’s annual 
report:  “The sanitary condition of all cities of this province is simply terrible, and a 
great amount of work and expenditure of much money will be necessary to make them 
habitable.”51  In the city of Santiago alone, the continued maintenance of proper 
sanitation required draconian punishment, including the use of a horsewhip on offenders.  
Individuals who violated the sanitation codes, and escaped corporal punishment, often 
found themselves sentenced by the governor to thirty days of hard labor cleaning the 
streets. 52  George Barbour, Sanitary Commissioner for the city, regularly employed 125 
men and 32 sturdy carts pulled by a team of mules to keep the streets clean.53  To 
dispose of the refuge collected by his workers, Barbour had it taken to the outskirts of 
the city where they doused it with petroleum and burned it.   
When the United States assumed control of the whole island in January 1899, the 
U.S. Army adopted the methods first utilized by Wood and invested time and energy 
into exploring proactive methods to prevent and eventually eradicate tropical diseases 
rather than just responding to an outbreak.  In Santiago, Wood proposed measures to 
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increase the supply of fresh water for the city and to dredge the waterfront.  He wrote to 
McKinley: 
 
I believe, [the waterfront is] the focus of most of the fevers, and 
especially of the Yellow Fever in Santiago, as it is composed almost 
entirely of the washing of the city during the past three hundred years, 
and has formed a great mass of bank of corruption, which is exposed at 
low tide and must be most unhealthy and dangerous.  It has been 
impossible to touch this during hot weather, as any stirring it up would 
result in an immediate outbreak of Yellow Fever; but his winter I intend 
to remove it with the use of suction dredges and scows and dump it way 
out to sea in deep water.54 
 
 
In the annual Report of the Secretary of War, his assessment of the situation in Cuba and 
the steps to be taken there mirrored the recommendation of Wood in Santiago: 
 
The sanitary conditions of the cities and towns throughout the island 
were found to be as bad as it is possible to conceive.  Through and 
systematic inspections were made, sanitary corps were organized, streets 
were cleaned, sewers were opened, cesspools and sinks were emptied, 
public and private buildings were disinfected, methods of disposing of 
refuse were adopted, water supplies were improved, and rules were 
established and enforced to prevent a recurrence of similar conditions.  
In the larger cities a thoroughly good sanitary condition will require the 
establishment of grades, the construction of adequate sewer systems, and 
increase of water supplies.55 
 
 
In the first six month of 1899 alone, the occupation government spent, from the customs 
revenue of the island, $1,712,014 on sanitation and $293,881 on charities and 
hospitals.56  When Wood became military governor at the end of 1899, the scope of 
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sanitation projects increased and included efforts like the yellow fever commission that 
eventually led to the virtual eradication of that disease from the island. 
The sanitation efforts pursued by the United States were not entirely altruistic.  
The War Department, U.S. Army field commanders in Cuba, and the McKinley 
administration all acknowledged that sanitary reform and the eradication of disease in 
the island benefited Americans in Cuba and the continental United States.57  The 5th 
Corps, the initial American invasion force, had suffered heavily from yellow fever and 
other diseases at all levels of command.  At one time or another, Shafter, General Joseph 
Wheeler, Lawton, and Wood all suffered from yellow fever.  Regular troopers, often 
bivouacked in the tropics with nothing more than a tent between them and the elements 
or quartered in infected barracks that once housed the Spanish, suffered even more.  
Improved sanitation on the island lowered the attrition rate in the occupation force and 
made it possible for the army to extend its control throughout the island.   It made the 
island safer for foreign investors and even brought economic benefits to the southern 
portion of the United States, which had almost yearly suffered from yellow fever 
epidemics originating in a Cuban port.  Robert Porter, McKinley’s special envoy to 
Cuba, argued: 
 
Not only the commercial prosperity of Cuba, but to a considerable extent 
that of the southern portion of the United States depends upon the 
possibility of destroying the foci of yellow fever which exist in the 
larger cities and towns – especially in Havana and Matanzas – and 
which have been the cause of the epidemics of this disease which have 
occurred in the United States during the present century.  It is believed 
that to destroy these germs is possible, and from a mere industrial and 
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commercial point of view it would be a paying investment to spend 
several millions of dollars, if necessary, to effect it.58 
 
 
Along with their efforts to improve sanitation and public health, the U.S. Army 
found it necessary to issue rations to the Cubans to prevent malnutrition and even 
starvation.  The war had destroyed or curtailed the cultivation of most native sources of 
food.  Shortly after the occupation began, the army established distribution centers 
within each city and throughout the province and simply handed out all available rations 
to the population.  As organization and the amount of food increased, distribution 
became more systematic.  General Order No. 110 standardized the typical ration at “8 
ounces of bacon; 12 ounces flour, or ounces corn meal; and to 100 rations:  6 pounds 
coffee (green), 10 pounds sugar, 2 quarts vinegar, 4 pounds salt, 4 ounces pepper, 4 
pounds soap.”59  As public work projects got underway, the U.S. Army made 
participation in those projects a prerequisite for receiving rations and ordered that “all 
able-bodied me needing food will be given work, as soon as practicable, on the repair of 
roads and sanitary and other public works.”60  Governor Brooke’s even ordered that men 
“who are offered work and refuse to work should not be fed.”61  Originally adopted as a 
temporary necessity, the extent of wartime devastation on Cuban agriculture and the lack 
of economic development in the island forced the United States to supply rations to the 
Cubans for more than a year.  Not until November 1899 could the U.S. Army cease 
issuing rations to the general population and confine their distribution to hospitals and 
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asylums.  All total, in the first year and a half of occupation, the army had issued 
5,493,000 rations at a cost of $1,417,554.62  While rations, sanitation, and public health 
measures brought a needed stability to Cuba, the occupation government sought to move 
from stability to self-sufficiency. 
One of the most pressing problems encountered by American forces as it 
consolidated control over Santiago and moved into the interior, involved what to do with 
the Cuban Liberation Army, which numbered close to 11,000 in the province with about 
5,000 stationed around the city of Santiago.63  The Cuban Liberation Army had worked 
closely with the U.S. Army since the start of the American intervention and, despite 
some disagreements and recriminations on both sides, the spirit of cooperation held 
beyond the ceasefire with the Spanish.  Much of the credit for the cooperation goes to 
General Calixto Garcia, who as commander of the Oriente province (Santiago) assisted 
Shafter and the 5th Corps in its campaign against the Spanish.  Garcia and the forces 
under his command later acted as an unofficial auxiliary of the U.S. Army by securing 
the countryside as Spanish forces relinquished control and moved toward their point of 
embarkation.64   
In filling the vacuum created by the departure of the Spanish, the Cuban 
Liberation Army performed an important service by keeping the province from 
descending any further into chaos; however, it complicated the expanding American 
occupation because it left the Cubans in control of many of the towns and cities.  The 
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existence of an organized and well led army, skilled in guerrilla warfare and in control of 
most of the municipalities in Santiago province, caused concern for the American 
occupation force.  Relations between the two forces were delicate at best and a serious 
misstep could lead to conflict.  Although the United States had promised Cuban 
independence, doubts still lingered among the Cubans, especially as the Americans 
showed no signs of following the Spanish in withdrawing from the island.  A similar 
situation in the Philippines led to the bloody insurrection that took the United States 
government almost three years to suppress.  The U.S. Army command in Santiago, 
aware of the potential danger, stayed in close contact with Washington as it searched for 
a proper solution.   
The McKinley administration, with Lawton and Wood playing the lead role on 
the ground, eventually solved the impasse through skillful diplomacy and by exploiting 
conditions in the province.  While reassuring the Cubans that an American occupation 
would be a short one, Lawton and Wood appealed to the members of the Cuban 
Liberation Army on several levels.  To Cuban soldiers, often suffering from privations in 
their encampments, they offered employment and provisions if they would lay down 
their arms, peacefully disband, and return to their homes.  To many of the officers and 
commanders they offered positions within the occupation government and in the various 
municipal governments being reorganized at the time by Wood.  The strategy worked 
and, on September 27, 1898, Lawton informed Washington that he had successfully 
recruited Garcia to the American cause and appointed him to the board of directors of 
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the Cuban Educational Association with a modest salary.  By the end of October 1898, 
the Cuban Liberation Army in the province of Santiago ceased to exist.65 
Many of the soldiers unwilling or unable to return to more peaceful pursuits 
joined the local civilian police force or the newly formed Rural Guard, a mounted police 
force designed to function in the countryside.  Wood created the Rural Guard to extend 
the reach of the occupation government into the interior, to curb brigandage and robbery, 
and to quell any potential opposition to the occupation.  Eventually composed of 
between 250 and 300 officers and men, who were, according to Wood, “carefully 
selected from the best material in the Cuban Army,” the guard functioned as a 
paramilitary force with their own uniforms and insignia.66  They reported directly to the 
military government and received $36 a month in gold for their service.67  The guard 
proved so effective that by August 1899 Wood informed the Secretary of War that “all 
sections of the country being reported quiet and practically free from these lawbreakers 
[brigands].”68 
The assistance of the Cuban Liberation Army and the Rural Guard gave the 
United States the time needed to organize the occupation beyond Santiago and to 
mobilize the men and resources necessary to carry it out.  To accomplish the task, the 
War Department organized the occupation force along two theoretical lines – military 
and civil.  The military occupation focused almost exclusively on issues relating to the 
use and maintenance of American armed forces in Cuba, namely the proper deployment, 
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housing, and provisioning of army personnel, matters of defense from external threat, 
and issues of internal control and stability.  The civil occupation focused on restoring 
order and preparing the island for self-government and independence.  The breadth and 
depth of what that entailed depended upon whether a minimalist or progressive held the 
reins of power at the time.  Nonetheless, despite the formal separation, the distinction 
between the military and civil sphere was more imagined than real.  In regards to insular 
affairs, the United States combined both civil and military functions into the office of the 
district commander, departmental (province) commanders, and military governor for the 
whole island.  Officers and enlisted personnel, drawn from the forces assigned to 
occupation, often served in both a civil and military capacity.  While the degree of 
separation between military and civil affairs increased as the United States moved 
toward granting Cuban independence, the U.S. Army remained the final authority on all 
policy decisions. 
In Santiago Wood divided the province into five administrative districts along 
basically the same lines as the Spanish.  These districts included Santiago under Wood’s 
direct control, Manzanillo under Colonel S.M. Whitside of the 10th Cavalry, Holguin 
under Major J.L. Fowler of the 10th Cavalry, Guantanamo under Lieutenant Colonel M. 
Hooton, 5th Infantry, and Mayari under Major T. F. Forbes of the 5th Infantry.69  Wood 
gave each district commander a general letter of instructions and placed him in charge of 
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both military and civil affairs in his district.70  Funds for the various projects undertaken 
by the occupation government, both civil and military, flowed from Wood as 
departmental commander to his district commanders.  They supervised the expenditure 
of these funds and oversaw, from conception to completion, projects designed to elevate 
the standard of living in Cuba and prepare it for self government. 
Since Wood felt self government and eventual independence depended upon the 
existence of viable local civil governments, he visited towns and cities throughout the 
province to put an interim form of municipal government in place.  As in Santiago, the 
situation in most of the municipalities bordered on anarchy as the functioning apparatus 
of a state had virtually ceased to exist.  As Wood later recalled,  
 
When the American authorities took charge of the Province of Santiago 
de Cuba they found the civil affairs of the province in a condition of 
complete chaos.  The treasuries of all the different municipalities were 
empty; the offices were vacant; public records, such as had not been 
burnt or destroyed, were bundled up in abandoned buildings.  The courts 
had ceased to exist.  In fact there was only a semblance of any form of 
civil government.71 
 
While the Spanish and then Cuban armies had provided the necessary structure and 
discipline to keep most municipalities in some form of order, the U.S. Army wanted to 
rid itself of that responsibility and restore the local municipal governments to 
functionality as soon as possible. 
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Unable to hold elections in the turbulent aftermath of the war, Wood used his 
executive authority as governor to install and empower municipal administrations.  
While the number of public officials appointed by Wood varied according to the size and 
importance of the municipality, the basic administration for each municipality included a 
mayor, a secretary, and at least one or two police officers.72  In each town he visited, he 
followed a similar procedure.  As he told McKinley, 
 
The policy in all appointments has been to call together the most 
prominent and reliable men, present to them the situation, explain what 
appointments I wish to make, and then to call on them for 
recommendations, impressing upon them the fact, that a failure to 
recommend good men will result in an entire loss of confidence in my 
part, and be disastrous in the end to their cause.73 
 
 
In each of the meetings with local elites, Wood struck a delicate balance between 
frankness and intimidation.  Although he often listened to local concerns, the 
assessment of the situation and the agenda set forth came from the governor and not 
from the locals.  Wood wanted “good men” who would implement his agenda.  He 
expected compliance and forthrightly stated the consequence for non-compliance.  The 
tactic became a favorite and Wood often used it in dealing with the Cubans and later the 
Moros.   
Wood rejected the temptation to appoint large numbers of Americans to civil 
offices at the municipal level or elsewhere.  He recognized Cuban resentment toward 
the Spanish appointees brought in by the previous regime and wanted to avoid a similar 
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situation with an American dominated civil government.  Instead he saw the 
reconstructed municipal governments under American oversight as an opportunity to 
train the Cubans in the practice of good government and honest, efficient 
administration.   Wood argued that “if we are here to teach them to govern themselves, 
it would seem that the best way to begin is by letting them try, standing here ourselves 
simply to supervise, and, if necessary, check, when we see affairs going wrong.”74  As 
he had to those making recommendations on leadership, Wood emphasized to each 
office holder that their appointment and subsequent performance in office reflected 
upon Cuba and the Cuban people. 
 
In appointing these men I have impressed upon them the fact that their 
duty is a very important one, and if they fail to maintain civil order, to 
arrest all offenders against the law, and to conduct themselves with 
propriety, that the failure will be, not a failure for them personally, but a 
failure for civil law in Cuba, and an advertisement to the world that they 
are unable to control and govern themselves.75 
 
Wood felt the Cubans had some serious liabilities when it came to government 
service and early on he subscribed to many of the racial stereotypes held at the time.  He 
wrote to Mrs. Wood in October that she “would be amazed at the frankness of some of 
the people who want to buy favors and influence, they are so absolutely corrupt.”76  
Writing to McKinley the follow month he called Cubans “impetuous and hot-headed and 
liable to do a good many foolish things.”77  To the readers of The Independent he 
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explained that a “great failing of this people is their desire for office and salary, 
considering, as they often do, petty official positions more honorable than honest 
labor.”78  Nevertheless, Wood felt that these habits, learned under the corrupt Spanish 
administration of the island, could be unlearned by following the example of the United 
States and by the careful shepherding of the military government.  In working together to 
revitalize the province, Wood used the military occupation to provide an example for the 
Cubans to follow and to give them training in the “efficient administration of public 
business.”79  He preached insistently to the Cubans “upon the fact that prosperity comes 
as the result of hard work and simple, honest and efficient government.”80  Honest and 
efficient governance meant not only municipal reform but a reform of the Cuban judicial 
system. 
To many Cubans their judicial system had become a symbol of corruption.  
Under Spanish administration, the legal system had favored the wealthy and recognized 
distinctions in race and ethnicity.  Spanish officials often appeared above the law while 
blacks, at the lower end of the economic and ethnic hierarchy, received harsher 
treatment.  Cubans of Spanish descent or mixed ancestry often fell somewhere along the 
spectrum depending on their heritage and relative economic worth.  Government 
authorities used the judicial system to intimidate and bully their opposition.  Prisoners 
often went months, in some cases years, without trial because the state wished to keep 
them out of the way or because they could not afford to pay the legal fees associated 
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with the cost of a potential trial.  As the war progressed and the municipal system of 
government had declined, the judicial process had almost ground to a halt.  Cubans 
unfortunate enough to be caught in the system often waited longer for a trial than their 
time of incarceration would have been if convicted of the accused offense.  In many 
municipalities the jails overflowed with political prisoners and prisoners whose accused 
crime was no longer known to the authorities.   
In an attempt to curb such injustices, Wood introduced into the judicial system of 
the province Anglo-Saxon legal concepts, previously unobserved in Cuba.  He made 
every effort “to impress upon them [the Cubans] the fact that the civil law must in all 
free countries be absolutely supreme, …, and that all people, without regard to race, 
color, or religion, are entitled to equal protection.”81  To remove the law as a potential 
political weapon, he issued a bill of rights early in his administration and guaranteed “the 
freedom of press, the right to assemble peaceably, the right to seek redress for 
grievances, the right of habeas corpus, and the right to present bail for all offense not 
capital.”82  To alleviate the overcrowding in the jails, Wood immediately set up military 
courts chaired by an officer of the U.S. Army to review the cases and to set free all but 
those charged with serious offenses.   
While these courts sorted out the prisons, Wood reorganized the lower courts and 
the provincial supreme court located in the city of Santiago.  He streamlined the judicial 
process, improved the efficiency of the courts, and could by May 1899 boast a fifty 
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percent reduction in cost.83  In appointing justices to the supreme court, Wood advised 
McKinley that he chose men “wholly on account of legal attainment; the Bar 
Association of the province having been consulted as to the character and qualification 
of the new judges.”84  On December 1, 1898, in a solemn ceremony attended by Wood 
and representatives of the occupation government and the McKinley administration, 
Wood convened the first session of the revamped supreme court.  As he had with other 
Cuban civil servants, he sought to impress the necessity of honest and efficient 
government upon the justices. 
 
Your enemies who say the Cuban cannot govern themselves will watch 
you critically, and your friends hopefully.  Above and beyond all, be 
honest in your decisions, for absolute integrity must ever be the 
foundation of a fair and impartial judiciary.  I pray you do not follow the 
example of those who have made the courts of Cuba a byword for 
corruption.85 
 
Recovery from the aftermath of the war and the establishment of municipal and 
civil government was only the first phase of the plan to rehabilitate Santiago.  
Policymakers wanted the municipalities and the provincial government to eventually 
become self-supporting and carry on the work begun under the military occupation.  
Both progressives and minimalists agreed that economic development held the key to a 
prosperous and stable Cuba and thus the key to self-sufficiency.  However, they 
disagreed on how that development should proceed.  The minimalists wanted to leave 
the task mainly to the private sector and to encourage development primarily by ensuring 
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political stability and the rule of law.  Wood and the progressives agreed with the need 
for political stability but wanted the occupational government to go further and to 
actively lay the foundation for economic growth through an expanded program of public 
works and the systematic creation of an infrastructure network for the island.   
At the end of Spanish control, the island contained isolated sections of roads, 
railroads, railways, and harbors, but no insular wide system existed to unite the scattered 
elements.  Although the Spanish had taxed millions from the island, they had spent 
almost nothing to maintain existing infrastructure or develop it beyond the major towns.  
Most of the roads into the interior of the island were mere trails unsuitable for wagon or 
cart traffic.  Where interior roads had existed in the past, lack of maintenance had either 
allowed the jungle to reclaim the land or the tropical rains to wash out the road. At the 
beginning of the American occupation transportation inland consisted primarily of pack-
mule trains and even these could not function in some areas during the rainy season.86  
The lack of an adequate transportation network made travel expensive and time 
consuming.  To travel inland from Santiago to Havana, a distance of only a couple of 
hundred miles, took the same amount of time as someone traveling from New York to 
San Francisco.87  Consequently, the shortest and safest route between the port cities was 
by ocean transport. 
The inadequacy of the Cuban infrastructure significantly restricted the economic 
development of the island by preventing the creation of an insular market and by 
hampering the flow of Cuban goods produced in the interior from reaching the 
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international market.  Wood’s initial effort to address the problem focused on the roads 
within the city of Santiago.  Once his administration had addressed immediate issues of 
sanitation, the focus of public works shifted to repaving many of the existing 
thoroughfares in the city.  The new pavement elevated the level of the road and graded it 
with a high arch to improve drainage and to eliminate, as much as possible, the potential 
for standing water.  Graveled ditches on the side helped as well.  These improvements 
further promoted sanitation and made the roads suitable for cart and wagon traffic thus 
generating the potential for more commerce.   
Wood also turned his attention to addressing problems with the port, the 
crumbling waterfront with its dilapidated warehouses and inadequate docking and 
storage facilities, and to extending the roads into the interior of the island.  As he 
reported to Brooke in October 1899: 
 
The new wharf is nearly completed, as well as the extensive repairs 
required on the old wharf.  Extensive filling along the water front is still 
being carried on and general sanitary improvements are being pushed 
forward as vigorously as possible.  The main road to the interior of the 
island, passing from the city over the mountains by way of Dos 
Caminos, San Luis, and Palma Soriano, is being constructed as rapidly 
as possible.  The extent and difficulty of the work in passing from the 
plain about Santiago over the mountain to the interior plateau are great 
and will require considerable time and labor for its accomplishment.  
The road is at present passable for vehicles, but extensive macadamizing 
of certain sections will be required before it can be considered to be of a 
permanent character and serviceable at all seasons and under all 
conditions.  This road is of the greatest benefit, furnishing as it does the 
only outlet for the interior country except the railway, whose freight 
rates are so high as to be practically prohibitive.88 
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Along with the transportation infrastructure, the occupation government in 
Santiago strove to complete a communication network to connect the various cities in 
the province.  During the war the Cuban insurgents had destroyed virtually all the 
telegraph lines in an attempt to isolate Spanish troops and disrupt communications.  The 
U.S. Army Signal Corps, charged with the task of restoring communication, reported 
that it “amounted practically to a rebuilding of the entire system; and this through the 
roughest part of the Island of Cuba.”89  As Second Lieutenant Victor Shepherd of the 
Signal Officer’s Office pointed out to Wood: “The difficulty of the work may be more 
fully appreciated when it is understood that many miles of wire had to be strung through 
dense tropical forest and over trails traversed with difficulty by pack animals.”90  To 
assist in the repairs and to maintain the network once completed the Signal Corps hired a 
large number of linemen; many were Cubans completely new to the technical field. 
Providing employment for the Cubans was one of the primary goals of the public 
works program and had far reaching benefits for the entire province.  The unemployed in 
the cities consisted largely of farmers and agricultural workers from the rural areas who 
had fled to the towns to escape the ravages of the war.  Often these refuges lost 
everything and had no capital with which to rebuild and, even if they could rebuild, the 
lack of infrastructure made it impossible to get their products to market at an acceptable 
cost.  Unable to return to their land, the refugees remained in the towns where they 
became a burden on the social system.  Wood’s program of public works attacked the 
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problem on two fronts.  First, the rebuilding of the transportation infrastructure opened 
up the interior and created a market for their goods.  Since the projects often employed 
the same farmers who would benefit from the improvements, it also gave them the 
capital to invest in rebuilding their farms.  As Wood told readers of The North American 
Review, “with steady labor, means will be furnished to the small farmers to purchase 
tools and, perhaps, a mule or a horse, and to establish themselves once more upon a 
comparatively prosperous basis.”91  According to Wood, Brooke, and other observers, 
the creation of such infrastructure would attract capital investment from outside of Cuba 
and then the “fertility of the soil and the industry of the people will work out a happy 
solution of the [economic development] problem.”92   
To assist in the recruitment of outside capital, the McKinley administration and 
the War Department became a clearinghouse of information on Cuba and the potential 
for economic development in the island.  Shortly after the cessation of hostilities with 
Spain, McKinley dispatched Robert Porter as Special Commissioner to report on the 
“industrial, commercial, and financial condition” of the island.  Porter spent seven 
months preparing his report.  During that time he visited all the provinces and most of 
the principal cities and towns.  Along the way he interviewed over five hundred people, 
mainly business leaders.  Porter published his report, Industrial Cuba:  Being a Study of 
Present Commercial and Industrial Conditions with Suggestions as to the Opportunities 
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Present in the Island for American Capital, Enterprise, and Labour, in February 1899.93  
A condensed version followed in April as an article in The North American Review.94  
The extended report contained an economic history of the island accompanied by the 
statistics and data needed to reassure prospective investors.  Industrial Cuba became the 
standard work on Cuba at the time.  Investors, missionaries, and foreign policy experts 
used the information contained therein throughout the first half of the twentieth century. 
The War Department also became a source of material and data for those 
interested in Cuba.  From 1898 until the end of the occupation in 1902, the annual 
reports of the War Department contained detailed intelligence gathered and reported by 
the occupation forces.  The reports not only covered the actions of the occupation 
government but contained statistical tables on the imports and exports to and from 
various ports, detailed descriptions of the various Cuban provinces and the agricultural 
and mineral products produced therein, comprehensive analysis on the cost of material 
and labor in various parts of the island, and maps and commentary on existing towns and 
infrastructure.  These reports provided a snapshot into Cuban life and conveyed valuable 
information to those interested in Cuba and its potential development.95 
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Wood considered public education an important part of the rehabilitation effort 
and essential to the future of the island.   The economic development envisioned by 
Wood required an educated workforce as its foundation.  Such a workforce would be 
able to move beyond manual labor and accelerate further economic development in the 
island by attracting capital investments.  The spread of public schools also provided the 
occupation government with the opportunity to teach the skills progressives felt 
necessary for self-government.  As Wood explained to the readers of The Independent:  
“Whatever work has been done here has been founded upon the belief that no liberal 
form of government can exist except among an intelligent, well educated people.”96  
Such a population, according to Wood, would understand the rule of law, respect civil 
government and democracy, and make the rationale decisions required of a self-
governing people.  To accomplish those ends, he put together a Board of Public 
Education for the province, encouraged municipal authorities to build at least one school 
in each municipality, and laid the groundwork for future improvements.  As military 
governor of the province, he commissioned a board – composed of one Cuban and four 
Americans - to review of the Spanish system of public education and recommend a 
scheme for the establishment of an educational system throughout the province.  
However, progress on public education ground to halt as the new insular government 
under Brooke claimed control of educational policy. 
Similar to the sanitation measures, the transportation and communication 
infrastructure created by the occupation government served a dual purpose.  While it 
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benefited the Cubans and led to economic development, it also benefited the occupation 
forces.  The improved system of roads increased the ability of the U.S. Army to move 
men and supplies quickly.  It enabled them to further extend their control into the 
interior and to patrol against brigands and possible revolutionaries.  Improved 
communications assisted the military government in coordinating its efforts and in 
maintaining garrisons at remote but strategic posts.97  The Cubans, not unaware of the 
dual nature of the improvements and increasingly concerned about foreign investors, 
looked upon the public works with suspicion.  Ray Stannard Baker described the mood 
best to his American readers:  “…the average Cuban cannot see the utility of such 
improvements, except as a means of providing work for the unemployed.  He is merely 
vaguely jealous, feeling somehow that the American is repairing Cuba so that it will be 
habitable for himself.”98  Cuban concerns grew as the U.S. occupation continued and the 
Brooke administration appeared unable or unwilling to chart an exit strategy.   
 
Conclusion 
As military governor of Santiago Province for most of the first year and a half of 
occupation, Leonard Wood conceived and implemented a comprehensive set of reforms 
designed to rehabilitate Santiago and create a model of progressive imperialism.  Wood 
embraced the progressive ethos of direct governmental intervention and used his 
authority as military governor to advance the progressive agenda in Cuba.  He operated 
from the premise that military governance provided an excellent opportunity to reshape 
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Santiago in accordance with progressive principles, to create a model of good and 
efficient government, to instill into the Cubans the traits necessary to govern themselves, 
and to spur the economic development he felt necessary to create self-sufficiency.  His 
reforms fundamentally challenged traditional Cuban society and greatly exceeded 
President McKinley’s declared view on the proper limits for the occupation.  In 
exceeding his authority and operating on his own initiative, Wood met with significant 
resistance from the Cubans, from other department commanders who had their own 
reform agenda, and from Governor John Brooke, a minimalist who sought to curtail 
progressive reform and reign Wood in as a subordinate.  The struggle for control of 
insular policy had ramifications for the island, for the U.S. Army, and for the direction of 
occupational policy. 
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CHAPTER IV 
POLICY DEBATES AND IMPERIALISM 
 
During the first year and a half of the Cuban occupation, July 17, 1898 to December 20, 
1899, a profound and sweeping debate over American imperial policy and its 
ramifications took place.  In the Philippine archipelago, the president enjoyed greater 
control and personal discretion on administrative policy due to the continuation of 
hostilities after the outbreak of the Philippine War on February 4, 1899.  In Cuba the 
explicit commitment to self government embodied in the Teller Amendment and the 
cessation of hostilities curtailed presidential prerogative and opened the door for greater 
Congressional involvement and even disagreements within the McKinley administration 
over policy.  The debate and ensuing division witnessed the rise of three distinct 
philosophies on how to proceed:  the minimalist approach espoused by President 
McKinley and Governor John Brooke in Havana, the progressive approach pursued by 
Wood in Santiago and championed by Theodore Roosevelt, and the natural expansionist 
/ annexationist approach advocated by James Wilson in Matanzas and supported by 
Senator Joseph B. Foraker.  These philosophies demonstrated profound disagreements 
over the proper administration and eventual future of the island, the direction of imperial 
policy, the proper role of government, and the appropriate employment of the U.S. 
Army.  As departmental commanders, Wood and Wilson resisted the implementation of 
McKinley’s minimalist approach and developed their own imperial policy.  Both men 
garnered support for their policies in Washington and elsewhere in the Republican Party 
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by exceeding the chain of command, appealing directly to supporters and potential 
supporters, and by the skillful use of the media.  Their success in forestalling and 
supplanting the strategy of their commander-in-chief demonstrated the importance of the 
colonial administrator and the ability of those chosen to implement policy to influence 
the actual development of said policy.  
 
Leonard Wood and the 1898 Campaign for Governor 
Although Wood had presided over a progressive government in Santiago for 
most of the occupation in 1898, he and other advocates of the progressive approach 
realized that the continuation of their strategy depended upon who McKinley chose to be 
military governor of the island when the Spanish relinquished complete control on 
January 1, 1899.  As McKinley deliberated on a potential governor, the progressives 
mounted a campaign designed to woo the president into embracing their strategy and to 
appoint either Wood or Wilson to the post.  Wood had already established his 
progressive credentials in Santiago.  However, despite his wartime rank, he was a 
relatively junior officer from the Medical Department and thus a long shot to become 
governor as more senior officers could lay claim to the position.  On the other hand, 
while Wilson’s commitment to the progressive position remained largely unknown, he 
had vast experience and numerous connections in Washington.  He had served with 
distinction during the U.S. Civil War and, although he had spent much of the last thirty 
years in the private sector, he remained well connected in government circles.  He had 
only recently rejoined the service in anticipation of the conflict with Spain.  Leading 
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progressive like Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge favored the appointment of Wilson 
but advanced Wood as an alternate should Wilson prove unacceptable to the 
administration.   
Although not their first choice for military governor, Wood still served as a 
standard bearer for the progressive cause and as a rising star in their ranks.  Roosevelt, 
fresh from the war and in his own race for the governorship of New York, lobbied for 
Wood with the administration.  He urged McKinley to forego the practice of promotion 
based on seniority and to appoint Wood a brigadier general in the Regular Army.  He 
also lobbied Lodge, “We want young Generals of Wood’s capacity, sound good sense 
and extraordinary energy.”99  Lodge and others progressives promised their support and 
encouraged Wood in his efforts.  Gradually, as the occupation proceeded in 1899, 
Wilson and the progressives parted company and the latter increasingly turned to Wood 
as the alternative to the Brooke. 
Not content to leave the politicking to others and determined to secure the 
governorship for himself, Wood launched a campaign of his own.  He wrote to anyone 
he thought could advance the progressive strategy in Washington and possibly influence 
his appointment as military governor.  He used his professional experience in Santiago 
and his grasp of the conditions in the island to develop a comprehensive plan for the 
continued revitalization of the city and recommendations for the pending occupation of 
the entire island.  Initial elements of his plan, as expressed in a long letter to Secretary of 
War Alger on September 15, 1898, focused heavily on an ambitious public works 
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program.  As the occupation continued, the plan grew to include the plethora of reforms 
that marked Wood’s administration of Santiago. 
Wood’s initial lobbying effort met with some success in Washington where like-
minded public officials praised his administration of Santiago and promised their 
continued support.  Lodge proved especially encouraging: 
 
There is not one of the suggestions you make which does not commend 
itself to me as thoroughly sound and valuable, and if there is anything I can 
do by letter to Washington, or later by personal effort to aid you, I wish 
you would let me know.  …immediate steps such as you suggest, for the 
establishment of schools, improvement of the water supply and the 
dredging of the harbor, should also be taken as soon as possible.100 
 
Encouragement also came from Robert Porter, Special Commissioner of the United 
States to Cuba, who had met Wood when he toured the island on behalf of the 
administration.  Porter had  spoken glowingly of Wood’s efforts in Santiago in his 
reports.  He told Wood that McKinley “follows your excellent record with a great deal of 
satisfaction” and that at “any and all times confidential hints from you will be well 
received at headquarters, where your judgment is respected and with the best of 
reasons.”101 
Heartened by the reception of his views, Wood wrote directly to McKinley on 
November 27, 1898, explaining both his philosophy and his methods:  “The plan of the 
administration [Wood’s administration in Santiago] has been one of personal supervision 
to the greatest extent possible.  I inspect, advice, and counsel with hundreds of people 
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daily, always with one end in view that is getting them to disband, getting them to work, 
and impressing upon them the necessity of recognizing the absolute authority of the civil 
law.”102  “The civil government of this Province,” he continued, “for a time at least, has 
got to be one almost of paternalism; one has got to go among the people, advise them, 
help them, and in fact give one’s personal attention to the greatest extent possible, 
considering no detail too small to be worthy of careful investigation.”103  He urged the 
President to embrace a similar philosophy for the insular government, to avoid 
centralization of power in Havana in the short term, and to allow departmental 
commanders virtual autonomy.  Instead of minimalist government from the top, Wood 
contemplated an activist government involved in the smallest details of Cuban life and 
implementing progressive reforms at all levels.  If, he counseled McKinley, “we are to 
have a successful civil government, each Department Commander has got to be 
physically able to make extensive tours of inspection, to be a great deal among the 
people, and to give the greatest amount of personal attention to all the details of the civil 
work in his Department.”104  Centralization of the insular government in Havana should, 
according to Wood, wait until progressives at the local level had reformed Cuban society 
and prepared the way.   
Wood went so far as to briefly hire a personal lobbyist, A.E. Mestro, to make his 
case to President McKinley and other members of the administration.  He sent Mestro to 
Washington in October with letters for McKinley and other policymakers and instructed 
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him to obtain a personal interview with each recipient if possible.105  Mestro also 
drummed up support for Wood’s gubernatorial aspirations in the New York press.  He 
succeeded in getting The Evening Sun, a pro-administration daily, to editorialize on 
behalf of Wood.  The Sun, sister paper to The Evening Sun, supported Wood as well.  
Writing at the behest of Vice President Garrat Hobart, Frederick Evans of The Evening 
Sun conveyed to Wood “the highest respect and admiration” held by both papers for 
Wood and pledged their support for his work.106  Evans told Wood that his “old friends 
are delighted beyond expression with your splendid success in the field and as an 
administrator, and you may count your new friends and admirers by tens of 
thousands.”107 
Roosevelt and Wood even joined forces to launch a media campaign designed to 
further the progressive cause.  As Roosevelt told the publishers of Scribner’s Magazine, 
the real work in Cuba, the work of Leonard Wood, was in “making a State.”108  In an 
article for Outlook, Roosevelt described Wood as the “model American military 
administrator” and argued that such administrators should be given “the widest possible 
latitude as to means and methods of solving the exceedingly difficult problems set before 
them.”109  Scribner’s Magazine, sufficiently enlisted to the cause, contracted with Wood 
to write an article detailing the nature of his work in “the making of a State out of a 
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conquered province.  ….  We feel that what you have to say will be of great importance 
in forming public opinion on questions of the greatest moment, and we believe that the 
public which we reach is a very important element in the formation of that opinion.” 110   
Wood’s contribution to Scribner’s Magazine appeared in the May 1899 issue and 
ran to thirteen pages including sixteen photos.111  Wood used most of the narrative to 
vividly describe the conditions found in Santiago after the war and the heroic efforts 
taken by the U.S. Army and the Cuban people just to survive.  He detailed the efforts 
taken by the occupation government to stabilize conditions in Santiago and to avoid a 
further humanitarian catastrophe.   He then went on to explain the additional reforms 
needed to revitalize Santiago and insure the safety and wellbeing of the people.  
Although the piece and the other articles came out too late to influence McKinley’s 
immediate selection of a governor, they did provide a national forum for the 
progressives to shape and direct public opinion in support of their agenda and to bring 
pressure on McKinley and other minimalists in the administration. 
 
Governor John Brooke and the Minimalist Approach 
To shepherd his minimalist strategy, McKinley chose General John R. Brooke as 
the first Military Governor of Cuba.  Over sixty at the time of his appointment, Brooke 
had began his military career in 1861 and rose to become one of only three major 
generals in the regular army at the time of the Spanish American War.  A solid career 
soldier, who governed cautiously and followed the instructions of his superiors to the 
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letter, Brooke made a reliable governor.  Unlike many of his subordinates, he was not 
the man to take the initiative and he dutifully limited the role of the occupational 
government to the boundaries prescribed by the administration.  McKinley essentially 
gave Brooke the same instructions he gave to General Shafter the previous July. As 
Brooke relayed to the Cuban people:  “I deem it proper to say that the object of the 
present Government is to give protection to the people, security to person and property, 
to restore confidence, to encourage the people to resume the pursuits of peace, to build 
up waste plantations, to resume commercial traffic; and to afford full protection in the 
exercise of all civil and religious rights.”112  Brooke saw his task as maintaining law and 
order and refused to proceed beyond that goal.  The task of rebuilding he left largely to 
the private sector. 
Shortly after assuming control from Spain in January 1899, Brooke began the 
construction of a dual military and civil government for the island.  The insular civil 
government, located in Havana, consisted of four departments:  State, Finance, Justice 
and Public Instruction, and Agriculture, Industry, Commerce and Public Works.  The 
civilian heads of each of these departments became known collectively as the Cuban 
Cabinet.  Individual cabinet members oversaw the civil bureaucracies of their 
departments, responded to specific requests by the governor, developed and 
implemented policy decisions at the insular and departmental level, and reported directly 
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to Brooke, or his chief of staff, Major General Adna R. Chaffee. 113  Brooke exercised 
final authority over all civil and military affairs. 
Immediately below the insular level, the occupational government consisted of 
seven geographic departments which corresponded to the traditional provinces of the 
island:  Pinar del Rio under Brigadier General George W. Davis, the province of Havana 
under Major General Fitzhugh Lee, the city of Havana under Major General William 
Ludlow, Matanzas under James Wilson, Santa Clara under Major General John C. Bates, 
Puerto Principe under Brigadier General Louis Carpenter, and Santiago under Wood.  
The departmental commanders organized and then supervised the civil governments of 
their provinces.  They reported to Brooke and to the insular civil government, whose 
policies they were expected to implement in their departments.   
In his organization of the insular government, Brooke re-introduced many of the 
grievances that had led to the revolt.  Instead of reforming the entire system of 
governance, Brooke created the Cuban Cabinet and then simply placed it atop the 
existing civil structure used by the Spanish.  He expressed to the Cubans his intent to 
“carry out these objects through the [existing] channels of civil administration, although 
under military control” and that the “civil and criminal code which prevailed prior to the 
relinquishment of Spanish Sovereignty” would remain in force.114  He failed to 
recognize, as Wood had in Santiago almost six months earlier, that the Cubans resented 
the system of governance designed by the Spanish and felt persecuted by a legal system 
that had left thousands in judicial limbo.  He further exacerbated the problem by 
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retaining many of the officials who had served under the Spanish. As Jose Gonzaloz y 
Lanuza, an official in Santiago, laid the matter before Brooke, the “revolution fought 
Spain in order to overthrow the entire past; its men went to war in order not merely to 
snatch a flag from our soil, but in order to see that they became masters of their own 
land, and in order to organize our commonwealth politically and civilly as the entire 
people should choose.”115   The Cubans had not fought to maintain the colonial system 
of government or to trade one colonial master for another.  In short the Cubans had not 
fought to maintain the status quo.  
Brooke’s centralization of authority and financial resources in Havana also 
struck a raw nerve with Cuban leadership in the provinces and with his own 
departmental commanders.  The centralization of fiscal policy had been one of the 
primary objections to Spanish rule.  The provinces, especially Santiago, had resented 
being taxed by the Spanish for projects that only benefited the capital.  In the five 
months prior to Brooke becoming governor, Santiago had enjoyed complete control over 
its own revenue and Wood had not hesitated to spend that money on improving the 
province.  When Brooke centralized control of the custom revenues in Havana and 
forced the departmental commanders to apply for funds before they could launch major 
projects, many in the provinces began to complain openly.  The process eventually led to 
problems with Wood and Wilson. 
Brooke further alienated the Cubans through a series of misunderstandings that 
seemed to minimize their role in liberating Cuba from Spain. When Brooke officially 
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took command from the Spanish, he denied the Cubans the right to participate in the 
ceremonies or to parade in triumph through Havana. When the United States returned 
the body of General Calixto Garcia to Havana in February – the general had 
unexpectedly died while on a diplomatic mission – Brooke bungled the ceremonial 
procession and excluded the Cubans from participating. Although Brooke never repeated 
these blunders, the initial missteps significantly harmed his relations with the Cubans. 
Brooke and the minimalists proved more successfully in dealing with the 
potential threat to the American occupation posed by the existence of Cuban led 
organizations dedicated to Cuban independence:  the Cuban Junta in New York, the 
Cuban Liberation Army in the field, and the Cuban Council of Government.  Although 
united in their common struggle against Spain, these three factions had never cooperated 
well together.  Geographically isolated from one another and with competing interests, 
the American intervention drove a further wedge between these groups.  The McKinley 
administration recognized the division and exploited it to their advantage.  At the onset 
of the intervention, the administration decided to make the Cuban Council of 
Government irrelevant by simply ignoring it and dealing directly with the Cuban Junta 
and the Cuban Liberation Army.  The administration developed a close working 
relationship with the Cuban Junta and eventually co-opted its leadership in a pro-
American faction.  In February 1899, at the behest of the Estrada Palma and the Junta, 
McKinley sent Porter to visit General Maximo Gomez, supreme commander of the 
Cuban Liberation Army, at his headquarters in Remedios.  Gomez agreed to disband the 
army and support American occupation as the clear way to peace and eventual 
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independence.  In exchange the United States promised to pay the Cuban soldiers and 
assist them in returning to civilian life.  Gomez traveled to Havana later in the month to 
officially confer with the U.S. military government.  Brookes, who had learned a lesson 
from the previous fiascos, went out of his way to honor Gomez and his supporters.  In 
the end the United States appropriated $3,000,000 and paid each Cuban soldier who 
came forward $75.  By late summer, the Cuban Liberation Army ceased to exist. 
The Cuban Council of Government, unable to exert control over the Junta or the 
Liberation Army, found itself increasingly isolated.  In an attempt to broaden its appeal 
the Council dissolved itself and invested its authority in a national assembly which met 
in Santa Cruz del Sur in Camaguey in October 1898.  The Santa Cruz Assembly, 
however, exerted no more influence than its predecessor.  The Junta increasingly ignored 
its directives and the administration stonewalled representatives from the group who 
traveled to Washington on its behalf.  When Gomez accepted the premise of an 
American occupation without consulting the Assembly, it removed him from the 
leadership of the army by simply abolishing his rank.  The effort backfired and inflamed 
public sentiment against the Assembly.  On April 4, 1899, the Assembly gave up the 
fight, accepted the reality of the American occupation, and voted to dissolve itself.  In 
doing so it removed the last organized threat to the American control. 
Despite the removal of organized Cuban opposition, Brooke’s tenure as military 
governor was anything but peaceful.  Brooke’s lack of initiative and his caretaker style 
of governorship did not set well with many of his departmental commanders.  
Throughout most of 1899, they actively campaigned for his job and continually carped 
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against his administration.  Both Wood and Wilson chafed under Brooke’s minimalist 
approach.  Wood, in Santiago, resented the centralization of control in Havana and 
especially the loss of customs revenue, which limited the number of progressive projects 
he could pursue.  Wilson, in the rich agricultural region of Matanzas and Santa Clara, 
wanted to implement a program for agricultural rehabilitation.  When Brooke refused to 
support their plans, both men superseded the chain of command and appealed to their 
friends in Washington.  With little active support from the administration, and with a 
president who actually encouraged backdoor communications, Brooke found his position 
increasingly untenable and by mid-year the military government had disintegrated into 
competing factions.  All movement toward an independent and self-governing Cuba 
ceased. 
 
The Progressive Campaign for Governor 
By the end of his initial six months in Cuba, Wood had reached an important 
crossroads in his military career.  Fulfilling an ambition dating back two decades, he 
decided to officially leave the Medical Department and to seek an appointment as a line 
officer in the Regular Army.  In doing so he hoped to maintain the rank he had acquired 
during the war and subsequent occupation.  Without the intervention of the War 
Department or the administration, Wood would once again become a captain and most 
likely have to return to service as a doctor.  He hoped to avoid that scenario.  Wood also 
set his sights upon becoming the military governor of Cuba.  Always an ambitious 
officer, the governorship proved attractive to him for two reasons.  First, it represented 
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the natural culmination of his efforts at Santiago and would allow him to expand the 
progressive program to the whole island.  He believed in the progressive strategy for the 
revitalization of Cuba and he wanted to see it succeed.  Second, and in some ways more 
important, his appointment as military governor would go a long way to making his 
entry as a line officer in the Regular Army not only a possibility but a success as well.  
As governor he would keep his senior rank and thus avoid a seniority system which had 
kept so many officers in the junior ranks for their entire careers.  Success as governor 
would also brighten his prospects for a productive and illustrious military career.  He 
never made peace with the appointment of Brooke as military governor nor the 
preferment of the progressives for Wilson as their candidate.  His campaign for the 
military governorship did not end when Brooke assumed control on January 1, 1899.  It 
merely intensified. 
The clash between Brooke and Wood began almost immediately after the arrival 
of the governor in Havana.  Brooke moved quickly to assert his authority and to 
centralize power in the insular government.  In a January 10th letter from Adna Chaffee, 
Brooke revoked Wood’s ability to independently appoint judges, fiscals, and other high 
level civil servants in Santiago.116  Instead the governor required him to report directly 
to Havana on his efforts at judicial reform and to submit a list of potential candidates 
with recommendations for the approval of the insular government.  Wood could not e
remove an official for any reason without the approval of headquarters.   
ven 
                                                 
116 Adna R. Chaffee to Leonard Wood, 10 January 1899, Box 27, Wood Papers. 
  
  76
In a second letter dated the same day, Chaffee rebuked Wood for allowing the 
citizens of Santiago to question the policy of routing all customs revenues to Havana 
prior to their disbursement.117  Wood, who also resented the policy, had allowed and 
possibly even encouraged the criticism.  Chaffee ordered Wood to contact local 
newspapers and warn them that “any further criticism, reflections, or publications of 
calls to mass assemblage for discussion of this subject” would not be tolerated and 
would lead to the “suspension of the offending paper.”118  Respectful discussion of local 
needs was permissible but emotional and “unintelligent criticism of the policy and 
purposes of the President, or of those of the Division Commander … are wrong and 
must [not] be countenanced by you.”119  Chaffee concluded with a reminder to Wood 
that he would “be expected to conduct the affairs of your Department along the lines 
prescribed for guidance, repressing with your influence, power if necessary, all acts that 
may tend toward interference with an orderly execution of, and adherence to, every 
regulation prescribed by the President for the government and business affairs of the 
Island.”120 
The following week, Chaffee once again wrote to Wood as the governor moved 
to extend his control over the finances of Santiago.  Chaffee asked for specific 
information on the salaries of all civil servants as well as their rank and species of 
payment.  He asked for an estimate of the indebtedness of the department at the end of 
the month, an accounting for that debt, and a preliminary estimate of expenses in 
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February.  To make clear the chain of command, Chaffer instructed Wood that, “No 
project involving payment of money derived from custom revenues will be entered upon 
without first securing approval of division commander [Brooke] unless it be absolutely 
necessary sanitary work.  Much sanitary work ought to be done by men without other 
employment in return for food.”121  The days when Wood could run the show in 
Santiago unfettered were clearly over. 
Wood had enjoyed professional autonomy for too long and he resented the 
circumvention of his power.  Bypassing official channels, he cabled the War Department 
for permission to travel to Washington for a brief visit.  Over the objections of Governor 
Brooke, the administration granted the request.  In the states, Wood received a hero’s 
welcome for his much publicized work in Santiago.  He accepted accolades from fellow 
progressives and from the Metropolitan Club in Washington and the Union Club in New 
York.  He met with the president, officers at the War Department, and the Senate 
Military Affairs Committee.  At each of these meetings he lobbied for local autonomy 
for the departmental commanders and against the loss of customs revenue to Havana.  
He warned that the progressive program in Santiago would grind to a halt with the loss 
of revenue.  The administration listened but refrained from taking any direct action at the 
time.   
Along with his lobbying efforts, Wood found time to testify before the Dodge 
Commission while in Washington.   Having penned his hope on a senior appointment in 
the regular army and in need of the administration’s support to make that a reality, Wood 
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moderated many of his previous criticisms of the war effort and of Secretary Alger.  His 
testimony proved so favorable that it briefly strained his relationship with Roosevelt, 
who wanted Alger removed from office.  Roosevelt had increasingly become the leading 
voice in the growing opposition to Alger and he had counted on Wood’s testimony to 
back up his allegations of misconduct and incompetence.  Wood, however, dependent as 
he was on the good graces of the President and the War Department, demurred.  As an 
officer in the Medical Department, line officers considered him an outsider and he could 
count on little support from the War Department for his appointment or in his feud 
against Brooke.  He served at the behest of the president and could not afford to alienate 
that support.  Although, over the next several months, he became increasingly critical of 
Brooke, he carefully avoided any criticism of the president or the administration.  He 
focused on Brooke and he did so publicly. 
Wood followed his initial article in Scribner’s Magazine, published in May 1899, 
with one in The North American Review, published the same month.  In The North 
American Review article, “The Existing Conditions and Needs in Cuba,” Wood never 
mentioned the governor by name, but his references to what was wrong with the existing 
conditions left little doubt who was to blame.  According to Wood, the insistence on 
retaining much of the Spanish system and its functionaries, the centralization of 
authority in Havana, and the creation of a bloated insular government had denied the 
Cubans what they wanted – “a firm but liberal and just government of the people, for the 
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people and by the people, under American military supervision.”122  Wood strayed 
dangerously close to insubordination when he opined, “What is to be avoided, above all 
things, is militarism, military pedantry, unelastic methods and any continuance of the old 
Spanish system of multitudinous office holders, filling unnecessary office and rendering 
practically no return for the salaries paid them.”123  He also used the article to settle 
scores with Brooke over the customs dispute: 
 
The agitation which recently took place in Santiago was not based, as 
was currently reported in the United States, on an effort to retain in 
Santiago all the revenues of the Province; but it was caused by rumors of 
an effort to abolish what we all hold most dear, that is, the local, 
municipal and provincial (or State) autonomy.  What the Cuban people 
desire is that each Province should be developed very much upon the 
lines of our States, and that the relations of the Province to the General 
Government should be similar to those of the States of the Union to the 
Federal Government.124 
 
 
In June 1899, Wood published a short but devastating critic of the Brooke 
administration in The Independent.  He accused the insular government of neglecting the 
public business and stated that the “present methods [of governance] are … 
intolerable.”125  Brooke’s centralization of power in Havana and his insistence of a top-
down approach to reform had simply failed. 
 
A vast amount of work has to be done in all the towns to make them 
habitable and healthy.  The present condition of affairs demands in the 
most imperative terms strong local control of local affairs, with, of 
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course, the whole system under the firm but broad and liberal 
supervision of a central authority.  The best results will be obtained if to 
those responsible for the control, development and re-establishment of 
the different sections there be given wide discretion and they be left 
unhampered as far as possible by petty and arbitrary restraints.  If one 
man cannot be trusted to act with honesty, good sense and judgment, 
another should be found who can be.126 
 
 
In perhaps his boldest move yet, Wood went beyond a repudiation of Brooke’s 
administration and the policies, he all but directly called for his dismissal.  The 
McKinley administration remained silent. 
Brooke, however, did not take these challenges to his authority lightly.  On July 
26, 1899, Chaffee sent a scathing cable to Wood describing his expenditure report for 
August as “carelessly written” and something that “cannot be allowed.”127  “The 
haphazard methods heretofore existing in this matter must cease instantly…  The 
accounts rendered by you for the last six months are a disgrace to the Army.”128  To 
make the matter more humiliating for Wood, Chaffee sent the cable without cipher and 
thus open for all to read.  As Wood told Roosevelt, 
 
[Brooke] charged me with ‘great folly in building roads, haphazard 
methods of doing business, and submitting reports for six months which 
were a disgrace to the army.’  This was sent through virtually public 
channels as it was handled by ten or fifteen different men in the signal 
corps, clerks in the office of Department Headquarters etc.  ….  In 
addition to sending it through the signal corps he directed me to repeat it 
in full back to him.  This I did.129 
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Wood retaliated with his own cable to the War Department.  In his cable, sent 
through Division Headquarters, Wood repeated the Chaffee cable in full and then denied 
“every insinuation and reflection” and “specifically every charge” tendered by 
Brooke.130  Wood also demanded a court of inquiry to clear his name, exonerate his 
record, and to stop Brooke’s attempt “in every way to hamper, hinder and discredit my 
[Wood’s] work here.”131  The demand for an official court of inquiry, and the negative 
publicity that would most certainly ensue from it, led McKinley to intervene personally 
with Wood.  In return for the promise of a promotion to Brigadier General in the Regular 
Army, McKinley asked Wood “to keep the peace with Brooke and co.”132  Although the 
peace remained a troubled one, the conflict did not flare into open war again during the 
remainder of Brooke’s tenure as governor.   
McKinley’s pledge reiterated an earlier promise he had made to Wood.  Wood 
took McKinley at his word with such trust that he turned down a lucrative business 
opportunity to remain in the army.  Earlier in the year, shortly after his return to Cuba in 
February, the Washington Railway and Electric Company had offered Wood the 
presidency of the company, a $20,000-a-year salary - almost four times his army pay - 
and a five year contract.  The position offered stability whereas continued service in the 
army – absent any direct action by the president - would must likely lead to a reduction 
in rank and pay.  Roosevelt wrote to Wood in June and urged him to take the position as 
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it would lead to a “literally limitless future.”133  Wood considered the offer but decided 
to place his hopes in political favor.  He declined the offer. 
 
James Wilson and the Matanzas Alternative 
Major General James Wilson, like Wood, also harbored gubernatorial ambitions.  
During the American Civil War, Wilson distinguished himself as both a reliable staff 
officer and battlefield commander as he rose from the rank of second lieutenant in the 
Topographical Engineers to become major general of volunteers and head of the Union 
cavalry for the Military Division of the Mississippi.  He had reorganized the corrupt 
Cavalry Bureau during the war and then administered parts of Georgia after the conflict 
ended.  Born in Shawneetown, Illinois, on September 2, 1837, Wilson entered the United 
States Military Academy at West Point in 1855 and graduated in 1860 with a brevet 
commission in the U.S. Army.  Wilson remained in the army until 1870 when he left the 
service to pursue greater financial security for his growing family.  For the next fourteen 
years he struggled as a railroad executive and managed several railroads in the east.  
They all eventually failed.  In 1884, due to a quick sell of stock before his latest venture 
failed, he entered semi-retirement as a moderately wealthy man and devoted himself to 
pet entrepreneurial projects, to writing and speaking, to politics, and to managing his 
investments.  From 1885 to 1886, at the behest of some New York investors, he spent 
ten months in China scouting various routes for a potential railroad, making a careful 
study of the country, and visiting with various governmental officials.  Although the 
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venture never materialized, the knowledge he gained made him an expert on Asian 
affairs and an unofficial advisor to the McKinley administration.  From his home in 
Wilmington, Wilson consolidated his position in Delaware politics and became a small 
but recognized leader of the Republican Party at the national level.   
With the declaration of war against Spain, Wilson abandoned retirement and 
lobbied the administration for an appointment as a major general in the Regular Army.  
Although they denied his request, the War Department offered him the rank of major 
general in the U.S. Volunteer establishment.  He accepted and served under Major 
General Nelson Miles for the invasion of Puerto Rico.  In the aftermath of the conflict, 
he hoped to become either military governor of Puerto Rico or Cuba.  The administration 
passed him over both time.  When Brooke became military governor, the administration 
assigned Wilson as one of his department commanders. 
Due to his experience and seniority, and despite his absence from the army for 
almost thirty years, Wilson considered the governorship of Cuba rightfully his.  He 
counted the loss of the governorship to Brooke as a personal affront and an attack on his 
military honor since he was “the most worthy of that distinction.”134  Wilson considered 
Brooke “a very poor stick for any such command” and “while he is an officer of eminent 
respectability and good character, he is a stupid and inexperienced person in all matters 
pertaining to civil life or the administration of government.  He is close, also, to the 
retiring age, and very torpid in his intellectual operations.”135  As one of the seven 
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departmental commanders, Wilson was not happy about playing second fiddle to a man 
he considered his inferior. 
As with Wood in Santiago, Wilson held his own view of American imperialism 
and had developed his own strategy for how the occupation of Cuba should proceed.  He 
favored the immediate annexation of Cuba and the incorporation of the island into the 
America political and economic structure.  However, since the Teller Amendment 
prohibited that course of action, he recommended that the United States withdraw from 
the island after concluding a reciprocal commercial treaty with a new insular 
government.  The treaty would essentially lower all trade barriers between the United 
States and Cuba.   In the ensuing period of independence, the resulting economic forces 
would cause the island to naturally gravitate toward the United States and eventually ask 
for annexation.136  He felt that the whole process would take ten years.137  After only a 
month of taking command of Matanzas, Wilson declared U.S. objectives in the island 
achieved and urged the withdrawal of the U.S. Army from the province and eventually 
from Cuba. 138  Wilson saw no need to remain in Cuba any longer and felt that to do so 
would only postpone the inevitable annexation of the island and sour the good will of the 
Cubans toward the United States.  He repeatedly warned about a growing unease among 
the Cubans as to the intentions of the Americans.139 
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Since Wilson advocated a quick withdrawal from the island, he did not follow 
Wood’s approach in Santiago and create an intensive program of public works.  As 
military governor of Matanzas and later Santa Clara, he did little more than oversee the 
civil government of the provinces and maintain basic sanitation.  He did not reject the 
progressive reforms outright but considered them inapplicable to the Cuban situation.  
If Cuba were a permanent dependency of the United States, or if we were 
charged by law with the establishment of a government for these people, 
we might do many things which it is now more or less of an 
impertinence for us to undertake.  It seem to me, from reading your 
[Wood’s] reports, that your views are more or less colored by the 
consideration that in one way or another, our occupancy of this island is 
to be permanent; but under the present conditions of the law, and of 
public opinion in this United States this result will hardly be obtained in 
the near future.140 
 
Not only did he considered such actions an “impertinence,” but a waste of revenue and a 
distraction from the more important task of creating a functioning civil government. 
Although Wilson rejected Wood’s progressive program of public works, he 
embraced the possibility of actively involving the insular government in reviving Cuban 
agriculture.  To that end he developed and sponsored an extensive program for 
agricultural rehabilitation and lobbied Brooke and the War Department for support.  
Wilson had concluded, shortly after his arrival in Cuba, that the economic development 
of the island – at least in the short run – depended on the exportation of raw materials, 
especially sugar and tobacco.  Since Matanzas constituted the agricultural center of the 
island, the agricultural rehabilitation of the province figured largely in the overall 
                                                 
140 James Wilson to Leonard Wood, 17 October 1899, Box 45, Wilson Papers. 
  
  86
economic outlook.  The devastation caused by the war had destroyed the agricultural 
infrastructure and siphoned off operating capital. 
Although Wilson regarded himself as the representative of the agricultural class 
as a whole, his program focused almost exclusively on rehabilitating the sugar 
plantations.  He justified that focus because “sugar is the first, second, third and fourth 
interest of the island, and that tobacco, fruits, cattle, etc, are by products or mere 
auxiliaries in the primary of important business of the people.”141  Due to the nature and 
scale of the work involved, the restoration of the sugar industry required a large and 
immediate infusion of capital.  Something Wilson believed Wood failed to understand. 
 
His [Wood’s] plan appears to be to carry on great public works and thus 
employ the people at remunerative wages.  He thinks that they would 
apply their wages to the development of agriculture and other resources 
of the Island, and that in time prosperity would be restored.  He 
apparently forgets that there s not much profit in day labor and that about 
all the advantage which could come from his plan would be the 
completion of roads, harbors, streets, etc, for business which does not 
exist.  The people thus would be about as badly off at the end of the 
period taken up in construction as they are now.142 
 
 
Rehabilitation of the sugar industry could not proceed under Wood’s plan, the sugar 
industry required direct assistance from the government. 
Initial efforts at rehabilitation, proposed by Wilson in February 1899, simply 
advocated for the redistribution of custom duties to “farmers and small proprietors” so 
they could purchase the necessary equipment and supplies and resume farming.143  
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During the spring months, Wilson consulted local leaders and further developed his 
agricultural plans.  A visit by Alger in March allowed him to place those plans before 
the administration.  Brooke initially expressed tentative approval of the plan but deferred 
to Washington.  Washington, however, remained silent as neither the administration nor 
the War Department responded.144 
Rebuffed by the silence of the administration and the unwillingness of Brooke to 
proceed without direct orders, Wilson conducted a behind the scenes campaign to 
replace Brooke as governor and thus allow him to implement his plans for Cuba.  He 
found a ready ally in Senator Foraker, who disagreed with much of McKinley’s 
occupation policy.  In addition he also launched his own public relations campaign.  
Unlike Wood, Wilson never ventured into print himself and remained largely behind the 
scenes.  He worked most often through Paul Dana of The New York Sun and Albert G. 
Robinson of The New York Evening Post.  To both of these men he leaked details of the 
administration in Cuba, his personal commentary on events, confidential copies of his 
unpublished reports, and tidbits of gossip and second-hand commentary garnered from 
his vast correspondence.  He also worked closely with their correspondents in the island.  
In April he asked Dana to have the new representative from The Sun visit him:  “I think I 
can put some strings in his hands which will enable him to ‘get the hang of the 
schoolhouse,’ more promptly than he would if he were left to his own devices.”145  Of 
course, “getting the hang of the schoolhouse” meant understanding the situation in Cuba 
from Wilson’s perspective, acknowledging the shortcomings of the current policy, and 
                                                 
144 James Wilson to Charles Emory Smith, 29 May 1899, Box 44, Wilson Papers.  
145 James Wilson to Paul Dana, 4 April 1899, Box 43, Wilson Papers. 
  
  88
embracing eventual annexation as the only logical course for the island.  Wilson gave 
Dana and Robinson unofficial access to the policy debates over Cuba.  In return they 
both championed Wilson and attacked his critics and rivals in their respective papers and 
articles. 
 
Sea Change – The Summer of 1899 
The minimalist policy advanced by the McKinley administration and 
implemented by Governor Brooke had stalled by the summer of 1899.  The future of 
Cuba remained in political limbo as the administration gave out conflicting signals and 
the occupation government failed to make any progress toward establishing a civil 
government.  In the press and among policymakers, “the Cuba problem” became a topic 
of discussion as uncertainty as to policy and who controlled it threatened to engulf the 
administration.   Two events in the summer, however, brought an end to indecision and 
marked the demise of the minimalist policy. 
At the beginning of June, Governor Brooke convened a conference of all his 
departmental commanders in Havana.  Sensitive to the beating his administration was 
taking in the press and to growing Congressional concerns, Brooke called the meeting to 
rein in his subordinates and to develop a comprehensive policy for the whole island.146  
The meeting, however, came too late to salvage any sense of consensus.  Wood and 
Wilson had already formulated and, to varying degrees, implemented their own vision 
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within their departments.  Neither was willing to settle for anything less than the official 
endorsement of his plan.  The group came closest to a consensus on a plan proposed by 
Wood to divide the surplus revenues of the island among the various departments based 
on their population.  The departmental commanders, free from the oversight of the 
insular government, could then decide on how best to use the resources in their 
departments.  Brooke, still without clear direction from the president or the secretary of 
war, refused to consent and the meeting quickly disintegrated into political wrangling.  
The meeting ended with each departmental commander appealing to their supporters in 
Washington.  The June gathering marked Brooke’s last attempt to achieve a coherent 
Cuban policy and to unify the command under his leadership.  The disintegration of the 
conference meant the end of any chance of progress at the insular level. 
The second event, and by far the one with the largest impact on Cuban policy, 
came with the forced resignation of Secretary of War Alger.  Since the Spanish 
American War, criticism over the mismanagement of the war had dogged the secretary 
and the War Department under his leadership.  Although many in the Republican Party 
considered the secretary to be an albatross around their neck, McKinley refused to 
abandon Alger and the secretary continually expressed his determination to remain in 
office until the end of the administration.  Subsequent investigations by the Dodge 
Commission pointed to problems within the management of the War Department and 
further discredited the secretary and his administration.  Yet, surprisingly, Alger clung to 
his position for almost a year after the war and what prompted his departure had nothing 
to do with his effectiveness at the War Department.  Alger fell from favor with 
  
  90
McKinley when he agreed to run for the U.S. Senate seat from Michigan against a 
McKinley stalwart.  When the president learned of the betrayal, his relationship with 
Alger soured and the secretary tendered his resignation in July. 
Almost immediately the scramble began to see who would replace Alger.  
Possible candidates for the position included General Franke Greene of New York, 
Wilson, Roosevelt, Wood, and Elihu Root.  McKinley’s subsequent offer of the position 
to Root, the only candidate without any previous military background, demonstrated his 
frustration with U.S. colonial policy and the military.  As Root later told the New York 
County Lawyers’ Association, a representative of the president called him and offered 
him the position. 
 
I answered, ‘Thank the President for me, but say that it is quite absurd, I 
know nothing about war, I know nothing about the army.’  I was told to 
hold the wire, and in a moment their came back the reply, ‘President 
McKinley directs me to say that he is not looking for any one who knows 
anything about war or for any one who knows anything about the army; 
he has got to have a lawyer to direct the government of these Spanish 
islands, and you are the lawyer he wants.’147 
 
 
As McKinley’s response to Root indicated, after a year of frustrated policy and 
stalemate, the president had decided on a new approach and enlisted the aid of someone 
without any previous involvement in military affairs.  The move so astounded the 
progressives that Roosevelt, although he judged Root to be “an absolutely upright and 
very able man” who would “make a good Secretary,” considered the appointment to be 
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“simply foolish” and an “excuse” not to have a “sweeping reform of the office, or too 
thorough-going a policy.”148 
Root, however, proved to be exactly what the progressives needed to implement 
their strategy.  He possessed a keen legal mind that could quickly grasp the essentials of 
most situations.  More importantly, he could logically and coherently articulate his 
policy agenda and then develop a systematic strategy that advanced his goals.  Over the 
next three years, the progressive ethos spread not only in Cuba but to the War 
Department where Root became a strenuous supporter of reformers in the ranks and 
presided over some of the most sweeping reforms in the history of the department.  
Within a month of accepting the nomination, Root had read the existing civil reports and 
instructed the departmental commanders in Cuba to submit a special report on civil 
matters in their provinces so that he could reach an honest appraisal on the effectiveness 
of the occupation.  Each took the opportunity to not only cover their current policies and 
existing conditions but to push their vision for the future of the occupation.  Wood and 
Wilson both recognized that McKinley’s minimalist approach would soon come to an 
end.  The recognitions added incentive to their quest to replace Brooke and bring their 
respective strategies to the fore of Cuban policy. 
Concerned that Wood might secure the prized governorship, Wilson became 
increasingly strident in his attacks upon the latter.  Since the early days of the 
occupation, he considered the public works projects in Santiago to be an impertinence 
and a distraction from the main question of civil government.  When an epidemic of 
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yellow fever broke out in Santiago in July, Wilson took his criticism a step further and 
wrote many of his contacts, including important senators and army brass, that Wood had 
caused the epidemic through his public works program. 
 
It is suggested that this is but the result of the digging and turning up of 
the soil to which General Wood so extensively resorted in Santiago.  It is 
claimed by local Cuban physicians that cutting and filling in this Island 
which exposes the fresh earth to the direct rays of the sun is always 
followed by fevers and frequently by yellow fever.  I am told by officers 
who served in Santiago that this danger was pointed out to General 
Wood, and that he ‘pooh-poohed’ it.  You will remember that in the 
towns of my department we have done nothing of that sort, but confined 
ourselves rather to the cleansing of streets, house yards and cess pools, 
and to the disinfection of the filthy localities.  So far we have no fever:  
whether it is a mere coincidence or the result of our forbearance I leave 
the future to decide.149 
 
 
Wilson also claimed to know from officers who had served in Santiago that “Wood has 
been ‘blowing,’ and that Santiago is neither so clean as it ought to be, nor so well 
governed.”150  He felt completely satisfied that any objective comparison of his work 
with the work of Wood in Santiago, would convince anyone that he was the better 
choice for governor.  As he wrote to H.V. Boynton at the War Department:  “I need not 
tell you, if Brooke goes, I want the place, and shall under all the rules expect it.”151  
As summer turned to fall and rumblings of reform emanated from the War 
Department, Wilson became more direct in his attacks on Wood.  He wrote to Roosevelt 
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in late July to remind him that “personal friendship” was not a good enough reason to 
support Wood for the governorship over him.  “I could never consent, nor do I think my 
friends would consent that I should be overslaughed by him.”152  Over the next several 
months he attacked Wood as the beneficiary of presidential favoritism and a biased 
media.  He constantly derided his prior military service as simply consisting of “three 
days skirmishing.”153  He visited the Santiago battlefield and declared reports of the 
importance and valor of the Rough Riders to be overstated, as Kettle Hill could not have 
had more than ten defenders.154  He even began to spread rumors that Brooke had begun 
an investigation into Wood for ordering the execution of alleged bandits without a 
proper trial. 
 
Both Brooke and Chaffee tell me that Wood is in very deep water.  They 
know personally that he has been hanging a lot of people without trial, 
and have directed him to make an impartial investigation.  Brooke, 
however, read me a dispatch to him in which he distinctly stated that he 
would himself send a commission unless the work was thoroughly and 
impartially done.  Chaffee says that Wood told him in person that he was 
having alleged banditti killed without trial.  When he sent his men out of 
them he expected them to bring back their heads, or evidence of their 
death.  Of course this is all in the strictest sense confidential.  I have no 
right to repeat it, but I know you will make no improper use of it.155 
 
 
In the fall of 1899, rumors about the future of Cuba included a scenario in which 
the McKinley administration created a colonial style civil government which would rule 
the island for an indefinite period of time.  Wilson used the rumor to open two additional 
fronts against the McKinley administration.  He argued that any civil government, other 
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than one organized and led by the Cubans themselves, was simply a delaying tactic 
designed to forestall self government.156  He encouraged his supporters to lobby the 
Senate against the plan and to urge them to take the direction of the Cuban policy away 
from the president.  He wrote to Foraker that McKinley favored the policy of delay “and 
all who hope to get plunder out of the island by one process or another, will favor all 
measures which tend to prolong the situation.  General Wood will cooperate with this 
class, because he will think it will be to his interest to do so.”157  Action in the Senate, 
Wilson felt, offered the only hope of preventing such an injustice and affront to national 
honor. 
 
If I am correct in this assumption, the Senate will very closely scrutinize 
all appointments and nominations [i.e. Wood] made in connection with 
the administration of affairs in this island, and it will seek to have a 
definite and distinct announcement of policy from the President as to 
how and when he is going to terminate the present occupation of the 
island. [the adoption of the Wilson plan]158 
 
 
Wilson made the same appeal to the acquaintances in the Cuban leadership and urged 
them to resist the establishment of a civil government under American auspices.159  He 
created enough of a disturbance that Root felt the need to publish his annual report, 
which provided a path to Cuban independence without a colonial civil government, to 
quiet the turmoil. 
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The political uncertainty in June and July renewed the lobbying efforts upon 
Wood’s behalf.  Roosevelt led the way and wrote to members of the administration 
urging that Brooke be recalled and that Wood be given the command.  In a letter to 
Secretary of State John Hay, Roosevelt stressed the importance of making a good start in 
colonial policy if the United States expected to continue with its policy of expansion. 
 
A series of disasters at the very beginning of our colonial policy would 
shake this administration, and therefore our party, and might produce the 
most serious and far-reaching effects upon the nation as a whole, for if 
some political cataclysm was the result, it might mean the definite 
abandonment of the course upon which we have embarked [Roosevel’s 
“large policy” of expansion] – the only course I think fit for a really great 
nation.160 
 
 
To Attorney General John W. Griggs, Roosevelt stressed the political liabilities involved 
should the situation deteriorate further in Cuba.  “Our success or failure in the 
Philippines and in Cuba means the success or failure of the President, and therefore of 
the republican party, and therefore of the nation.”161   
Two both men Roosevelt sang the praises of Wood, who “stands out head and 
shoulders above everybody for conspicuous success.”162   
 
We need tact and judgment just as much as we need firmness in Cuba 
now.  Wood is a born diplomat, just as he is a born soldier.  I question if 
any nation in the world has now, or has had within recent time, anyone 
so nearly approaching the ideal of a military administrator of the kind 
now required in Cuba.  Perhaps one or two of the Englishmen who have 
appeared in India during the last forty years come up to his level, but 
only one or two….163 
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Roosevelt argued that in recognition for Wood’s success, and as an acknowledgement of 
the dire situation in Cuba, the traditional seniority system of the army should be ignored 
and Wood placed in absolute control of the island.  As he told Hay, if “we are going to 
try to administer Cuba and conquer the Philippines on the seniority plan, we had better 
abandon the two jobs at once, as it is not possible to carry either through successfully on 
such terms.”164  Roosevelt advised Griggs that colonial administrators had to “possess 
tact and judgment, fertility of resource, patience, courage, and limitless endurance, and 
they must possess all of these qualities in the very highest degree.”165 
After the appointment of Root as Secretary of War, Roosevelt began to bombard 
him with unsolicited information and advice on Cuba.  Since Roosevelt and Wood 
maintained a regular correspondence and the latter vented much of his frustration with 
Brooke and the situation in Cuba in his letters, Roosevelt often had a lot of interesting 
material for the secretary.  On 8 August 1899, Roosevelt notified Wood that he had 
decided to show some of his letters to Root as a way of impressing upon him the 
seriousness of the situation in Cuba.  Although Wood felt uneasy and had requested in 
the letters that they remain confidential, he did not stop Roosevelt from meeting with 
Root or from using his letters to appeal directly to Root and thus subvert the chain of 
command.  By October Root had grown weary of the Roosevelt’s incessant lobbying.  In 
a brief interview to discuss the Philippines, Root bluntly told him that “he did not at the 
moment care to hear … anything more about Cuba.”166  Undeterred Roosevelt took the 
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opportunity presented by the comment to declare Brooke unfit and urge Wood as his 
replacement.   
Wood had other powerful supporters in Washington as well.  Senator Thomas 
Platt from New York declared his support for Wood.167  Lodge, once a champion of 
Wilson, not only swung his support to Wood but also actively lobbied on his behalf 
alongside Roosevelt.  Frank Greene, as a candidate for the secretary of war position, 
declared himself in favor of Wood.168  Charles Dawes, Comptroller at the Treasury 
Department, expressed his support and admiration.  According to Dawes, Wood had 
made a particular impression on him and others but his selfless service and by his 
dramatic decision to cut short his own leave in July to return to Santiago to fight against 
the yellow fever.169 
Wood’s greatest asset in Washington, however, remained his wife Louise (Lou) 
Wood.  A fixture in Washington society for most of her life, she attended all the 
fashionable parties, celebrations, dinners, and other gatherings of the political elites.  
She dined regularly with the McKinley and Roosevelt families.  When Root and his 
family moved to Washington, she got to know them as well.  Her presence in 
Washington kept her husband’s career constantly before his political superiors and it 
allowed her to provide information to the politicians that Wood could not do through 
official channels.  It also allowed her to keep Wood abreast of all the developments and 
gossip in Washington.  Wood often made specific requests for information to find out 
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the general disposition of someone toward him.  She, in turn, reported to her husband the 
details of her social schedule and the topics of discussion at each.  Although she 
destroyed parts of her letters before bequeathing them to the archives, enough remains to 
show a husband and wife team working conjointly to advance their military career.  
Wood owed much to his wife. 
 
Conclusion 
On 13 December 1899, Secretary of War Elihu Root announced the appointment 
of Wood as the new military governor of Cuba, effective as of 20 December 1899.  The 
announcement marked the end of McKinley’s minimalist strategy and opened the way 
for the progressive imperialism Wood had implemented in Santiago.  Although Brooke 
had failed as military governor, most of the blame for that failure belonged to McKinley.  
McKinley had placed Brooke in an untenable position by encouraging backdoor 
communications with his subordinate commanders and then failing to support the 
governor’s efforts to rein in those subordinates.  His toleration of direct acts of 
insubordination by Wood undermined the whole command structure of the occupation 
force and contributed to the policy drift that characterized the first year of insular rule.  
Wood succeeded in his quest for the governorship due to his record in Santiago and his 
ability to forestall the imperial strategy of the administration while implementing his 
own progressive agenda.  It was to his political benefit to cripple the Brooke 
administration and present himself as the clear alternative.  Progressives in Washington, 
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eager to use the island as a showcase of progressivism, supported a Wood candidacy and 
applied steady pressure on the administration. 
Historians have largely judged Wood harshly for involving himself in the 
political process, for advocating certain policy positions over others, and for his 
shameless advancement of his own career by campaigning for the governorship of Cuba.  
Without a doubt Wood did all of these things; however, two points should be kept in 
mind.  First, the occupation of Cuba proved to be a very political enterprise.  American 
intervention in the Cuban revolution and the subsequent occupation of the island greatly 
divided policymakers, even those within the same party.  The implementation of any 
strategy in Cuba depended on the ability of the administration and its chosen colonial 
administrators to win political support for its policies and to continually satisfy partisan 
demands.  Wood, more than any other candidate for governor, realized that necessity 
and crafted an image as a progressive and competent colonial administrator.   Second, 
the institutional culture of the U.S. Army at the time lent itself to political involvement. 
In the days of a relatively small army, before mandatory retirement or even fitness 
exams, promotion stagnated and younger officers had to get noticed in order to get 
ahead.  They often found it necessary to ally themselves with powerful military and 
political patrons who could advance their career.  Wilson, who later criticized Wood as a 
political general, wrote the same letters to his political patrons, in some cases the same 
patrons that Wood courted. Similar situations occurred in the careers of Nelson Miles, 
John Pershing, Hugh Scott, Fred Ainsworth and many others. The Byzantine system of 
alliances between members of Congress and various staff officers in the Bureaus of the 
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War Department have become legendary and should end the notion that Wood was the 
only officer involved in the political process. 
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CHAPTER V 
BUILDING THE STRUCTURE OF THE STATE 
 
As Military Governor of Cuba, Wood faced two important and interrelated challenges – 
the formation of an occupation government that would advance his progressive agenda 
and the framing of a Cuban government to replace the occupation.  Wood began by 
creating a unitary state designed to make progressive reform easier to implement at all 
levels of government.  Promptings by Root and McKinley overcame Wood’s reluctance 
to move toward independence and led to a call for municipal elections and eventually a 
constitutional convention.  Wood worked closely with Root to achieve these objectives 
and to address the demands of imperial defense.  Root exercised direction supervision on 
matters of Cuban-American relations and with overall policy but allowed Wood 
significant freedom in following his progressive agenda.  Wood kept Root abreast of 
developments in Cuba and offered input upon the resources needed and the methods 
employed to achieve the objectives of the administration.  Root listened to these 
suggestions and made policy adjustments as long as the end result achieved the 
administration’s goals.  American imperial policy toward Cuba evolved around the 
policy axis of the War Department and the occupational government in Havana.  Their 
effective partnership eventually led to the termination of the American occupation and 
the creation of the Republic of Cuba.   
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Concentration of Power into the Office of Military Governor 
After assuming command on December 20, 1900, Wood moved immediately to 
concentrate all power and authority into his office.  Despite his vehement opposition to 
his predecessors, Wood now asserted: 
 
The military government of Cuba, as constituted and operating 
December, 1899, consisted of a military governor, with authority 
sufficient to conduct the government of the island and to institute such 
changes in existing law and procedure, both in the general law of the 
land and municipalities, as he deemed necessary for the conduct of a just 
and stable government, ample to maintain order and to give adequate 
protection to property and vested rights, and to secure to the inhabitant of 
the island the greatest degree of liberty consistent with existing 
conditions.170 
 
 
Ironically, Wood cited McKinley’s original proclamation to the Cubans on July 18, 
1898, the same proclamation which Shafter and Brooke cited as limiting the governor’s 
power and authorizing a minimalist occupation.171   
Wood’s assertion of his prerogatives indicated a substantial shift in American 
policy toward the island.  Since the onset the occupation had drifted along without a 
consistent internal program of insular administration and with little headway made 
toward a self-governing Cuba.  The War Department needed the personnel and financial 
resources currently committed to Cuba for the war effort in the Philippines.  In 
Washington, Congressional forbearance with McKinley’s colonial policy had begun to 
wane and increasingly opponents of the president – usually Democratic but with a 
                                                 
170 “Civil Report of Major General Leonard Wood,” 1 January 1901, 56th Cong, 2d Sess, H. Docs, vol. 1, 
pt. 11, vol. 1, pt. 1, 1.  
171 Ibid., 1-3. 
  
  103
smattering of Republicans - inserted themselves into imperial policy through 
investigative committees and fact finding tours.  The upcoming presidential election in 
the fall of 1900 and the increasing rhetoric of the anti-imperialists made it essential to 
show progress in Cuba.  
The creation of a unified command under his leadership also reflected Wood’s 
personality and management style.  As a progressive reformer, Wood believed that the 
concentration of political power under a central authority made political and societal 
reform much easier than a system which defused power through several levels.  Viewing 
himself as a benevolent autocrat, Wood chafed at any insular restrictions upon his power 
and wanted a government in which he or his administration could touch every level of 
society without interference.  Surrounding himself with like-minded subordinates who 
possessed expertise in certain policy areas, Wood set about creating a central 
government that could and would govern the island. 
The Havana based Cuban Cabinet offered Wood the first opportunity to 
consolidate his political control.  The cabinet consisted of four native secretaries who 
directed the four departments of the nascent Cuban government - the Department of 
State and Government, the Department of Justice and Public Instruction, the Department 
of Agriculture, Commerce, Industries, and Public Works, and the Department of 
Finance.    The cabinet initially operated as a quasi-independent entity that made 
recommendations to the military governor and oversaw the daily operations of their 
departments.  Brooke granted the secretaries substantial freedom and refrained from 
directly interfering in their administration.  The former governor had even refused to act 
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directly on a request by Secretary Root to resolve problems of gross negligence and 
corruption in the judicial system.  Instead he referred it to the Secretary of Justice and 
Public Education, who promptly took no action to rectify the problems.172   
As Governor of Santiago, Wood had railed against the Cuban Cabinet because of 
their opposition to his progressive agenda and because of their insistence on continuing 
many of the practices of the Spanish administration.  Wood considered the cabinet 
secretaries to be little better than scoundrels out to enrich their own fortunes by 
oppressing the Cuban people.  A clash appeared inevitable.  The situation however 
resolved itself when the Cuban Cabinet requested an audience with the new governor on 
the day of his arrival in Havana and resigned en masse.173   
The resignations gave Wood the opportunity to restructure the Cabinet and its 
various departments along the lines he had pursued in Santiago.  Within ten days, Wood 
created a separate Department of Public Works from the existing Department of 
Agriculture, Commerce, Industries, and Public Works.  He also broke up the Department 
of Justice and Public Instruction into separate departments.  These reforms expand the 
total number of departments to six.  In the future, as further progressive reforms dictated, 
Wood created new departments and expanded the central government accordingly.  To 
reform their internal bureaucracies and make sure the departments adopted progressive 
reforms, Wood created separate committees, largely composed of Americans, to serve 
alongside the Cuban departments and provide guidance.174 
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To ensure the backing of other insular leaders, Wood sought to co-opt their 
support. On January 1, 1900, he called a meeting of the Civil Governors from the 
various provinces and invited other influential leaders, including Cuban army officers 
and member of the wartime Cuban government, to attend as well.  He consulted with 
General Maximo Gomez and suggested to Root that he and two other generals be placed 
on a committee to oversee the welfare of the veterans in return for a substantial salary.175  
His efforts to win over the insular leaders paid off in the long run by giving him a 
working relationship with opinion makers in Cuba and largely securing their support for 
his administration. 
The drive to concentrate power into the hands of the military governor extended 
to other U.S. agencies conducting operations in Cuba.  The U.S. Navy, the Revenue 
Marine Hospital Service, and the U.S. Postal Service all operated in Cuba independent 
of the military governor.  All three services used insular resources and drew upon the 
insular treasury without accountability to the occupational government and without 
regard for the needs of the military occupation or the civilian population.  Although such 
entities had functioned separately under Brooke, their autonomy did not fit with Wood’s 
goal of a unified command.  Lack of official coordination between the three services and 
the insular government led to inefficient planning, to turf wars, and in one case to 
corruption.  Wood especially disliked the ability of these entities to interfere with his 
policies and then appeal to their superiors in Washington for support.  Over the next 
year, he worked with Root to reign in these independent actors. 
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The presence of the U.S. Navy in Havana and its control of the port thereof, 
created several problems.  The port of Havana accounted for over 60 percent of the total 
value of exports for the island and collected customs receipts ten times that of the next 
largest port. 176   Consequently, the administration of the harbor impacted the economic 
development of the entire island.  Although American naval presence was small and 
activity minimal, the U.S. Navy occupied valuable facilities along Havana harbor and 
thus, by mere possession, denied the use of those facilities to the general public or the 
occupational government.  The navy controlled the Machina Wharf, the only wharf 
capable of loading passengers and baggage directly onto a ship.  A separate naval yard 
occupied the only wharf suitable for the loading and unloading of lumber and other 
heavy freight.  The inability of commercial shipping to use these facilities resulted in 
delays and additional costs.  These costs and the resulting demurrage fees placed a heavy 
financial burden upon insular commerce.177  To compound the problem, Captain of the 
Port, Lucian Young, a Navy lieutenant commander, was independent of insular control 
and was not required to coordinate with the military government, the municipal 
government, or local merchants.  Although Young proved receptive to coordination, 
other officers stationed in the city failed to report their presence to the military governor 
and proved less receptive to inter-service cooperation with the U.S. Army led 
occupation.  Root, working closely with Secretary of the Navy John Long, eventually 
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resolved many of the issues and preserved inter-service harmony by making the office of 
Captain of the Port of Havana a part of the governor’s staff. 
The Revenue Marine Hospital Service, which conducted a quarantine service for 
the island, proved troubling as well.  Wood found the service uncooperative and 
complained to Root that it often imposed “quarantines between sea coast towns of the 
Island and between ports of Cuba and the United States, far in advance of any necessity 
whatever, [which] serves to seriously injure commerce and disturb the normal flow of 
trade and traffic.”178  Medical personal serving with the Marine Hospital duplicated 
many of the services already provided by the U.S. Army and often clashed with the 
military doctors in scattered turf wars.  The duplication of services led to additional 
expenses without additional benefits.  The Marine Hospital contracted for supplies and 
services without reference to the insular government and then submitted the bills to the 
government for payment out of the treasury.  Root secured an executive order from the 
President that gave Wood control over the expenditures of the Marine Hospital and 
attached a commissioned officer from that service to his staff.179   
The U.S. Postal Service and its Department of Posts in Cuba proved a much 
more difficult and politically dangerous situation to handle for both Wood and the 
McKinley administration.  Director General of Posts in Cuba Estes Rathbone had carved 
out a substantial fiefdom in the island totally free of supervision by the insular 
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government and even the War Department.180  In many ways, the resources at his 
command dwarfed those of the insular government.  His office employed a workforce of 
seventy-nine clerks at substantial salaries.  By contrast, the Office of the Military 
Governor employed thirty clerks and eleven messengers to meet the needs of the entire 
Havana based military government and the offices of the Staff Departments of the Cuba 
Division.  Rathbone drew a personal salary of $6,500.00 annually.  In addition, his 
benefits included per diem for meals, housing rental, coach, coachman, footman, and 
attire plus laundry service for the aforementioned servants.  Total compensation for 
salary and expenses exceeded $12,000.00 annually, all paid from the insular treasury 
without any oversight by the insular government.  As Wood complained to Root,  
 
This office, I believe, has been built up by the present incumbent as 
much to gratifying personal motives as anything else.  New routes are 
established, new projects are formed and new offices created without 
reference to these Headquarters.  Large deficits are presented monthly 
for payment.  This [is] only one of the several instances where officials 
have gradually increased the scope of their influence until the 
harmonious administration of Island affairs is seriously threatened.181 
 
 
Rathbone reported directly to the U.S. Postmaster General Charles Emory Smith 
and he jealously guarded his autonomy.  Shortly after taking office, Wood wrote to 
Rathbone about a pending appointment in the Department of Posts.  Rathbone 
considered the communication a violation of his professional prerogative and the 
perceived infringement necessitated a visit by Smith to the War Department where he 
called Root’s attention to the executive order that created the Department of Posts in 
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Cuba and established it as independent of the insular government and the War 
Department.182  Root, somewhat surprised by the incident, promised to pursue the matter 
with Smith as soon as possible.  In the meantime, he suggested that Wood proceed 
cautiously and not provoke the Director General.183 
The issue between the insular government and the Department of Posts came to a 
head in the late spring.  In response to Congressional inquires shortly after the new year, 
Wood launched a systematic review and general audit of insular finances.  Early on 
discrepancies began to emerge in the postal accounts and further investigation showed 
negligence on the part of the clerks in following proper accounting procedures.  These 
discrepancies led to further investigation and more questioning.  Feeling the heat from 
the investigation, Charles Neely, head of the financial department of the Department of 
Posts, fled the island on April 28, 1900.  Subsequent investigation found that he had 
embezzled close to $100,000.184  Wood sensed a larger conspiracy and immediately 
broadened the scope of the investigation.  By the middle of May, investigators had 
implicated most of the internal auditors at the Department of Posts and even Rathbone.  
Wood advised Root that “the only chance to free ourselves of blame is to smash the 
offender without regard to who they are.”185  Root agreed and told Wood “to scrape to 
the bone, no matter whose nerves are hurt by it.”186  Washington sent down A.L. 
Lawshe as an independent auditor to oversee a new audit of the postal accounts and to
advise Wood on the situation.  On May 20, 1900, the postmaster general suspended 
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Rathbone and replaced him with J.L. Bistow, Fourth Assistant Postmaster General.  
Root and Wood detained Rathbone on the island as a material witness against Neely 
until enough evidence mounted to indict Rathbone as well.  Wood insisted, and R
the administration concurred, that the Neely, Rathbone, and the other conspirators 
should be tried by the Cuban courts and made an example of American colonial 
oot and 
integrit
 
 
ed 
ad finally achieved the unified command he felt necessary to 
the gov
                                                
y. 
The postal scandals and the ensuing trial took almost two years to resolve and
had far reaching effect upon the colonial administration and upon Wood personally.  
Due to delays in gathering evidence and Neely’s legal battle against extradition back to 
Cuba, the actual trial did not begin until January 4, 1902.  The trial ended on March 24, 
1902, with the conviction of Neely, Rathbone, and several others for conspiracy and the 
embezzlement of a conservatively estimated $130,000.187  The vigor and determination
with which Wood investigated the postal scandal and prosecuted the offenders creat
powerful enemies in Washington.  Rathbone, a political protégé of Marcus Hanna, 
proved to be especially well connected.  Hanna never forgot the treatment of Rathbone 
and looked for opportunities to attack Wood.  In the short term, however, as a result of 
the scandal, the Department of Posts came under the auspices of the insular government 
on July 14, 1900.  Wood h
ernance of Cuba. 
The drive for a unified command illustrated Wood’s tendency to demonize his 
opponents and his inability to remove himself personally from the issues involved.  In 
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his mind the original Cuban Cabinet did not oppose his ideas of governance or even his 
progressive agenda.  They opposed him personally and they did so because they wante
to exploit the Cuban people for personal gain.  Although he presented no evidenc
support such an allegation, he had no problem slandering them to the McKinley 
administration.  He made similar allegations against Rathbone based upon the salary and 
benefits he enjoyed.  Even before evidence of misconduct surfaced, Wood accused him
not of inefficiency, but of “gratifying personal motives” and building his own political 
kingdom.  Since Wood considered these men evil, he had no qualms about destroying 
their careers.  The members of the Cuban cabinet went voluntarily into political exile.  
Rathbone, who proved corrupt, did not get off so easy.  A simple trial and punishment
was not enough for Wood.  Rathbone had to be “smashed” publicly in a Cuban court 
with Wood overseeing the investigation and prosecution.  Wood’s need to fulfill his 
sense of justice and enact retribution for what he perceived as a personal slight led
d 
e to 
, 
 
 to 
problem
es 
 
istration politically, especially in an election year.  Root complained to Wood in 
June, 
n 
enormous labor, so that we can appreciate the position you are placed in 
in Cuba when we forward such resolutions to you.  I am sending you 
s for the administration and for him personally.  It was not the last time.   
The ongoing postal scandal gave a rationale for further Congressional inquiri
into the colonial government.    It also gave hope to those who wanted to find other
instances of corruption in the colonial possessions that might injure the McKinley 
admin
 
We [The War Department] are flooded with resolutions of inquiry from 
both Houses of Congress, relating to pretty nearly everything the army 
has done for the past two years in the islands or elsewhere, involving a
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today copies of four communications from the Investigating Committee 
of the Senate.188 
 
 
The most comprehensive request came on May 26, 1900, when the U.S. Senate “directed 
its Committee on Relations with Cuba to investigate and report … regarding the money 
received and expended in the island Cuba” from the start of the occupation through 30 
April 1900.189   The report was to include “a statement of all public works of every kind, 
including buildings, wharves, railroads, and all other structures built or constructed, 
improved, repaired, or decorated; and a statement of the personal property which was 
purchased or procured and intrusted to any officer of the military government within the 
said time.”190 These requests required an enormous amount of work for the insular 
government, forced them to hire additional auditors, and cost an additional $15,000 in 
1900 alone.191 
The increased Congressional scrutiny led Wood to institute a complete overhaul 
of the insular financial system.  He ordered the insular treasurer and the auditors “to 
immediately put their offices in condition to be prepared for a most rigid and searching 
investigation in case our Democratic friends in Congress attempt to in any way discredit 
the administration of affairs in the Island.”192  Later in the year, he directed the Insular 
Treasurer to extend the overhaul into the civil departments of the insular and municipal 
governments.  The reforms required a transition from the old Spanish system of 
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accounting, deemed too cumbersome by the Treasurer, to the accounting system used by 
the U.S. Army.  The process took months as representatives from the Treasurer traveled 
to each municipality and instructed the local officials in the new system.  It required the 
Auditor to create an insular auditing system in the midst of the ongoing occupation and 
then to centralize control of that system under a single auditor and his Cuban assistant.  
In the process the government had to hire and train a substantial number of clerks and 
instruct American officers unfamiliar with the accounting system.  Working with 
American officers proved frustrating due to the constant rotation of officers around the 
world, thus necessitating an ongoing training program.  Native clerks offered more 
stability but the language problem provided yet another obstacle to overcome.  In the 
end these efforts paid off as the insular Treasurer reported he was “able to lay their 
records before the War Department in such shape as to leave no inquiry of the 
Congressional committee unanswered.”193 
In addition to the official requests, Congressmen and their political agents soon 
found their way to Cuba in search of damaging information.  Some even went so far as 
to try and create incidents by inciting the Cubans against colonial policy.  In February 
1900, the Mayor of Matanzas reported that a J. H. Drake of Chicago was traveling 
throughout the Department of Matanzas and Santa Clara and advising the municipal 
officials there to oppose the forthcoming suffrage requirements.194  In April 1900, Wood 
reported Democratic agents in Havana looking for damaging material to use against 
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McKinley.  In June 1900, Root reported information from his sources in Washington 
that Democrats had operatives in the island.    Throughout much of the year, Wood and 
Root labored to keep a handle on the situation.  The political intrusion into insular affairs 
lessened after McKinley won reelection but it never completely ended.  Against such 
scrutiny, the unified command structure and the support of the local elites proved 
essential. 
Despite being under political scrutiny, the most serious threat to Wood’s 
governorship came from his long feud with Governor Brooke.  In late November 1899, 
with the decision of the governorship still in question, James Runcie, a longtime friend 
of Wood, wrote a damning article about the Brooke administration and gave it to Ray 
Stannard Baker.  In the article Runcie charged Brooke with incompetence and blamed 
the McKinley administration for a lack of direction in insular policy.  The North 
American Review published the article in February of the following year.  Its publication 
came as quite a shock to Wood and he immediately wrote to Root to distance himself 
from the article.  According to Runcie he had written the article for Baker as a statement 
of his views but had been clear that it was not intended for publication.   
Under the previous Secretary of War, Russell Alger, policy disputes within the 
army had constantly found its way into the press.  Since his appointment, Root had 
worked to curtail that activity and to keep policy matter completely in house.  In a stern 
letter to Wood he wrote, “I am trying to check the tendency to turn the army into a 
newspaper debating society, and have just made an order prohibiting the publication of 
inspection reports and similar papers which have been gradually tending away from their 
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proper office of frank and full information to superiors into newspaper articles.”195  He 
called the matter “grossly improper.”196  If, and here Root expressed considerable doubt, 
Runcie had a pledge from Baker, “it is certainly incumbent on him to call Baker to 
account for it.”197  
Initially, Wood mounted a stiff defense of Runcie.  He wrote to President 
McKinley and, although he did not excuse the article, portrayed Runcie as a selfless 
servant who worked without pay “almost day and night to promote the welfare and 
success of the American administration in Cuba.”198  Convinced that Baker had 
committed a breach of trust, Wood asked Oswald Villard of the New York Evening Post 
to write an editorial in defense of Runcie and to take Baker and The North American 
Review to task for their indiscretion.  The editorial appeared on March 10, 1900.  Four 
days later George Harvey, editor of The North American Review, produced the original 
letter from Runcie to Baker.  The letter not only gave Baker permission to publish the 
article but allowed him to use the author’s name if he thought it was necessary.   
Presented with the evidence, Wood quickly dropped his defense of Runcie. 
Although the matter created considerable stir in the press and within the War 
Department, its significance should not be overrated.  Shortly after the publication of the 
article, Runcie voluntarily separated himself from the occupational government.  
President McKinley counseled Root that the matter should be left to Wood “to deal with 
himself.  The offence was committed in his Department by one of his subordinates and 
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friends.  His own sense of propriety will indicate the course which ought to be 
followed.”199  After Harvey produced the letter to Baker, Wood took no further action 
than to acknowledge Runcie’s separation.  Root, while still displeased, accepted the 
resolution and considered the matter closed.  He took no further action against Wood or 
Runice.  Although Runcie continued to harbor resentment against Baker and now Wood, 
the issue vanished as quickly as it arose. 
 
Municipal Elections 
As insular governor and thus the point man for imperial policy, Wood framed a 
system of government for Cuba.  He based his conception of the Cuban government on 
the unitary state model.  In a unitary state the central government dictates policy to all 
levels of the state and no other governmental body (regional or local) has exclusive 
control over a policy area.  All levels of government submit to the central government.  
In a federalist model, as in the United States, regional and local governments exercise 
exclusive control over certain policy areas.  Not so in the unitary state model.   During 
the American occupation, the military government in Havana developed policy and then 
issued policy directives for the provincial and municipal governments to follow.  The 
provincial and municipal governments reported back to the central government but had 
no choice but to follow policy directives.  The elected civilian government, to which 
Wood handed power in 1902, closely followed the unitary state model of the military 
occupation.  
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In the occupation government, authority and power flowed from the military 
governor through the cabinet to the provincial civil governors and eventually to the local 
municipalities.  The office of the military governor exercised both legislative and 
executive power with policy decisions taking the form of civil orders and circulars 
issued to the general public.  Although the Cuban Cabinet had a hand in the development 
of public policy and supervised the daily operation of the military government, it 
functioned under the direction and supervision of the governor and submitted to his 
ultimate authority.  The Department of State and Government, within the Cuban 
Cabinet, supervised the work of the six provincial civil governors who in turn supervised 
the work of the municipalities in their jurisdiction.  The military governor appointed 
each of the civil governors who exercised civil control over municipal governments.200  
Prior to the municipal elections on June 16, 1900, the insular governor also appointed 
the alcaldes and councilmen who constituted the municipal governments.  The top down 
command structure greatly centralized authority and made reform efforts easier to 
implement.  However, it took ultimate control of local and regional matters away from 
the municipalities and provincial governments and invested that control in the central 
government in Havana.  By these means the governor-general of the island could review 
and rewrite the municipal budget for the smallest towns of the island and thus dictate the 
priorities pursued by the local government. 
Wood never seriously considered using the federalist model to recreate the 
Cuban political structure in the image of the United States.  He adopted the unitary 
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model almost by default.  The top down administration harmonized well with the 
command structure of the U.S. Army, the instrument of imperial governance which had 
served by default as the government after the initial chaos of the war.  It also reflected 
the progressive preference for a strong executive and a powerful central government. 
The Spanish had governed the island along those lines before the American intervention 
so the Cubans had familiarity with the model.  Many, especially in the eastern provinces, 
felt that such a system favored Havana at the expense of the other regions.  Ironically, as 
a provincial military governor, Wood felt the same way and had personally lobbied the 
War Department against the creation of a unitary state.  He strongly warned that it would 
cause regional divisions to emerge and possibly lead to another revolution.  However, as 
insular governor, a unitary state complemented the drive for a unified command in 
Havana and he quickly and quietly reversed his previous position.  
Wood discounted the danger of concentrating power in Havana and dismissed 
problems with centralized government under Spain.201  In his view it was not the system 
of government but the people and the programs they pursued.  Under a Brooke or 
Wilson, who rejected progressive reforms, centralization created a problem because it 
denied regional commanders like Wood the opportunity to pursue their progressive 
agendas.  Under a progressive administration, centralization no longer posed a problem 
because the right man would implement the right program.  The progressive program, 
Wood and others believed, would naturally reduce regional differences as it raised the 
standard of living for the entire island and transformed the country into the progressive 
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image of a modern state.  Neither Wood, nor his supporters, ever considered that a 
centralized power in Havana pursuing a progressive agenda might inflame provincial 
discord or that one program might not be right for all.  As he had in the past, Wood 
questioned the motives of anyone who raised such concerns. 
The Brooke administration had taken the initial step toward creating a Cuban 
state by launching a census of the entire island.  By presidential proclamation, McKinley 
had declared the census “the first and necessary step in building up the structure of their 
government.”202  Brigadier General Joseph P. Sanger oversaw the census effort.  Six 
Cuban supervisors, one chosen from each of the provinces, supervised the work of 1,607 
Cuban enumerators who conducted the field work.  The census found a total population 
of 1,572,797 of which 533,498 (almost 34 percent) could read and write and 1,039,299 
(almost 66 percent) could not.203   
Although the insular government waited until the completion of the census to 
publish the suffrage requirements for the upcoming municipal elections, Root and Wood 
had decided on a limited suffrage before the latter had even left Washington to become 
governor.  The census simply provided the hard numbers needed to support a limited 
suffrage.  Root considered literacy an important requirement not just for voting but for 
the survival of the Cuban Republic.  If popular education did not reduce the number of 
illiterate in Cuba, Root argued, then the “permanence of free constitutional government 
could hardly be expected.”204  Fearing a “second edition of Haiti and Santo Domingo” if 
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the “absolutely illiterate element be allowed to dominate the political situation,” Root 
and Wood proposed strict suffrage requirements.205  Under the new election law, 
 
every native male Cuban or Spaniard who had elected to take Cuban 
citizenship, of full age [21 years old], might vote if he either could read 
and write, or owned real estate or personal property to the value of $250, 
or had served in and been honorably discharge from the Cuban army; 
thus according a voice in the government of the country to everyone who 
had the intelligence to acquire the rudiments of learning, the thrift to 
accumulate property, or the patriotism to fight for his country.206 
 
Wood had wanted the soldier vote restricted to officers, non-commissioned officers, and 
individual soldier who met the other two requirements.  However, after discussing the 
issue with insular leaders, the administration decided to extend the vote to all Cubans 
who had fought in the war against Spain.   
In mid-February 1900, Wood appointed a commission to draw up the rules and 
regulations to govern the municipal elections.  The commission consisted of fifteen 
individuals, thirteen Cubans and two Americans.  As with many of the commissions he 
appointed as governor, the inclusion of a few Americans allowed Wood to keep abreast 
of developments in the committee, exercise some control over deliberations, and 
ultimately shape policy direction.  In this particular instance, the commission became 
deeply divided on the rules governing the elections.  When the commission submitted 
two plans to the governor, Wood rejected the will of the majority and adopted the plan 
favored by the American representatives.207 
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Once the military government issued the regulations and established the 
apparatus needed to conduct the elections, it stepped away from the process and left it in 
the hands of the Cubans.  Local registration boards began registering voters in May.  
Local boards of elections conducted the municipal elections on June 16, 1900, without 
the presence or assistance of any American soldiers and without any reported 
disturbances.208  The voters went to the polls and elected municipal officers including 
the alcalde (mayor), members of the ayuntamientos (city council), the municipal 
treasurer, municipal judges, and correctional judges.  Of the 150,648 voters registered in 
the island, 110,816 or 73.5 percent turned out to vote.209  (See Table 5:1)  The elected 
officials took office on July 1, 1900 to serve for a term of one year.   
 
Table 5:1 Provincial Statistics of Voters in the Municipal Elections210 
 
Province   Voters        
Pinar del Rio    10,224 
Habana    36,207 
Mantanzas    11,873 
Santa Clara    24,283 
Puerto Principe    6,382 
Santiago de Cuba  21,887 
 
Total       110,816 
        
 
The municipal elections disappointed and concerned Wood.  Despite the fact that 
the percentage of voter participation in Cuba exceeded the percentage of voter 
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participation in the American presidential election of the same year (73.5 percent to 73.2 
percent), Wood considered the turnout indicative of a lack of general interest and public 
spirit.  He wrote to Washington to bemoan the fact that “the revolutionary element . . . 
was generally successful throughout the island” and that the conservative element took 
“very little active interest in elections.”211  According to Wood, most of the conservative 
political parties – the Union-Democratic party, the Autonomist party, etc. – withdrew 
from the race after it became apparent that they could not win against the revolutionary 
elements.   
 
These people will not make a contest on the lines which we make at 
home.  Whichever party feels it is about to be defeated is apt to withdraw 
entirely from the contest.  It has happened in Havana this year and at 
various places in the island.  The only way to prevent a one sided 
administration is to insist that there shall be a small minority 
representation and provide for it in the electoral law.212 
 
 
Notwithstanding Wood’s concerns, the administration in Havana and Washington 
accepted the outcome of the elections and moved forward with establishing the Cuban 
state. 
 
Imperial Defense 
The municipal elections in June marked not only the first step in the creation of 
an independent Cuban state but the beginning of a substantial drawdown in American 
troops on the island.  Root and the War Department considered the municipal elections 
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ample proof that the political stability in Cuba warranted the removal of additional 
troops.  Four days after the municipal elections, Root wrote to Wood regarding the 
manpower issue. 
 
I suppose now you can let me have some troops.  We need them very 
much to replace those we must send from here to the Philippines, for 
within a few months we must begin bringing back the volunteers.  I will 
not rob you of your cavalry but I wish you would telegraph me on receipt 
of this how many infantry you can spare, leaving yourself only such 
troops as are absolutely necessary to preserve order.  We cannot afford to 
leave a single man more than that in Cuba.  The sending of troops to 
China, of course, increases the necessity in the Philippines.213 
 
To facilitate the reduction in troop strength, Root suggested the consolidation of 
all the military departments in Cuba into one large department under the direction of the 
military governor.  When Wood first took command in Havana, the occupational 
government of Cuba consisted of four military departments:  the Department of Havana 
under Brigadier General William Ludlow; the Department of the Province of Havana 
and Pinar del Rio under Brigadier General Fitzhugh Lee; the Department of Matanzas 
and Santa Clara under Brigadier General James H. Wilson; and the Department of 
Santiago and Puerto Principle under Colonel Samuel M. Whitside, who had replaced 
Wood as departmental commander on January 22, 1900.  Each of the military 
departments required its own command and support staff.  Consequently, the elimination 
of a military department freed up the staff officers and the enlisted personnel under their 
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direction for service elsewhere.  Root considered the consolidation the “simple and 
natural thing to do upon the reduction of troops.”214 
Consolidation actually began before the elections with the discontinuation of the 
Department of Havana, consisting of the city of Havana and some of the surrounding 
territory.  Shortly after the beginning of the year, General Ludlow engaged in a bruising 
battle with the Havana press corps.  Several of the local papers, specifically La Lucha 
and El Cubano, attacked not only the administration but the general personally.  Ludlow 
returned fire using papers friendly to the military government and appealed to Wood to 
suppress the anti-administration papers or to at least allow him to suppress the papers.  
Since nothing in the editorials threatened public order, Wood denied the request and 
urged the general to either accept the criticism as that which befalls all public men or to 
appeal to the courts for redress against the libelous attacks.215  All attempts at 
reconciliation however failed.  Root, aware of the situation even before Wood called his 
attention to it, temporarily brought Ludlow back to the states for consultations on the 
proposed War College.216  In the following months, Root and Wood worked to transition 
Ludlow out of Cuba and, on May 1, 1900, they combined the Department of Havana 
with the Department of the Province of Havana and Pinar del Rio to form the 
Department of Havana and Pinar del Rio under the command of Lee. 
On July 21, 1900, the War Department further consolidated the military 
departments by merging the Department of Matanzas and Santa Clara with the 
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Department of Havana and Pinar del Rio to create the Department of Western Cuba.  
Once again, Lee commanded the enlarged department while Wilson departed to join the 
China Relief Expedition.  For the past seven months, Wilson had been a thorn in the side 
of the military government and the War Department.  After the administration passed 
him over for the governorship, he continued his letter writing campaign against both 
Wood and the adopted policy of the McKinley administration.  He publicly condemned 
the occupation for not accepting his agricultural reform program while at the same time 
accusing the War Department of adopting his plan for Cuban independence and 
choosing a less qualified man to run it.  In Matanzas he openly entertained opponents of 
the McKinley administration and sought unsuccessfully to undermine the policies of the 
occupational government.  Although plainly insubordinate, he remained in his position 
largely due to his influence within the U.S. Army and with certain member of Congress.  
The China expedition provided a convenient and politically safe means of extracting him 
from the island. 
On October 29, 1900, the War Department completed the consolidation of the 
military commands by joining the Department of Western Cuba with the Department of 
Eastern Cuba, the renamed Department of Santiago and Puerto Principe, to form the 
Department of Cuba.  In the process, the War Department reduced the number of troops 
in Cuba to almost half, going from 334 officers and 10,796 men to 260 offices and 5,468 
men.217  Over the next year, as Cubans took over more and more of the daily operations 
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of the government, troop levels fell further to 166 officers and 4,748 men.218  The 
decline continued until the end of the occupation on May 20, 1902.     
Jack Lane attributed the reduction in military departments to Wood’s desire to 
get rid of his former rivals.  While Wood was eager to get rid of Wilson and asked Root 
on several occasions to transfer him from the island “as soon as convenient,” he also 
indicated that there was “no need to embarrass yourself in any way by an immediate 
change in these stations.”219  Root took Wood at his word and Wilson continued to 
command his department for seven months after Wood took office.  As to the others 
commanders, Wood welcomed their continued service and at no time asked for their 
removal.  In his response to Root’s suggestion that all the departments be consolidated 
into one, he cautioned the Secretary to move slowly and consolidate only one 
department at a time.220  Ludlow returned to the states in 1900 to head the Ludlow 
Board, which laid much of the groundwork for the Army War College.  He died the next 
year after serving briefly in the Philippines.  Lee returned to the states to command the 
Department of the Missouri and retired in 1901.  James Wilson returned from China 
after suppressing the Boxer Rebellion and retired from the army in 1902.  Until his death 
in 1925, he continued to travel, to write, and to attack Leonard Wood whenever possible. 
Wood proved remarkably generous with those he had previously clashed with 
under the Brooke administration.  After assuming the office of governor, he requested 
that Adna Chaffee, Brooke’s chief of staff, remain at his post.  Since Chaffee had 
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authored several of the reprimands from Brooke to Wood, the relationship between 
Chaffee and Wood never became intimate.  Nonetheless, the governor recognized the 
ability and integrity of the older general, as well as, his extensive connections within the 
Army.  He expressed to Root on numerous occasions his desire to appoint Chaffee a 
departmental commander or to some other important senior post in the occupational 
government.  When Chaffee asked to be relieved in May 1900, Wood requested that he 
be given a promotion in recognition of his service in Cuba and assigned to command a 
department in the states.221  “He is a fine old soldier,” Wood wrote, “and an honest 
straight forward man, and whatever he thinks of me, I wish him good luck and good 
fortune everywhere.”222  Ultimately, Chaffee commanded the American contingent of 
the China Relief Expedition. 
The drawdown of troops in Cuba and increasing manpower issues across the 
American empire revealed the importance of officers to occupational duty and to 
reconstruction.  Officers in Cuba performed a number of essential functions for the 
military government.  As Wood acknowledged in his annual report, “the variety and 
number of duties, most of them entirely new, which our officers have been called upon 
to perform has included supervision and control of almost every class of work, whether 
administrative or constructive.”223  Officers provided the manpower needed “on all 
occasions for inspection work of all sorts; from organizing and inspecting schools to 
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running Custom Houses.”224  They “are, in a way, the frame work on which we build 
very largely, even our civil government for the time being; not as direct participants, 
perhaps, but as men we can send about to quietly look into things and whom we can 
depend upon to give good advice and a helping hand here and there.”225  Wood 
attributed the success of the officers in meeting these challenges to their “habits of 
thoroughness, obedience, and straightforwardness, which are the results of military 
training, [and which] form a splendid basis for administrative and reconstructive 
work.”226 
The need for officers in Cuba, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico stretched the 
American officer corps to the limits and negatively impacted the U.S. Army.  Due to the 
need for officers in the field, military education virtually stopped between 1898 and 
1902.  Occupation duty often took officers away from their regiments, left the regiments 
understaffed and thus led to problems in training, morale, discipline, and overall 
efficiency.  Officers serving in whatever capacity often went without leave while 
working in a dangerous and hostile environment.   
In light of the shortage, Wood took several steps to meet manpower needs in 
Cuba.  He asked the War Department to fill all the officer billets for each company in the 
island and he requested that officers currently detached from their command be returned 
for service, excepting those otherwise engaged in similar work in the Philippines or on 
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“important special work” in the states.227  On several occasions he lobbied Root to 
personally block the normal transfer of an officer from the island to another duty station.  
New officers required time to train and to familiarize themselves with the details of the 
occupational government.  Even if they arrived prior to the departure of their 
predecessor, Wood estimated that it would take months for them to become as valuable 
as the officer they replaced.  By its very nature occupation duty required the 
establishment of trust and a working relationship between local officers, their civil 
counterparts, and the Cuban people they served.  Such a relationship required time and a 
constant contact between the parties involved.  A high rate of turnover amongst officers 
meant that these relationships had to be rebuilt each time an officer switched duty 
stations.  Finally, in order to free up officers on the island itself, Wood abandoned as 
many of the smaller posts and temporary stations as possible and gathered the troops into 
larger garrisons. 
Service in the tropics created its own problems.  The threat of yellow fever and 
other tropical diseases meant that an officer with a family often had to maintain two 
residences, one in the tropics for himself and one in the states for his family.   In many 
such cases, Wood complained that “the outlay exceeds the income of the officers in 
question” and he requested additional pay for those placed under such a burden.228  In 
further deference to the tropical heat and disease, Wood recommended that troops 
deployed to Cuba arrive in the cooler winter months between the first of November and 
end of March so that they would have time to acclimate before the hot summer months.  
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He limited, as much as possible, outdoor activities – outdoor drill, target practice, 
practice marches, reconnaissance, and scouting – to these months as well.  In the 
summer, the command concentrated on indoor instruction.  Given these limitations, 
Wood developed specific ideas on the type of garrison troops needed. 
 
All troops intended for service in Cuba should be mounted troops except 
necessary batteries of artillery and companies of infantry for garrison 
duty at two posts.  Infantry engage in active work in Cuba during the hot 
and rainy months, and even during the winter, will suffer severely from 
malaria, heat, and exhaustion, whereas mounted troops can perform hard 
service without bad results.  The work required in Cuba is of such a 
character that the troops require to have a high degree of mobility.  The 
climatic conditions are such that this mobility must be obtained with as 
little effort as possible on the part of the troops.229 
 
 
Wood encouraged the War Department to increase the size and strength of the cavalry 
arm for imperial service.  He also proposed the formation of native regiments of cavalry 
on several occasions but the suggestion was never followed through with much vigor.  
Despite these precautions, service in the tropics proved especially arduous and led to 
increased desertions. 
 
The Constitutional Convention 
The success of the municipal elections paved the way for calling a constitutional 
convention to establish a civilian government for the island.  Wood traveled to 
Washington in July 1900 to strategize with McKinley and Root on how to proceed.  
Dissatisfied with the quality of the people elected in the municipalities, Wood counseled 
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patience and delay.  He felt that the Cubans were not ready for independence or self-
government and needed time to learn under the tutelage of the American occupation.  
McKinley and Root disagreed.  Congressional pressure and public opinion favored an 
end to the occupation.  The administration had grown weary of defending its Cuban 
policy in the face of Congressional inquiries and against partisan political attacks.  The 
president and secretary both wanted to end the situation and move on politically.  They 
sent Wood back to Cuba with orders to hold an insular wide election for delegates to a 
Constitutional Convention to meet in the fall of 1900.  Wood later showed a similar 
reluctance to accept that Moros and Filipinos were capable of self-government. 
Shortly after his return to the island, Wood complied and issued orders to hold a 
general election on September 15, 1900, for delegates to a constitutional convention 
scheduled to begin on November 5, 1900.  The order set the total number of delegates at 
thirty-one with each of the six provinces electing a number of delegates proportional to 
its population:  Pinar del Rio (3), Havana (8), Matanzas (4), Santa Clara (7), Puerto 
Principe (2), and Santiago (7).  According to Wood’s proclamation, delegates were “to 
frame and adopt a constitution for the people of Cuba, and, as a part thereof, to provide 
for and agree with the Government of the United States upon the relations to exist 
between that Government and the government of Cuba, and to provide for the election 
by the people of officers under such a constitution and the transfer of government to the 
officers so elected.”230   
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Wood viewed politics in Cuba along a political spectrum running from 
conservative to radical.  He classified the conservative element as “highly intelligent 
Cubans of the land owing, industrial and commercial classes.”231  The conservatives 
supported the American occupation and some even favored annexation to the United 
States.   Above all – including independence and self-government - the conservative 
wanted political and economic stability even if it meant continued occupation.  The 
radicals, again according to Wood, represented the uneducated who clamored for 
immediate independence and self-government.  They wanted freedom to exploit their 
fellow Cubans, raid the Cuban treasury, and build their own political fiefdoms on the 
island.  Radical leaders were demagogues who gained power by rallying the people 
against the occupation and for radical proposals such as universal suffrage.  Wood 
believed the majority of Cubans to be conservative but apathetic about politics because 
they favored continued American occupation.  He believed that conservative apathy had 
plagued the municipal elections and led to the election of radical elements at that level. 
To avoid a repetition of the municipal election results, Wood took several steps 
to insure conservative representation at the constitutional convention.  In the month prior 
to the election, Wood traveled extensively throughout Cuba and impressed upon “the 
leaders of all parties that they must not trifle with this Constitutional Convention, and 
that if they send a lot of political jumping-jacks as delegates they must not expect that 
their work will be received very seriously.”232  He encouraged members of the insular 
cabinet, justices of the supreme court, and local conservative leaders who had worked 
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with his administration to run as delegates.233  In August, to avoid radical domination 
and ensure at least some conservative representation, he modified the electoral law to 
introduce a plan of minority representation.234 
Participation in the election of delegates increased substantially from that of the 
municipal elections.  The number of registered voters increased from 150,648 to 
185,501, or by a total of 34,853, a 23 percent increase.235  The number of actual voters 
in the election rose by 20,811 from 110,816 to 131,627 or by 19 percent. 236  (See Tabl
5:2)  Despite initial optimism, Wood had mixed feeling about the actual election results. 
e 
                                                
 
I am disappointed in the composition of the Convention in one way and 
satisfied in another.  I hoped they would send their best men.  They have 
done so in many instances, but they have also sent some of the worst 
agitators and political rascals in Cuba.  I should say we have about ten 
absolutely first class men and about fifteen men of doubtful 
qualifications and character and about six of the worst political rascals 
and fakirs in Cuba.237 
 
Again Wood reasoned that voter apathy suppressed the conservative vote.  Although 
almost 71 percent of registered voters participated in the election, Wood estimated that 
less than 30 percent of qualified voters had participated.  He considered the election 
“entirely one-sided, the vote cast being comparatively small, the conservative element 
displaying practically no interest in the campaign.”238  As he explained to Root, “The 
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sum and substance of the whole thing is that the people of the Island are to-day enjoying 
more liberty than they have ever had before, and they are not, as a body, anxious to take 
another leap in the dark.  In other words they lack confidence in their own people.”239 
 
Table 5:2 Voters in the Elections for the Constitutional Convention by Province240
  
rovince   Registered Voters   Voters  
 
P  
Santiago de Cuba  48,617     37,691 
  185,501 
      
 
Pinar del Rio    18,191     13,278 
Habana    49,565     31,620 
Mantanzas    18,344     12,899 
Santa Clara    39,662     29,148 
Puerto Principe  11,122       6,991 
 
Total        131,627 
  
 
 
In his correspondence and reports, Wood continually referred to a conservative 
majority among the Cubans that supported his administration and longed for a 
continuation of American rule.  However, the existence of such a majority is hard to 
reconcile with the realities of the political situation.  As statistics for the municipal 
elections and the elections for the constitutional convention show, voter participation 
remained high and proportional throughout all the provinces.  Nonetheless, no 
conservative majority stepped forward in any region – rural or urban - to openly 
campaign for the positions Wood claimed they held.  In his analysis of the municipal 
elections, he admitted that the more conservative parties pulled out of the elections 
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because they would have lost.  After the elections for the constitutional convention, he 
blamed apathy, contentment with the status quo, and a distrust of fellow Cubans for the 
lack of a large conservative turnout.  Yet, the constitutional convention presented the 
perfect opportunity for the conservative majority to step forth and defend the status quo 
or to put its stamp on the future.  Mostly likely the illusive conservative majority served 
as a fiction Wood used to justify his policies and to argue for a continued occupation. 
Several historians, who have examined Wood’s role in creating the Republic of 
Cuba, have portrayed him as favoring the eventual annexation of the island by the 
United States.  While Wood at times did voice support for Cubans who favored 
annexation, he never became an adamant annexationist.  He did, however, hold serious 
doubts about the present capability of the Cubans for self-government.  Shortly after 
assuming the governorship, he argued for a long occupation, “not measured by months, 
but by years; several of them at least.”241  According to Wood, the Cubans needed 
direction and tutelage in self-government.  They needed time to adopt the progressive 
ethos and to benefit from progressive reform.  He considered it perfectly acceptable to 
convene a constitutional convention, write a constitution, and establish a Cuban 
government in accordance with its framework as long as the governor remained an 
“American commanding the military forces of occupation and holding an absolute 
power of veto.”242  Wood undoubtedly had himself in mind for the role of permanent 
proconsul and claimed the backing of the silent conservative majority.  If adopted, the 
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situation in Cuba would mirror the form of governance adopted by the British in Egypt 
and India. 
Root rejected the idea.  He wanted to “make a clean cut between the military 
government and the new Cuban government, turn over the administration and get 
out.”243  By 1901 the secretary had become disillusioned with the imperial governance 
of the island. 
                                                
 
I am getting pretty tired of having Congress on the one hand put us under 
independence of Cuban resolutions, and Foraker franchise resolutions 
and resolutions of hostile inquiry and criticism, and on the other hand 
shirk all responsibility; . . . [he feared another year of governance] with 
the Cubans howling at us to do something, and with the democratic press 
abusing us because we do not do something, and with the certainty that 
we will be met by a denial of our lawful authority if we undertake to do 
anything.244 
 
 
He felt it better to be “relieved from the burden and annoyance of their government” and 
to focus on other policy areas.245  Wood accepted the decision of the administration but 
continued to warn of the dangers of Cuban independence even as he implemented the 
policies that led to its fulfillment. 
When the Constitutional Convention convened on November 5, 1900, Wood 
called the meeting to order and gave a short address to the delegates.  He reminded 
them:  “It will be your duty, first, to frame and adopt a constitution for Cuba, and, when 
that has been done, to formulate what, in your opinion, ought to be the relations between 
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Cuba and the United States.”246  Other than to say that the “constitution must be 
adequate to secure a stable, orderly, and free government,” Wood gave no specifics 
about the framework of government or the nature of relations between the United States 
and an independent Cuban republic.247  He then left the convention to its own 
deliberations. 
The convention moved quickly and completed a draft of the proposed 
constitution in less than three months.  The “Constitution of the Republic of Cuba” 
provided the legal framework for the insular, provincial, and the municipal governments.   
Like the occupational government, the Cuban Republic followed the unitary state model.  
It bestowed upon the President of the Republic, as the chief executive officer, the ability 
to enforce the laws at all levels of the government.  The constitution gave both Congress 
and the President the ability to intervene at the provincial and municipal level to 
supersede laws and remove officials in accordance with the other provisions of the 
constitution.  Although it retained and acknowledged separate provincial and municipal 
governments, the constitution empowered the central government and weakened 
regional and local autonomy.  It did nothing to address the regional rivalries that had 
contributed to the previous rebellions. 
With the completion of the constitution, the convention turned its attention to the 
question of relations between an independent Cuba and the United States.  While the 
constitutional framework for governing the island invoked almost no interest on the part 
of the McKinley administration, the issue of relations generated a heated debate between 
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the Cuban convention and the United States government.  The administration wanted to 
extend a virtual protectorate over the island with explicit right of intervention in insular 
affairs and the acquisition of naval coaling stations.  The Cubans wanted to maintain as 
much freedom of action as possible while still satisfying the Americans enough to bring 
an end to the occupation.  Wood, as military governor, had the unenviable task of 
reconciling the two parties. 
The Cubans felt that the question should be settled independent of the 
constitution and that the United States and the future Republic of Cuba could work out 
the details on relations later in the form of a treaty between sovereign nations.248   
Therefore, the convention chose initially to ignore the issue, complete the constitution, 
and then forward it to the President without any discussion on the matter.  To some 
degree they may have hoped that to do so would put sufficient pressure on McKinley to 
accept the constitution without a clear determination on relations.  Although Wood 
initially agreed with the Cuban proposal to separate the issues, Root insisted that the 
Cubans incorporate the terms of relations as part of the constitution.  To forestall the 
Cubans from sending the constitution directly to the President, Root issued clear 
instructions that the proposed constitution had to proceed first to the military governor 
and then through the military chain of command.  He directed Wood not to forward to 
Washington any constitution that ignored the question of relations.249 
Wood worked quietly behind the scenes throughout January 1901 to induce the 
convention to make a clear statement of relations based upon their own authority.  The 
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Cubans resisted and the conservative leadership claimed that open support of an 
American protectorate would endanger the convention and empower the radicals.  Wood 
urged caution but Root remained firm.  He wanted the Cubans to agree to a protectorate 
and embody it in their constitution so that it would become a matter of international law 
and thus deter other nations from interfering in Cuban affairs.  He warned the 
convention,  
 
If Cuba declines to accord to this Government the authority and facilities 
for her protection, she will have to look out for herself in case of trouble 
with any other nation, and we will deal with that other nation.  And we 
should probably deal with the other nation not on account of Cuba but on 
our own account.  If the American people get the impression that Cuba is 
ungrateful and unreasonable they will not be quite so altruistic and 
sentimental the next time they have to deal with Cuban affairs as they 
were in April 1898.250 
 
 
Root instructed Wood to pass along the desires of the administration but to do so in such 
a way that it did not appear that the governor was “making demands, or even official 
suggestions.”251 
As the Cubans remained immune to unofficial and private suggestions, Root 
wrote a long letter to inform Wood “of the views of the Executive Department of our 
government upon that subject in a more official form than that in which they have been 
communicated to you hitherto.”252  Root’s letter contained the germ of what became the 
Platt Amendment.  He ensconced these suggestions in a historical review of U.S.-Cuban 
relations from Thomas Jefferson through the McKinley administration.  These points, 
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according to Root, embodied nothing new but simply confirmed rights that the United 
States had already gained through the Teller Amendment, the war with Spain, and the 
resulting Treaty of Paris.  Wood agreed with these points and suggested that Root go a 
step further and require the Cubans to maintain the sanitation measure implemented 
during the occupation.  
Wood, as Root intended, presented the views of the administration to the newly 
created Cuban Committee on Relations.  The Cubans objected to the right of 
intervention and to the granting of naval coaling stations.  The committee soon became 
as paralyzed in dealing with the question of relations as had the convention as a whole.  
Wood attributed the inaction to “moral cowardice” on the part of the delegates.253  
Secretly, he told Root, they all considered the proposals just but feared being held 
accountable for their actions by their countrymen.  As such, Wood wrote, the delegates 
had intimated that it would be “easier to yield to request or demand of U.S. than [to] 
suggest relations.”254  Wood recommended the administration steadily apply pressure to 
the committee and resubmit the suggestions in the form of a direct request. 
The Platt Amendment, which passed out of the U.S. Senate committee on 
February 25, 1901, and became law on March 2, 1901, made the terms official and 
ratcheted up the pressure on the convention.  The amendment slightly revised and 
expanded the original suggestions made by the administration and incorporated Wood’s 
suggestion about ongoing sanitation policy.  Congressional codification of those 
suggestions into law strengthened the hand of the administration in dealing with the 
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Cuban convention.  Root argued that it made the acceptance of these points essential to 
ending the occupation. 
The amendment created a brief firestorm of protest among the delegates.  
Despite Wood’s assurance that they wanted and needed the administration to demand a 
certain set of provisions, the Cubans were at first dumbstruck by the action.  Some 
delegates threatened to dissolve the convention. Others threatened to ignore the Platt 
Amendment, proceed with drafting the electoral law, and adopt the constitution without 
any reference to relations.  More conservative members wanted to modify the wording 
of the amendment to make it less intrusive.  Others wanted the United States to make a 
unilateral declaration of the Platt Amendment and thus free them from having to vote 
upon it.  Almost all claimed that they had no authority to accept the amendment.   
In the midst of the firestorm and afraid that the efforts of the convention would 
come to nothing, Wood wrote Root in support of the conservative elements.  He called 
the apparent differences between the position of the administration and the conservatives 
to be “largely a matter of words, but words are . . . sometimes very important among 
sensitive people.”255  Root, however, remained firm.  He made it clear to Wood and the 
delegates that acceptance of the Platt Amendment provided the only means of ending the 
occupation. 256  If the convention could not complete its task, then another would have to 
be convened to take its place. 
Public opinion in Cuba also reacted negatively to the Platt Amendment.  Reports 
of public demonstrations from across the island began to pour in on March 6, 1901.  In 
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Havana, 15,000 people turned out in the streets to protest.  Telegrams against the 
amendment came from the different municipalities.  Although the political uproar lasted 
well in to April, Wood minimized their importance and rode out the storm.  As he wrote 
to Root, “I am permitting the people to blow off steam freely and shall not interfere with 
any talk or publication unless it becomes absolutely dangerous to public order.”257  The 
only legal action involved the forced closure of La Discussion de la Habana and the 
arrest of its editor / owner and cartoonist.  The paper had printed an illustration in honor 
of Easter Sunday entitled “The Cuban Cavalry.”  It depicted the Cuban people crucified 
between two thieves – McKinley and Wood.258 
For the Cubans the main point of contention remained the clauses granting the 
United States the right of intervention and naval stations.  According to Wood, the 
“radical element has interpreted both of these clauses incorrectly.  They have attempted 
to make it appear that the intervention will take place at the whim of the officers 
occupying naval stations.”259  Although Wood blamed the radicals, the Cuban 
Committee on Relations saw enough validity in their argument to request an official 
interpretation on the clauses and to attempt to place restrictions on their implementation.  
The administration complied with both Wood and Root giving assurances that the Platt 
amendment was not “synonymous with intermeddling or interference with the affairs of 
a Cuban government.”260  Root even agreed to negotiate the details surrounding the 
naval stations as long as the convention agreed to make such stations available. 
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The assurances provided by Root and Wood failed to satisfy the convention and 
they requested permission from the president for a committee to travel to Washington 
and discuss the matter with him directly.  Wood characterized the trip as a mere political 
gesture designed to allow the committee to save face in their acceptance of the Platt 
Amendment.  To the Cuban public, the convention portrayed the trip as a means “to 
obtain information on certain of the articles of the amendment which they do not quite 
understand period.”261  According to Wood, the actual “purpose of this visit is in reality 
to accept Platt amendment but this must not be even intimated.  That such is the fact I 
know from the men themselves.  Everything depends upon this being unknown.”262  The 
Cuban delegation, accompanied by Wood, arrived in Washington on April 24, 1901, and 
spent three days with Root, McKinley, and various senators.  All reiterated the assurance 
made earlier by Root and Wood.  The Cubans took copious notes and returned to the 
island for another round of deliberations.   
After an additional month of internal consideration, the Constitutional 
Convention passed an annotated version of the Platt Amendment as an appendix to the 
constitution by a vote of 15 to 14.  While the convention accepted the amendment 
verbatim, the Committee on Relations surrounded the actual wording with explanatory 
remarks that limited the application of the amendment.  Since the explanatory remarks 
largely reflected the committee’s discussion with the administration, Wood urged Root 
to accept the decision.  Root demurred and replied that he did not think that the 
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amendment as passed would allow the president to withdraw the army from Cuba.263  
Wood assured Root that “it is considered here to have been accepted without 
modifications; that the explanations, remarks, etc., are words, nothing more.  …  There 
is nothing to worry about.”264  Root evidently found much to worry about and he quickly 
called Wood to fall in line.  He considered the annotation and explanations attached to 
the amendment unacceptable and flatly stated that the president would not withdraw the 
U.S. Army until the convention passed a pristine version of the Platt Amendment and 
made provisions for the execution of the stipulations contained therein.  A chastened 
Wood carried the news to the Convention which passed the Platt Amendment “exactly a 
written without any change or modification whatever” by a vote of 16 to 11 on June 12, 
1901.265 
 
Conclusion 
As military governor of Cuba, Wood did not function in an operational vacuum.  
Larger factors of imperial governance, domestic partisan politics, Congressional 
scrutiny, and bureaucratic rivalries influenced the process of state building in Cuba.  A 
proper response to these challenges required the development of a close working 
relationship between the governor and the secretary of war.  Root and Wood proved an 
effective team and together they reshaped the lackluster policies of their predecessors 
and moved the occupation of Cuba to a successful conclusion.  Although Wood 
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supported the ultimate objectives of Cuban independence, he considered the timetable to 
be unrealistic.  He wanted time to train the Cubans not only in self-government but into 
progressive government.  To that end he shaped an internal program of progressive 
improvements designed to transform Cuban into the progressive image of the United 
States.  
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CHAPTER VI 
EFFORTS TO BUILD A CUBAN NATION 
 
Responsibility for the internal programs and reforms designed to rebuild Cuba and 
prepare it for independence fell squarely upon Leonard Wood as Military Governor.  
Although Wood kept Secretary of War Root informed of developments in Cuba, the 
secretary largely left Wood to pursue his own agenda on internal matters and only 
intervened if the issue in question had larger policy or political ramifications.  Root had 
chosen Wood, at least in part, due to his much publicized success in rebuilding Santiago 
and he delegated to him the task of doing the same for the entire island.  Wood eagerly 
accepted the challenge and adapted the Santiago program to the insular level.  As he had 
as a departmental commander, Wood focused on five major administrative policy areas 
that would have been familiar to American progressives:  sanitation and public health, 
public works, economic development, education, and law and order.  In his two and a 
half years as governor, Wood relied upon an insular government composed of an 
amalgamation of civil and military institutions under his ultimate direction to transform 
his agenda into reality. 
 
General Governance 
The occupation government that emerged under Wood’s direction proved a 
peculiar combination of civil and military components.  The Cuban Cabinet served as 
the primary civil apparatus for governing the island.  Wood inherited the general cabinet 
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structure from Governor Brooke but immediately expanded the cabinet posts from four 
to six departments – the Department of State and Government, the Department of 
Finance, the Department of Public Works, the Department of Agriculture, Commerce, 
and Industry, the Department of Public Instruction, and the Department of Justice.  He 
appointed men of his own choosing to lead these departments and to report directly to 
him.  Most appointees were men of influence who had served in the revolution and/or 
represented a political faction in postwar Cuba.  While Wood governed through these 
civilian secretaries and listened to their opinions, he did not consider himself bound in 
anyway by their recommendations or even by traditional lines of authority.  To exert 
control over the existing bureaucracies, Wood often created sub-departments, usually 
under the direction of a U.S. Army officer, within the existing cabinet departments to 
implement the reforms he desired and to report directly to him.  In other instances, as in 
the case of the army engineers, he simply wedded elements of the U.S. Army to the 
existing Cuban bureaucracy.   
To overseas the daily operation of the insular government, Wood relied heavily 
upon the Department of State and Government under Senor Diego Tamayo.  The 
department under his direction consisted of three sections:  the Section of State, the 
Section of General Government, and the Section of Government.  The Section of State 
functioned as the Cuban equivalent of the U.S. State Department and handled all matters 
related to foreign and consular affairs.  The Section of Government dealt with matters of 
daily governance including issues related to the press, copyright, censorship, and 
archives.  The Section of Government dealt with areas of municipal government, public 
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order, jails and penitentiary, and public health and charities.  Tamayo served faithfully 
with Wood throughout the occupation and even functioned as his primary contact with 
the Cuban Constitutional Convention.  With the routine tasks of general governance 
handled by a competent and trusted secretary, Wood had the freedom to pursue the 
internal programs and reforms he felt fundamental to success in Cuba. 
 
Financing the Reforms 
Wood enjoyed considerable freedom of action in Cuba largely due to his ability 
to keep the financial cost of his administration within the bounds of what the insular 
treasury could afford and thus did not have to request funding from the administration or 
Congress.  Although Congress had the power to review insular finances - a power they 
availed themselves of continually - the military governor alone had direct control of the 
receipts and disbursements.  In the words of Wood’s aide, Lieutenant Frank R. McCoy, 
the governor served as the “unrestricted appropriating authority and [was] directly 
responsible for the use of state funds.”266  Wood saw in Cuba a country in desperate 
need of internal improvements, good government, and modernization and he willin
committed insular resources to meeting those needs.  Under his direction, the military 
government spent more per year in normal operating costs and on internal improvements 
than it received in revenue.  “My policy,” Wood explained in his annual report, “has 
never been to accumulate a large reserve of money at the expense of doing necessary 
public work, but rather to expend the public funds in important and necessary 
gly 
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improvements.”267  Between January 1, 1900 and May 20, 1902, the military 
government received $44,132,111 in revenue and spent $45,360,899.  The Wood 
administration inherited $1,863,958 from the Brooke administration and left $635,170 in 
the Treasury for the Republic of Cuba when it assumed control.  (See Table 6:1) 
 
Table 6:1 Revenue and Disbursements268 
 
Year             Revenue  Disbursement     
 
Cash on hand Jan. 1, 1900   1,863,958.46 
 
Jan. 1 to Dec. 31, 1900 19,044,305.46 19,060,811.64    -16,506.18  
Jan. 1 to Dec. 31, 1901 17,941,314.36 18,678,437.11    -737,122.75 
Jan. 1 to May 20, 1902   7,146,491.43   7,621,650.67    -475,159.24 
 
Cash on hand May 20, 1902      635,170.29 
         
 
 
The overwhelming majority of revenue flowing monthly into the Cuban treasury 
came from the Cuban Customs Service.  The U.S. Army, under the direction of the 
military government, took control of insular customs on January 1, 1899.  Under the 
Spanish administration, corruption, graft, and political patronage had riddled the customs 
service and significantly reduced its efficiency and revenue intake.  The United States 
consolidated the service into sixteen customs houses throughout the island and placed 
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each under the direct supervision of an American, usually an officer or a former officer 
in the U.S. Army.269  Major Tasker H. Bliss served as the Chief of the Cuban Customs 
Service and as the collector of customs for Havana throughout the occupation.  He 
supervised the entire customs service as well as a small fleet of revenue cutters and 
customs launches.  The elimination of corruption allowed the insular government to 
lower import and export duties while at the same time collecting more revenue.270  The 
military government eventually abolished all export duties on April 1, 1901.  (See Table 
6:2.  For a list of the amounts collected at each customs house, see Appendix A.) 
 
Table 6:2 Customs Revenue Compared to Total Insular Revenue271 
 
  Customs    Total             Percentage of 
Year  Revenue    Revenue  Total Revenue  
 
Jan. 1 to Dec. 31, 1900 16,136,523.28 19,044,305.46 85% 
Jan. 1 to Dec. 31, 1901 15,657,616.84 17,941,314.36 87% 
Jan. 1 to May 20, 1902   5,774,411.93   7,146,491.43 81% 
 
Total  37,568,552.05 44,132,111.25 85% 
         
 
The remaining income destined for the Cuban Treasury came from a mixture of 
internal revenue and receipts from the postal and telegraph services. The Department of 
Finance (Hacienda) oversaw all areas of internal revenue, supervised municipal finances, 
executed payroll for all governmental employees, and managed all governmental 
buildings and public lands.  The revenue the department collected came largely from 
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taxes (conveyance, inheritance, industrial, commercial, freight, etc.) and from the sell or 
rental of public lands, property, or resources.  (See Table 6:3)  Charged by Wood to 
develop and implement a systematic form of internal taxation and to standardize 
municipal accounting procedures and the collection of municipal taxes, the department 
sent trained representatives across the island as instructors.  Leopoldo Cancio, a native of 
Cuba, led the department for most of the two and half years of Wood’s administration. 
 
Table 6:3 Revenue from Sources other than Customs272 
 
 Year Ending Year Ending Year Ending  
Receipts Dec. 31, 1900 Dec. 31, 1901 May 20, 1902     Total 
 
Internal Revenue  798,638.34 693,879.48 339,171.49 1,831,689.31 
Postal Service  321,539.62 359,060.64 161,314.40 841,914.66 
Telegraph Service  66,834.19 82,830.71 44,832.64 194,497.54 
Miscellaneous  81,857.68 183,852.01 98,865.47 364,575.16 
 
Total  1,268,869.83 1,319,622.84 644,184.00 3,232,676.67 
         
 
 
 
At the beginning of the American occupation, the insular government simply 
allocated block grants of funding to the various departmental commanders and allowed 
them to disburse the money as they deemed best based on local conditions.  The War 
Department and General Chaffee, chief of staff to Governor Brooke, abolished that 
system on June 1, 1899, and instituted one based on allotments that the Wood 
administration inherited.  Under the allotment system, estimates on governmental 
expenditures originated at the municipal, provincial, and/or departmental level and 
worked their way up the chain of command to the military governor who made the final 
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decision on whether to authorize the allocation of funds for the estimate.  Wood rejected 
fixed budgeting as impossible due to the extraordinary demands involved in the “general 
reconstruction of the country, and the building up of new institutions.”273  Only the 
amount of money available in the treasury limited the funds expended in reconstruction.  
The lack of restrictions allowed Wood to easily transfer funds between allotments and to 
rapidly alter funding as he saw fit.  If a demand arose for more funds, he simply curtailed 
public works and detailed the saved funding to the new demand.  Once approved 
disbursements proceeded down the chain of command to the various civilian and 
military disbursing officers.   
Ultimate responsibility for maintaining the integrity of the insular financial 
system fell to the Auditor’s Department of the Military Government.  Prior to June 30, 
1899, five separate auditors exercised “distinct and independent jurisdiction over 
accounts pertaining to the moneys of the island.”274  President McKinley created the 
single office of auditor for the islands with an auditor and two assistant auditors.  The 
assistants, one for customs receipts and one for postal receipts, functioned under the 
auditor but remained in their respective departments.  When Wood took office as 
military governor, he moved to centralize the auditing system further.  The postal 
scandal gave momentum to his efforts and by May 1900 a strengthened and centralized 
office of auditor emerged.  The new office kept track of the financial affairs of both the 
civil and military sides of the occupation and worked closely with the governor, the 
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departmental heads, and military commanders to answer inquiries from Congress.  After 
such a rough beginning, the department soon settled into a routine and functioned 
effectively for the remainder of the occupation.  It concluded its work on July 19, 1902, 
almost two months after the transfer of power to the Republic of Cuba, with a complete 
thorough accounting for the financial affairs of the military government.  The auditor 
and Congressional oversight provided the only check on Wood’s financial independence. 
 
Reconstituting Municipal Government 
As he had in Santiago, Wood regarded local municipalities as the key to a 
revitalized Cuban society and the foundation upon which to build a stable insular 
government.  During his governorship and even previously as a provincial commander, 
Wood spent a lot of time and resources reconstructing municipal government and 
attempting to standardize their operations.  He considered the decades of Spanish 
mismanagement the primary obstacle to establishing good government.  Municipal 
officers,  
 
were much hampered in the performance of their official duties by the 
prevalence of old customs and ideas, which had resulted in an almost 
entire destruction of public spirit and interest in good government.  For 
twenty-five years previous inattention to municipal duties and 
responsibilities had characterized nearly all the municipalities of Cuba.  
There had always been a tendency to an abnormally large personnel and 
entirely disproportionate outlay for official salaries in comparison with 
expenditure for public improvements.275 
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Under the tutelage and discipline of the insular government, Wood sought to curtail 
these abuses, reform and standardize municipal expenditures and the collection of 
revenue, inspire civic pride and involvement, and turn the municipalities into a 
mechanism of progressive reform. 
The insular government ultimately wanted the municipalities to be financially 
self-sufficient and able to pay their own operating costs through the collection of local 
taxes; property taxes, licensing fees, etc.  The devastation caused by the Cuban 
insurrection however made it impossible for the municipalities to immediately meet even 
the basic operating costs as the amount collected through internal taxation proved 
negligible.  During 1899 the Brooke administration found itself forced to come to the aid 
of the municipalities and to pay all principal expenses – public education, police and 
judicial system, sanitation and sanitary works, jails, hospitals, and asylums.276  Even 
with the insular government covering these costs, the municipalities ended the year 
$300,000 in debt and once again the insular government had to come to their financial 
assistance.277  Shortly after becoming governor, Wood endorsed Brooke’s decision to 
use insular funds to cover the principal expenses of the municipalities for the foreseeable 
future.  He did however stipulate that all other municipal expenses had to be covered by 
local taxation and that the insular government would not cover any municipal deficits 
incurred after December 31, 1899.  The municipal governments had to learn to live 
within their budgets.  
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Wood worked closely with the Department of Finance to assist the municipalities 
in gaining a financial foothold.  The task proved difficult because the previous Spanish 
administration had in many cases destroyed all public records.  The new municipal 
government had to start from scratch by compiling tax lists, making new property 
assessments, and re-assembling the countless number of records needed for taxation 
purposes.  Many of the people chosen for and later elected to municipal office had little 
to no experience in such matters and the Department of Finance had to dispatch 
instructors once again to assist local officials and train them in the basics of municipal 
accounting. 
Wood hoped that the first municipal election on June 16, 1900 would mark the 
beginning of municipal independence from insular oversight and supervision.  Instead, 
he later reflected that it “was the beginning of a period of great difficulty for the general 
government.”278  The newly elected officials, replacing those previously appointed by 
the military government, had to be trained and brought up to speed on municipal 
finances.  To assist the new officials, the Department of Finance issued explicit 
instructions, rules, and regulations to follow in submitting municipal budgets, collecting 
taxes, and requesting funds.  It also launched systematic inspections of the various 
municipalities with the goal of finding and correcting abuse and mistakes.  By the end of 
the year, financial irregularities had led to the suspension of some alcaldes, the removal 
of others, and the arrest of more than a few.279 
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Serious and politically embarrassing issues arose in Havana and Santiago.  
Although Wood initially had high hopes for the Havana municipal government, by the 
end of 1900, he flatly declared it the “worst and most incompetent in the island” and 
noted that “constant restraint has had to be applied [by the insular government] to 
prevent serious abuses.”280  By the end of 1901, Wood had become so fed up with the 
city government that he recommended in his official report that it be declared a federal 
district and governed by a commission.  Only the constant supervision of the military 
government had kept municipal officials from creating circumstances “dangerous to 
public interest, and has necessitated the entire control of sanitary and engineering work 
and a close supervision over the police and their protection against political attacks.”281  
In Santiago, an investigation by the inspector general found enough evidence of 
mismanagement and corruption to require the removal of the mayor and the appointment 
of a replacement by Wood.282 
The level of control exercised by the insular government over the municipalities 
troubled a number of important Cubans.  Emilio Nunez, Civil Governor of Habana 
Province, warned that state funding of municipal government risked depriving the 
municipalities of their individuality, “inasmuch as the State on contributing to their 
maintenance must necessarily have intervention in the exercise of control over matters 
for which it pays – a highly dangerous situation if the liberties that those institutions 
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should have as modern principles advise, are to be respected and augmented.”283  Nunez 
called a meeting of all the municipal mayors of his province in May 1900 to discuss 
municipal autonomy and the revision of the tax structure so that each municipality could 
fund its own expenditures.  The conference unanimously held “it to be of great utility to 
the common interest that the greatest possible decentralization in government matters 
should prevail and … that a true and effective municipal autonomy be established.”284  
Nunez went further, 
 
the centralization of power by the latter [State] being antagonistic to the 
good principles of government, whereby the municipalities are deprived 
of rights that pertain to the as local governments, individual initiative is 
enervated, the liberty of the people to elect their rulers is annulled, and 
the action of the government, that should be promptly exercised by the 
proper parties, hindered in their management and control of interests that 
are freely confided to them.285 
 
 
Nunez and the alcaldes of his province called for the greatest amount of freedom 
possible at the municipal level with the State only exercising the right to inspect 
municipal government.  They acknowledged the need for the municipalities to become 
self-sufficient and urged the abolishment of municipalities that could not support 
themselves. 
P.G. Betancourt, civil governor of the Matanzas province, raised concerns about 
the structure of the municipal system as well.  In his annual report, he pointed out that 
most of the municipalities were artificial entities created by the Spanish government at 
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the end of the Ten Years War as a means of extending its control over the interior.  “The 
establishment of our municipalities is not due to the natural expansion of social life, nor 
to the wise union of minor groups, the reason whereby they do not have the 
characteristic vigor of spontaneous formations, nor do they respond to effective and 
traditional exigencies.”286  Many of the municipalities, Betancourt held, did not serve the 
people they represented but the interests of the political party, individual leaders, and the 
previous Spanish government which sought to dominate the municipalities to further its 
own agenda.  He recommended that the municipalities be restructured and territorial 
adjustments made to provide the tax base necessary for self-sufficiency. 
Concern over the centralization of power in Havana extended to the Department 
of Finance.  Secretary Cancio acknowledged that current financial policy would 
essentially make the municipalities “agents of the central administration, even when they 
were of popular and elective origin” and he believed Wood’s administration deprived 
local officials “of the feeling and of the exercise of self-responsibility [and] never 
educates them for self-government.” 287  Cancio argued for local control and self-
sufficiency as the only means of learning self-government.  He believed that the simple 
act of funding municipal services with insular funds encouraged irresponsibility among 
municipal leaders who counted on the insular treasury to meet their budget deficits. 
Wood did not share the reservations of his subordinates or even those of 
Secretary Root who wanted to end a system that kept the municipalities “under complete 
                                                 
286 “Report of the Civil Government of the Province of Matanzas,” 28 June 1900, 56th Cong, 2d Sess, H. 
Docs, vol. 1, pt. 11, vol. 1, pt. 2, 112. 
287 “Report of Leopoldo Cancio, Secretary of Finance,” 56th Cong, 2d Sess, H. Docs, vol. 1, pt. 11, vol. 1, 
pt. 3, 18. 
  
  159
financial subjection to the Havana government.”288  Wood saw the insular government 
as an excellent tutor for the municipal governments and dismissed fears that centralize
control and policy directives from above might not be the best way to address local 
issues and concerns.  In only a matter of a few months, Wood had completely reversed 
his position and now championed the policy on which he had challenged Brooke.  The 
ease with which Wood abandoned former principles leaves the impressions that the main 
thing for Wood was control.  In Santiago he wanted control of the finances so he voiced 
opposition to centralization that would have placed Brooke in control.  As insular 
governor he wanted control so he supported centralization and downplayed the need for 
regional autonomy.  For Wood it was not about the principles or the system but about 
accruing power.  He trusted himself, an enlightened progressive, to use that power for 
the good of all.  He did not trust that amount of power in others.   
d 
                                                
While he dismissed their concerns of centralization, Wood agreed with 
Betancourt that the number of municipalities were excessive and thus depleted the tax 
base unnecessarily.  Out of the 128 municipalities, a total of 106 existed in the western 
provinces of Havana, Matanzas, Pinar del Rio and Santa Clara.  Only 22 existed in the 
eastern provinces of Santiago and Puerto Principe.  The four western provinces 
contained 43 percent of the total area of the island and the two eastern provinces 
controlled 57 percent.289  Since municipal income came largely from property taxes, the 
sheer number of municipalities in the western provinces insured a smaller revenue base 
for each.  Wood worked closely with the Department of Finance and the Department of 
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State and Government to reduce the number of municipalities by either abolishing 
smaller ones or consolidating them with larger townships.  By the end of the occupation, 
he had reduced the total number of municipalities to 82.290  The goal, according to 
Wood, was for each surviving municipality to have no fewer than 12,000 inhabitants, 
“and territory with a sufficient number of properties in production to yield in the near 
future . . . the necessary income from the maintenance and support of such public 
obligations as the municipalities of Cuba are called upon to fulfil (sic).”291  After two 
and half years of labor to make the municipalities more self-sustaining, the increase in 
revenue only allowed the insular government to terminate its support for municipal 
police.  All other policies areas remained funded by the insular treasury.  (See Table 6:4) 
 
Table 6:4 Expenditure per Appropriation related to Municipalities292 
            To 
Appropriation 1900 1901 May 20, 1902 Total  
 
Municipalities 58,896.06 1486.00 20,000.00 80,382.06 
Police 988,077.61 367,614.89 2,921.60 1,358,614.10 
 
Total 1,046,973.67 369,100.89 22,921.60 1,438,996.16 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Sanitation and Public Health 
In Santiago Wood pioneered many of the sanitation measures later adopted by 
the military government under Brooke.  He expanded on these measures when he 
assumed ultimate command in Havana.  Throughout the occupation departmental 
commanders and local military officers bore primary responsibility for basic sanitation 
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and hygiene in the cities garrisoned by American troops.293  Municipalities not 
garrisoned by American troops controlled their own sanitation efforts, usually under the 
supervision of the U.S. military authority in their area.  Initial sanitation efforts focused 
largely on the removal of the existing filth and garbage from the cities and designing 
basic means of disposing of future waste in a hygienic manner.  By early 1900 most of 
the municipalities had freed themselves from the debris and carnage left from the war 
and began to institute measures designed to relieve specific local conditions.   
Havana, as the capital and chief port of the island, proved an especially troubling 
municipality in regard to sanitation.  Devoid of a functioning sewer system, many of the 
residents simply allowed refuge and filth to accumulate in the streets and gutters or in 
private cesspools.  Much of the garbage and filth ultimately found its way to the bay 
which had, according to the chief surgeon, the “reputation as one of the filthiest in the 
world.”294  Medical authorities attributed many of the diseases that periodically raged 
through the municipal population to these unsanitary conditions.  Major Valery Havard, 
Chief Surgeon for the department, argued that no system of sanitation could be truly 
effective so “long as the city is honeycombed with latrines, old and new, and fragments 
of ill-constructed, unventilated sewers (often mere elongated cesspools), whose contents 
seep into the porous limestone.”295  Under these conditions, Havard concluded, “a high 
rate of sickness can not be prevented.”296   
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Major W.C. Gorgas, who oversaw sanitation efforts in the city of Havana, 
attempted to implement a systematic solution to the problem while leaving the 
construction of a municipal sewer to the realm of public works.  Under his direction the 
sanitary department methodically inspected every house in the city at least three times 
during a given year.  The inspectors issued work orders to homeowners found in 
violation of the basic sanitation code and required that they perform the necessary work, 
usually within the period of a week.  Homeowners who refused to comply with an order 
received a fine.  If the inspectors found a particularly unsanitary house, then a sanitation 
squad under the direction of an inspector cleaned the house immediately.  Wood directed 
that all houses be cleaned and kept cleaned through the regular and liberal application of 
disinfectants, usually electrozone, bi-chloride of mercury and/or chloride of lime, 
sprinkled on the walls, in and around the houses, and in the yards and courts.297  Houses 
with defective plumbing received a visit from the engineering department, which 
authorized and then supervised the necessary repairs.  By February 1901, Gorgas had 
divided the city into twenty inspection districts with his department inspecting six 
hundred houses per day and issuing an average of 250 orders for cleaning.  At that rate, 
the Havana sanitation department could inspect the entire city every two months.298  The 
Havana office developed a property database containing a file that documented 
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everything the department had done pertaining to a particular house.299  Similar efforts 
occurred in the other major cities. 
In addition to the property inspections, the major municipalities also employed a 
large force of street sweepers to remove the filth and garbage from the public streets and 
parks.  In Santiago the street sweeping crews cleaned the 86 ½ miles of city streets on a 
daily basis.  Colonel Samuel Whitside, the departmental commander, estimated that 
within a year the sanitation department removed 25,000 cubic yards of street sweepings 
and 118,000 cubic yards of garbage from the city, which it then burned using 35,000 
gallons of crude petroleum.300  In Havana specially designed barges hauled the garbage 
and refuge out to the open sea and dumped it.  Disinfectant squads often cleaned the 
public buildings, utilities, streets, and sewers with liberal portions of the same 
disinfectants used on the houses.   Within a single year, Santiago alone used four 
thousand gallons of carbolic acid and eleven thousand pounds of chloride of lime.301 
Private charitable institutions in Cuba had crumpled under the demands placed 
upon them by the decades of political unrest, war, and economic decline.  Secretary Root 
reported that the war had left most charitable institutions without “funds or supplies . . . 
dilapidated, filthy, and unsanitary.  The hospitals were practically without apparatus, 
medicines, or physicians.  The children in the asylums were receiving but little 
education, insufficient food and insufficient care.”302  Initially the occupation 
government attempted to work within the existing institutions to meet the healthcare 
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needs of the population by providing a monetary stipend to the cover the cost of 
individual patients.  In Havana the municipal government provided direct funding of 
between $7.50 to $10.00 per month for each orphan and from 25 to 50 cents a day for 
hospital patients.303   
Under the Brooke administration, departmental commanders supervised the 
various charitable institutions and hospitals and provided funding estimates.  The 
somewhat loosely organized and decentralized system soon gave way to Wood’s desire 
to centralize authority and control in Havana.  Less than two months after taking office, 
Wood appointed Major Edwin St. John Greble as Superintendent of Charities and 
Hospitals.  In April Wood brought in Homer Folks, who had led the charge for the 
public health movement in New York City, as a consultant to help Greble organize and 
launch the Department of Charities, which Wood created by executive degree with Civil 
Order No. 271 on July 7, 1900.304  Nominally under the control of the Department of 
State and Government, Greble reported directly to Wood. 
The fundamental law governing charities throughout the island, Civil Order No. 
271, drastically altered the previous relationship between charitable institutions and the 
public by removing the control and supervision of these organizations from the private 
sector to the government.  The law defined “charitable institutions” as all private 
hospitals, “orphan asylums, and institutions for destitute children, juvenile reformatories, 
homes for the aged, hospitals for the insane, and all other institutions and societies 
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organized for, or whose principal business is the support or assistance of, persons who 
are unable to support or care for themselves.”305  To oversee these institutions, the law 
created an eleven member board of charities with each of the members appointed by the 
military governor – one from each province and five at large members.  Charitable 
institutions reported annually to the board.  The board inspected each institution once 
every six months and had the power and authority to hold hearings, compel testimony, 
and question witnesses under oath.  The board or its surrogates had “full access to the 
grounds, books, and papers of every such institution, and . . . [could] require from the 
officers and persons in charge thereof any information which they . . . deem[ed] 
necessary . . . to make a thorough inspection.”306  Public funding and the level of 
oversight given to the central government had a chilling affect upon private charitable 
contributions, which subsequently declined.  It also led to the withdrawal of several 
religious orders from participation with the institutions.307 
Civil Order No. 271 had its most profound impact on the care and supervision of 
orphaned and destitute children.  Article II shifted the burden of caring for destitute or 
delinquent children to the central government and away from municipal, district, and 
provincial institutions.  It prevented the establishment of new orphanages and allowed 
the board of charities to disband existing ones, which it increasingly did until less than a 
dozen remained at the end of the American occupation.  To replace the orphanages, the 
law created a Bureau for placing Children in Families.  Those children who could not be 
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placed in a family went to the Training School for Boys at Santiago de las Vegas or to 
the Compostela Training School for Girls at Havana.  The boys attended public school, 
trained in military drill, and learned a trade at the 200 acre institution, which contained a 
fully functional farm and various industrial workshops.  The girls attended public school 
and received instruction in the various branches of housework.  Children between the 
ages of ten and sixteen, previously convicted of a crime or misdemeanor, attended the 
Reform School for Boys at Guanajay or the Reform School for Girls at Aldecoa.  Those 
committed by the state to the reform schools received the same education and training as 
those in the training schools but within an environment structured to reward good 
behavior and punish bad.  The bureau returned most of the destitute children, committed 
to the orphanages by their impoverished families, to their relatives once the economic 
situation in the island began to improve.  Over the course of the occupation, it placed an 
additional 530 children with other families.308  By the end of the occupation, the military 
government had either placed the orphaned or destitute children in private homes or 
committed them to one of the aforementioned government institutions.  (See Table 6:5)  
Only a handful of private institutions remained and the state provided no funding for 
children outside of their own system. 
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Table 6:5 Number of Children in the State Support System at Date 
 
Institute July 1, 1901309  Dec. 31, 1901310 May 20, 1902311 
 
Reform School for Boys  408 179 211 
Reform School for Girls  83 96 94 
Training School for Boys  113 338 378 
Training School for Girls  170 155 171 
         
 
 
 
The Department of Charities organized and financed numerous medical facilities 
throughout the island.  The department created the General Asylum for the Insane at 
Mazorra, near Havana, and centralized the care of the insane to that facility.  (See Table 
6:6)  Formerly held at local hospitals and even in some prisons, Wood and Greble made 
a concerted effort to have all the insane transferred to Mazorra for treatment.  The state 
sponsored two leprosy hospitals, both named San Lazaro Hospital, in Havana and Santa 
Clara.  At the provincial level, the department supported and managed five General 
Hospitals, one located in each province with the exception of Pinar del Rio.  Each of the 
general hospitals operated a training program for nurses conducted by Americans 
recruited by the insular government as instructors.312  The department also fully funded 
twenty-four municipal hospitals and provided financial assistance to municipal 
institutions designed to assist the elderly.  As with many other municipal services, the 
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central government hoped the municipalities would eventually assume finance 
responsibility. It did not happen under the American occupation. 
 
Table 6:6  Number of Patients at the General Asylum for the Insane at Mazorra at Date 
 
January 1, 1901  639313 
July 1, 1901  722314 
December 31, 1901 861315 
May 20, 1902  939316 
         
 
One of the most celebrated achievements in the area of sanitation and public 
health came with the investigation into yellow fever and its propagation.  Initially the 
occupational government treated the disease as a filth disease caused by the unhealthy 
and unsanitary environment existing in most Cuban cities.  They felt confident that the 
extensive sanitation measures adopted by the military would completely eradicated the 
disease over time; however, despite their best efforts, yellow fever continually broke 
forth in epidemic proportion.  Almost everyone in a leadership expressed his own pet 
theory on the source and spread of the disease – frequenting houses of ill-repute, 
drinking intoxicating liquor in the tropical heat, disturbing the microbes in the soil 
through excavation, coming into contact with articles or a dwelling associated with a 
fever patient, etc.  Each new outbreak brought increased sanitation and various other 
prescriptions, depending on the pet theory, designed to contain the disease.  Yet, the 
disease proved unmanageable and unpredictable. 
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The U.S. Army and the Surgeon-General of the Army took the existence and 
dangers of tropical diseases seriously and dispatch what became known at the American 
Yellow Fever Commission to Cuba to investigate all “acute infectious diseases 
prevailing” on the island.317  The four member board arrived on June 25, 1900, under the 
command of Major Walter Reed, Surgeon, U.S. Army.  Members of the board included 
Reed and Contract Surgeons James Carroll, Aristides Agramonte, and Jesse Lazear, U.S. 
Army.  They immediately launched into an investigation of a yellow fever epidemic then 
underway in Quemados.  Reed approached Wood for the funding to conduct numerous 
experiments designed to evaluate many of the pet theories about yellow fever.  Wood 
recognized the value of the project and, thanks to the lack of fixed accounting, 
immediately transferred funding previously approved for police.  He also drafted a set of 
guidelines to govern how the board conducted experiments using volunteers from the 
U.S. Army stationed in Cuba.  In drafting the guidelines, providing funding, and 
authorizing the recruitment of volunteers from the ranks, Wood accepted ultimate 
responsibility for the project.   
The experiments conducted by the board effectively dispelled many of the myths 
surrounding yellow fever.  It then confirmed and scientifically demonstrated the original 
theory advanced by Dr. Carlos Finlay of Havana that mosquitoes spread the disease.  In 
response to the finding, Wood launched an extensive program designed to eradicate the 
mosquito and to control the spread of the disease.  He had barracks and quarters covered 
with mosquito screens, water receptacles covered, and doused pools of water with 
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kerosene to prevent the breeding of mosquitoes.318  New guidelines released by the 
military occupation called upon health authorities to keep yellow fever patients isolated 
from mosquitoes and to try and eliminate any mosquitoes still in the area that might have 
already become infected.  The program worked and by June 1901 Wood claimed that the 
effort against yellow fever had essentially driven the disease from the island.319 
The Quarantine Service, operated by the insular government, assisted in the 
effort to control the spread of disease.  At all of the principle ports of the island, the 
service had the power and authority to detain individual vessels, passengers, and cargo 
suspected of being infected or carrying infected material or personnel.  The service 
equipped its agents at each principle port with disinfecting apparatus designed to handle 
various types of shipping whether afloat or ashore.320  The geographical location of 
Cuba made Havana a valuable port for the tramp steamers, passenger liners, and other 
vessels operating between ports in the United States, Central America, and Mexico.  In 
the past such coastal shipping had carried yellow fever from Central America to Cuba 
and then to the United States.321  Usually these epidemics remained largely in the 
American south but at times reached as far north as Washington D.C.  The Quarantine 
Service and the equipment it used proved essential in prohibiting the propagation of 
disease and making trade safer. 
In addition to the benefits to public health in Cuba and the United States, these 
efforts had a larger impact upon American imperial policy.  The success of sanitation 
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and public health efforts in Cuba answered the larger question of whether or not 
American troops could serve effectively in the tropical environment.  Through the 
strenuous efforts undertaken by Wood and the military government the death rate per 
thousand of American troops in Cuba actually dropped below that of troops in the 
United States in1901 and remained lower throughout the occupation.  The death rate for 
thousand of troops in the United States was 10.14 in 1901 and 6.9 in 1902.322  In Cuba 
the rate was 9.72 in 1901 and 5.29 in 1902.323  As Brigadier General Fitzhugh Lee had 
foreseen in 1900, “if vigilance is at all times exercised troops can be kept in the tropics 
without loss of health, vigor, or military efficiency.”324  The Medical Department 
forecast in 1901 that, with the enforcement of the sanitary regulations, “the health of the 
troops stationed in the Tropics will be quite as good as if stationed in our own Gulf 
States.”325  The conclusion proved promising for continued efforts in the Philippines and 
for the pending canal project.  (See Table 6:7) 
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Table 6:7 Expenditure per Appropriation Related to Sanitation and Public Health326 
 
      To May 20, 
Appropriation 1901 1902 1902 Total 
 
Charities and Hospitals 1,757,697.08 1,589,459.13 547,337.66 3,894,493.87 
Quarantine Service 275,228.56 209,797.90 62,015.35 547,041.81 
Sanitation 3,018,903.50 2,787,093.16 1,035,808.40 6,841,805.06 
 
Total 5,051,829.14 4,586,350.19 1,645,161.41 11,283,340.74 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Public Works 
Wood considered an insular program of public works directed from Havana 
essential to the revitalization of the island and the future economic and thus political 
prosperity of the Cuban Republic.  Wood estimated that almost nothing had been done 
beyond his own efforts in Santiago and some road construction in and around Havana 
for almost forty years.327  The Brooke administration had authorized two road projects in 
Mantanzas province but work ground to a halt as the department lacked the necessary 
equipment to properly survey and plan the field work.  The secretary of public works 
reported that, outside of Havana, not “a single set of instruments for surveys and field 
work” existed in the entire island.328  The military government even lacked basic road 
building equipment like steam rollers and stone crushers.329  If Wood wanted a system 
of public works at the insular level, he had to build it from scratch. 
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True to his convictions about the importance of infrastructure development, 
Wood poured every ounce of revenue not allocated elsewhere into the various projects.  
In his first civil report, he declared, the “work of this department [public works] is 
among the most important and its responsibilities and duties will greatly increase with 
the development of the island and be limited only by the amount of funds available for 
the construction of public works.  The field is a vast one and includes every variety of 
general engineering work.”330  He refused to allow revenue to accumulate in the insular 
treasury.  Instead he diverted surplus funds toward a growing list of insular projects.  He 
even planned, as the municipalities assumed financial responsibility for other 
expenditures, to reallocate the funds previously spent on the municipalities to public 
works.331  To the incoming Cuban government, Wood stressed the importance and 
necessity of public works for many years to come.  He counseled that the “demand for 
expenditure in this field is so great that the allotments from year to year will necessarily 
be limited only by the amount of money available.”332   
Wood considered public works important because the completion of those 
projects multiplied the impact of the money spent into other policy areas.  Road 
construction and infrastructure improvements contributed to sanitation, economic 
development, and imperial defense while providing needed employment to the 
population.  A single road could address drainage and sewage issues, open up untapped 
markets in the interior, allow previously isolated farmers access to coastal markets, 
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develop lines of communication and increase the ability to move troops, and put funds in 
the pockets of the previously unemployed.  Wood recognized great potential in the 
Cuban people and their natural resources.  He saw public works as the key to unlocking 
that potential and elevated it to an independent cabinet post once he became governor.   
The Department of Public Works went through several modifications over the 
first six months of Wood’s tenure.  In the end it emerged as a hybrid organization 
composed of civil and military components.  Jose Ramon Villalon, the Secretary of 
Public Works, exercised nominal control over all public works on the island.  The U.S. 
Army relinquished official control over projects undertaken in the provinces of Pinar del 
Rio, Matanzas and Puerto Principe to the department on July 1, 1900, and those in the 
provinces of Havana, Santa Clara, and Santiago de Cuba a month later.  Practically, 
however, the U.S. Army and more particularly Wood remained in charge of these 
projects through the Office of Chief Engineer and through local engineer officers 
scattered throughout the island.  The chief engineer bore responsibility for harbor 
improvements in Havana, conducting an extensive survey of that city, and for the 
preparation of a military map of the island.  He also supervised the work of the Chief 
Engineer of the City of Havana and acting engineer officers stationed at Matanzas, 
Manzanillo, Cienfuegos, Holquin, Puerto Principe, Santiago, Quemados, Baracoa, and 
San Luis.333  Through the Chief Engineer and the engineer officers, all members of the 
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U.S. Army, the military governor controlled the focus and extent of public works in 
Cuba. 
Although the military government pursued a variety of projects, Wood 
considered the primary task of the department “to open up communication between the 
rich agricultural, mining, and timber districts, and means of transportation by rail and 
sea.”334  To that end he pursued an extensive program of road construction and 
improvements designed to open access into the interior.  At the beginning of his 
governorship, Wood estimated that Cuba needed 1,500 miles of “first-class turnpike 
roads” at a relative cost of $10,000 a mile for a total price tag of $15,000,000.335  He 
considered the fifteen million a conservative estimate since it did not include secondary 
connector roads or allow for much variation in the cost of material and transportation.  
Even connector country roads could cost between $9,000 and $15,000 per mile.336  
Much of the cost came from the superior quality of the roads Wood envisioned for the 
island.  The tropical weather and a rainy season that lasted from June to October proved 
disastrous to simple roads of packed dirt or gravel.  These roads became impassable to 
all but pack animals during the worst weather.337  Wood intended to build roads made of 
packed stone and pavement designed to shed the water into accompanying ditches and 
culverts.  Bridges, designed and built by the engineers, would span the larger streams 
and rivers. 
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Since the necessary funding and time did not exist to undertake all the projects 
envisioned, the military government kept several factors in mind while prioritizing road 
construction.  Not wanting to repeat the mistakes of the Spanish and inflame regional 
tension, the occupation government made a conscious decision to undertake road 
construction projects in all the provinces rather than to focus exclusively on Havana.  In 
deciding the priority of projects and the particular route, the government gave 
precedence to projects that connected the interior to existing infrastructure, opened up 
new fertile territory, and/or connected the countryside to the market towns.  The 
government also gave consideration to projects that provided needed employment to 
areas still recovering form the devastation of the war or lowered railroad shipping rates 
by providing an economically alternative means of transportation.  All in all the 
government sought to create a growing network of turnpikes and roads designed to link 
the countryside to the city and harness the natural resources of the island for economic 
development.  With only a construction window of roughly seven months between mid-
November and the end of May, prioritization proved essential.338 
The lack of accurate and comprehensive maps of the island hindered efforts by 
the military government to develop the infrastructure network.  At the time only partial 
maps, usually of a city, railroad, or fortification, existed with any degree of accuracy.  
No reliable topographical map of the island existed.339  To remedy the situation, Wood 
assigned responsibility for creating an accurate “military map” of the island to the Chief 
Engineer.  The very designation of a “military map” demonstrated the various purposes 
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served by public works.  The chief engineer planned to use practice marches made by 
U.S. Army garrison troops to collect the necessary information.  The patrols were to 
explore the unmapped countryside, collect topographical, economic, and political data, 
and then send their completed reports to the Office of the Chief Engineer for 
compilation.  Unfortunately, the shortage of officers caused by hostilities in the 
Philippines and China limited the availability of officers for these patrols until 1902.  In 
the meantime, the chief engineer compiled what information he could from the small 
number of patrols possible, from surveys conducted as part of the road building program 
and railroad construction, and from coastal surveys conducted by the Light-House 
Department.  The military map of Cuba remained largely incomplete at the end of the 
occupation. 
In addition to road building and map making, the department engaged in various 
projects across the island.  The military government conducted harbor improvements in 
all the major port cities.  The extent of the improvements ranged from simple wharf 
repair, to the expansion of wharf and pier facilities, to the dredging of harbors to allow 
for increased commercial shipping.  The Light-House Service, which became a part of 
the Department of Public Works just prior to the transfer of government, oversaw the 
construction and equipping of light-houses, the buoying and marking of harbors, and 
other tasks consistent with coastal shipping.  In the major cities, the military government 
spent considerable time and energy in repairing or constructing new public buildings.  
The secretary had high hopes for these buildings and saw something more than just the 
creation of new working space or the growing government.  He wanted the building to 
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possess architecture and artistic appeal so as to encourage emulation in the private 
sector.  “Fine buildings,” he argued, “not only serve to make the community having 
them feel proud but they also furnish an indirect public income.  Wherever architecture 
is good, commerce is prosperous.  In reality many cities of Europe live to-day upon the 
money spent by tourists who are attracted to them by the beauty of their buildings.”340  
The department also assisted in general sanitation efforts through their construction of 
city streets and gutters, the disinfectant of public building, the inspection and repair of 
private homes and sewers, and their completion of water treatment plants and public 
sewage systems in several of the major cities. 
  The program of public works promoted by the military government met with 
little resistance except for in Havana where American imperial policy clashed with 
American commercial interests.  The dispute centered on the construction of a sewage 
system for the city.  In 1895 the authorities in Havana had accepted plans advanced by 
Michael J. Dady and Company, an American construction firm, for the building of that 
system.  The acceptance of the initial plans conferred upon the Dady firm the right of 
tanteo under Cuban law.  The right of tanteo bestowed certain privileges in contract 
negotiations and an invested financial interest in the project.  Subsequently, the Havana 
authorities also accepted Dady’s bid for the project.  Since final approval did not occur 
until just before the American occupation, the Spanish governor refused to approve the 
action and left the decision to the incoming military government.  The issue remained 
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dormant under Brooke but as Wood launched his sanitation and public works programs, 
Dady reasserted his right to the project.   
Wood initially wanted to ignore Dady and to proceed with plans drafted and 
approved by the army engineers.  The engineers and consultants Wood brought in on the 
project, including Mr. D.J. McComb superintendent of sewers in Washington, D.C. and 
Mr. Samual M. Gray of Providence, Rhode Island, all agreed that Dady’s plan was 
insufficient for the needs of the city, failed to deal with the proper disposal of sewage, 
and would cost the city $14,000,000 to build and an annual charge of $165,000 to 
maintain.  According to army engineers, the plan backed by the military government 
would cost $8,250,000 and “would give to the city a complete system of sewage and 
modern pavements now needed.”341     
The dispute lasted throughout 1900 and prevented major efforts at sanitation and 
road construction in Havana.   When Wood refused to acquiesce and recognize Dady’s 
right of tanteo, Dady went on the offensive.  He spent money freely in Havana to stir up 
the local press and to sway public opinion on the issue.  He enlisted powerful friends in 
Washington and the Republican Party to advance his case.  He hired Lemuel Quigg, an 
influential player in New York politics and a former member of the House of 
Representatives, as his legal council.  At various times he charged Wood with exceeding 
his authority, ignoring Spanish and Cuban law, and of interfering at the municipal level.  
Wood responded by having his engineers write a detailed review of the Dady plan and 
systematically demonstrate why it would not benefit Havana.  The situation remained 
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deadlocked until Root and Quigg opened backdoor negotiations to settle the issue.  
Eventually, the two agreed and Root suggested to Wood that Dady might accept an offer 
of $250,000 to relinquish his rights to the projects and all claims against the military 
government.342  Wood, anxious to pursue the projects in Havana, agreed and the two 
sides reached an agreement on January 25, 1901.   
The variety of work undertaken by the Department of Public Works and the 
engineers proved incredibly diverse.  The insular treasury covered the cost of most of 
these projects including those undertaken in the larger municipalities of Havana, Puerto 
Principe, Santa Clara, Cienfuegos, Santiago, Matanzas, and Cardenas.  In his initial 
report, Major William M. Black, Chief Engineer, touted the efforts in Cuba as a training 
ground for army engineers and as beneficial to the whole army since “prior to the 
Spanish war, few opportunities for development were attainable for the younger 
officers.”343  At least in Cuba, service in the American empire promised to offer an 
assortment of assignments to stretch the skills of any engineer.  (See Table 6:8.  For a 
summary of public works undertaken in Havana, Matanzas, and Santiago, see Appendix 
A.) 
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Table 6:8 Expenditure per Appropriation Related to Public Works344 
 
            To 
Appropriation 1900 1901 May 20, 1902 Total 
 
Light Houses 120,586.97 284,938.98 71,916.62 477,442.57 
Public Buildings 191,974.58 913,123.07 602,493.27 1,707,590.92 
Public Works 1,895,256.07 1,692,754.41 740,252.14 4,328,262.62 
 
Total 2,207,817.62 2,890,816.46 1,414,662.03 6,513,296.11 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Economic Development 
Wood drew a direct correlation between the political stability of the Cuban 
republic and the economic development of the island.  Neither could exist for long 
without the other.  As he told Root, “[w]ork, contentment and political tranquility go 
hand in hand in Cuba as elsewhere and people with full bellies and pockets are more 
reasonable than idlers, and agitators cannot reach them.”345  In turn, political stability 
and the corresponding lack of political agitation allowed the population to turn their 
energies toward developing the island.  Political stability also increased investor 
confidence and fostered a willingness to risk financial capital in the island.  Throughout 
his governorship, Wood used the military government to impose the necessary political 
stability while he implemented programs designed to foster economic development.  In 
the end, he hoped the economic development would then generate the political stability 
that could replace the artificial stability provided by the occupational government. 
A major obstacle to economic development came from the scarcity of financial 
capital in the island.  The decades of political unrest and revolution had depleted all 
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insular sources and many, including the large land owners, found themselves unable to 
purchase the equipment, seed, livestock, and other supplies necessary to make the land 
productive again.  Large private ventures remained beyond the reach of most Cubans as 
no capital existed for major construction projects and funding for infrastructure 
improvements largely came from customs receipts.  Foreign investors proved reluctant 
to advance capital due the uncertainty about the political future of the island.  Such 
uncertainty made loans difficult and costly to obtain.  In some rural areas, interest rates 
ran as high as 24 percent.346   
The Foraker Amendment, which prohibited the McKinley administration and the 
occupation government from granting franchises and business concessions in the island, 
inadvertently added to the problem.  The amendment effectively barred any enterprise 
that required government authorization.  The problem became most apparent in the area 
of railroad construction.  The Cuban Company headed by Sir William Van Horne, noted 
railroad builder and former president of the Canadian Pacific Railroad, wanted to build a 
railroad from Santa Clara to Santiago.  The venture would connect the western and 
eastern halves the island for the first time in Cuban history.  Robert Porter had first noted 
the political and economic implications of such a central railroad in Industrial Cuba.  He 
argued that a central line running the length of Cuba would assist the central government 
in exerting its power, and “rapidly trend to the revival of commercial and general 
business as the facility for quick passage from one end of the island to the other, and 
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from the trunk line over branches to the seaboard cities.”347  Wood agreed with Porter’s 
findings and, since the project had profound economic and political ramifications, he 
enthusiastically supported the endeavor.  However, under the Foraker Amendment the 
military government could not grant the Cuba Company the authority needed to obtain 
right-of-ways, build bridges, or cross public and private lands.  Wood appealed to the 
War Department for assistance. 
Root saved the project by developing a scheme to grant the Cuba Company 
“revocable permits.”  The “revocable permits” were not as binding as official franchises 
or concessions and could be revoked by the Cuban government following the end of the 
occupation.  To avoid potential conflict with Congress, Wood wrote to Foraker on 
December 21, 1900, to explain the reasoning behind the revocable permits and to ask the 
senator’s support in the endeavor.  Wood even went so far as to recommend the repeal of 
the Foraker Amendment.  Foraker consented to the plan but refused to consider the 
repeal of his amendment.  With the tacit blessing and assurance of the War Department, 
the military government, and Congress, Van Horne and his fellow investors agreed to the 
scheme and began work.  The new railroad began operations in December 1902, seven 
months after the transfer of power to the Cuban Republic. 
The legal concept of “revocable permits” did not advance much beyond the area 
of railroad construction.  As long as the Foraker Amendment remained in force and the 
political future of the island remained uncertain, foreign capital did not flood into Cuba 
in a meaningful way.  Wood continued to lobby Root and others for repeal of the 
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amendment but it proved impossible in Congress where even Republicans opposed 
repeal.  The transfer of power from the occupation government to the new Republic of 
Cuba in May 1902 ultimately settled the matter by rendering the amendment mute.  The 
new Cuban government proved less discerning and more acquiescing to foreign capital, 
which soon flooded into the island and led to American domination of many of the 
principle industries.  American economic penetration did not occur in Cuba to any great 
extent during the occupation, as many historians have erroneously insisted.  Instead, 
such economic penetration came with the approval and encouragement of an elected 
Cuban government. 
Economic development depended not only on the introduction of foreign capital 
but also upon the opening of foreign markets to Cuban agricultural products.   Prior to 
the final Cuban revolt against Spain, the United States and Cuba had enjoyed close 
economic ties.  However, tariff revisions on both sides coupled with Spanish mercantilist 
policies closed the American market to Cuban products.  Wood sought to open these 
markets once again and hoped that by doing so he would ensure the economic survival 
of Cuba and bind her closely to the United States.  From the early days of his 
governorship, Wood championed reciprocity between the two countries and worked 
diligently to rally support for a trade treaty along those lines.  In his annual report for 
1900, he argued that all “farseeing business men realize that Cuba’s prosperity and 
advancement depend absolutely upon her commercial relations with the United States, 
where her two main products [sugar and tobacco] have their principal market.”348  Wood 
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considered reciprocity not just beneficial but essential to the survival of the Cuban 
Republic and its political stability.349  
Root agreed with Wood and advocated for trade reciprocity in the 
administration.  He accepted Wood’s conclusion that economic prosperity for the island 
depended upon Cuban sugar and tobacco gaining access to the American markets.  In his 
annual reports, Root took the situation a step further by showing the symbiotic 
relationship between Cuba and the United States – “for the peace of Cuba is necessary to 
the peace of the United States; the health of Cuba is necessary to the health of the United 
States; the independence of Cuba is necessary to the safety of the United States.”350  
Root argued that the same humanitarian impulse and calculated self-interest that had led 
the United States to intervene in 1898 should lead to trade reciprocity.  Despite 
administration support, Congress proved reluctant to move forward on the trade issue as 
powerful lobbies representing cane sugar, beet sugar, and tobacco opposed the 
measure.351 
As the date for the transfer of power approached, Wood increased the pressure 
upon Congress to act.  He organized the General Society of Merchants and 
Manufacturers of the Island of Cuba and assembled petitions and data designed to 
encourage congressional action.  He spent $15,626 from the Cuban treasury to lobby in 
Washington for an exemption to the American tariff and to distribute literature designed 
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to educate the American public on the economic needs of Cuba.352  He so bombarded 
Congress with circular letters and information on the topic that several members of 
Congress complained to the president.  The War Department responded by instructing 
Wood not to send any more circular communications to Congress, though Root still 
allowed him to correspond with individual members who showed an interest in the 
issue.353  Wood’s efforts proved futile in the short term as the occupation ended without 
any commitment to reciprocity.  Nonetheless, the battle over reciprocity continued and 
eventually the Roosevelt administration pushed through a treaty in December 1903. 
The treaty of reciprocity between the United States and Cuba owed much to the 
Wood administration.  Wood recognized reciprocity and the opening of the American 
market as essential to economic development in Cuba.  He rallied supporters in Cuba 
and made crucial contacts with business interests in the United States supportive of 
lower tariff on Cuban sugar, notably the American Sugar Company.  Wood brought the 
issue to the attention of the McKinley and Roosevelt administrations and he lobbied 
Congress incessantly on the issue.   Although the eventual triumph came seventeen 
months after the end of the occupation, the reciprocity treaty clearly demonstrated the 
power of an imperial proconsul to not only initiate policy but to push it through against 
domestic opposition. 
While Wood worked to overcome the deficiency in investment capital and to 
open the American markets to Cuban produce, he took several other steps as military 
governor to help economic development.  From the beginning, Wood worked closely 
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with the War Department on setting and adjusting tariff rates for products entering and 
leaving Cuba.  Initially the War Department set the rates but, as the occupation 
progressed and Wood continually made suggestions regarding adjustments, it conceded 
virtual control of the tariff to the governor.  Since customs revenues provided the 
majority of funding for Wood’s internal reforms, he strove to strike a balance between 
revenue gains and placing an additional burden on Cuba’s economy.354  In some areas he 
refused to lower rates on certain products if the businesses involved did not pass the 
savings on to the consumers.  In areas he hoped to stimulate development, as in 
agriculture, he allowed tools, farm implements, seed, livestock and other necessary items 
to enter the country duty free.  On April 1, 1901, Wood abolished all export duties in an 
attempt to encourage Cuban exports.   The move reduced revenue to the insular treasury 
but it made Cuban products more competitive on the international market. 
The system of public works had a large impact on the problem as well.  As he 
had in Santiago, Wood regarded public works as a way of introducing capital back into 
the insular financial system.  Farmers and laborers without the capital necessary to 
rebuild their livelihood could find employment on one of the numerous public works 
projects throughout the island.  Such employment would provide for their immediate 
needs and allow them to lay aside a small amount for rebuilding.  Additionally, public 
works, especially road construction and harbor works, often lowered the cost of 
transporting produce and goods.  Prior to the extension of roads into the interior of the 
island, the high cost of transportation meant that produce that could not sell locally had 
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to be left to rot in the field.355   To assist in lowering the cost of transportation, Wood 
worked with the insular railroad commissioner to write a new railroad law to control 
shipping rates and standardized freight charges.  Wood considered the railroads a 
“public service and that the public is entitled to consideration and that unreasonable and 
unjust charges and disregard for the public will and public interest will no longer be 
tolerated.”356 
In the insular cabinet, the task of supporting economic development fell to the 
Department of Agriculture, Commerce, and Industries.  Organized at the central and 
provincial level, the department performed the important task of establishing rules and 
regulations regarding patents and commercial activity.  It also worked with local 
authorities to reconstruct commercial records destroyed by the Spanish administration 
and to oversee all matters relating to agriculture, commerce, industry, forests, mines, and 
fisheries.  The department set as its goal the cataloguing and systematic supervision of 
Cuba’s natural wealth.  Its annual reports and other publications discussed in detail the 
nature of the crop system in Cuba, the untapped mineral wealth, the bounty of forest 
products, and the incredible resources that awaited foreign capital seeking to invest in 
the island.  In assembling the necessary information the department reconstructed from 
almost nothing the entire record on the extent and ownership of mines in Cuba.  To 
further advertise the natural wealth of the island the department sent a delegation to the 
Charleston Exposition in South Carolina and the Buffalo Exposition in New York. 
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Wood regarded Cuba as “essentially an agricultural country” that derived “her 
welfare principally from the soil.”357  Under his specific direction of the governor, the 
Department of Agriculture, Commerce, and Industry adopted several measures primarily 
designed to revitalize the agricultural sector.  Wood allotted special funding from the 
insular treasury and directed Perfecto Lacoste, the secretary of the department, to 
purchase cattle and horses and then to sell them at cost to poor farmers.  During the 
course of the program the department imported over 400,000 head of cattle.358  Buyers 
could pay cash or finance the purchase on a three year note at 4 percent interest.  The 
department also purchased large quantities of agricultural implements -including plows, 
hoes, machetes and axes - and distributed them to the people through local committees 
organized in the targeted districts.  The department established local agricultural stations, 
conducted extensive research into local conditions, provided informational seminars, and 
assisted with the diagnosis and treatment of sick livestock and diseased crops.  Lacosta 
hoped that the network of agricultural stations would facilitate the exchange of 
knowledge between planters and train agricultural experts who would awaken the island 
form its “lethargy and relative retardation in which, in this matter, no doubt through lack 
of intelligent direction, it finds itself.”359  (See Table 6:9.  For a summary of information 
on Cuban imports and exports, see Appendix A.) 
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Table 6:9 Expenditure per Appropriation Related to Economic Development360 
 
            To 
Appropriation 1900 1901 May 20, 1902 Total 
 
Agriculture 207,963.83 172,519.36 38,244.79 418,727.98 
Bills of Lading 
     And Transportation 175,685.00 105,014.99 45,000.00 325,699.99 
Captain of Ports 64,582.67 72,127.87 29,653.31 166,363.85 
Expositions 19,729.85 103,536.07 12,659.76 135,925.68 
Postal Service 571,070.07 440,901.00 176,705.88 1,188,676.95 
Immigration Station   19,558.72 19,558.72 
 
Total 1,039,031.42 894,099.29 321,822.46 2,254,953.17 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Public Education 
Wood considered public education a key component of ongoing economic 
development and essential to the survival of the future Cuban republic.  The census 
conducted prior to the municipal elections in 1900 found that over 65 percent of the 
population could not read or write.  Years of neglect by the Spanish regime and even the 
Brook administration did little to address problem.  Public school enrollment prior to the 
war showed 36,306 students enrolled but reports indicated that less than half actually 
attended.361  Toward the end of Spanish rule the system completely broke down.  
Enrique Jose Varona, first secretary of public education under Wood, reported that 
“There was not a single schoolhouse in the island; the teachers, always badly paid, lived 
in penury; school furniture and appliances were out of the question, the school 
attendance almost insignificant, and the greater portion of the school population was 
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illiterate.  There was not a single high school.”362  Although the Brooke administration 
authorized the municipalities to open schools under the old Spanish system, the results 
proved disappointing.  By December 1899 public school enrollment numbered only 
21,435, significantly less than it had under the Spanish.363  The deplorable conditions 
within the schools remained largely the same. 
The lack of progress spurred the Brooke administration to take additional steps.  
In November of 1899, Brooke created the position of Superintendent of Schools and 
appointed Alexis E. Frye to fill the post.  Frye, a wealthy graduate of Harvard, had 
requested a commission from the War Department to do educational work in the new 
colonial possessions.  Root sent him to Cuba to work with the military government.  
Brooke followed the appointment of Frye with a new school law on December 6, 1899.  
The new law, propagated as Order No. 226, empowered Frye to travel the length and 
breadth of the island to establish the schools needed to serve an estimated 462,856 
children.364  It gave him the power to “organize, direct, and inspect all the schools of 
Cuba,” develop a course of study, formulate the necessary exams, choose the 
curriculum, and eventually conduct a census of school age children.365  Frye 
energetically entered into his new duties.  At the beginning of Brooke’s new school law, 
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312 schoolrooms existed in the whole island.  Frye expanded the number to 3,126 in 
four month.366 
Wood, who inherited General Order No. 226 and Frye from the Brooke 
administration, initially allowed the latter to continue his work with the assistance of the 
newly independent Department of Public Instruction.  However, by March the rapid 
expansion of the school system and the nature of the arrangements made in regard to 
teachers, facilities, and equipment led Wood to place a temporary moratorium on future 
expansion until the existing schools could be inspected.  To address the problem and to 
consolidate control of the public school system in Havana, Wood assigned one of his 
aides, Lieutenant Matthew Hanna, a West Point graduate and former school teacher from 
Ohio, to write a new school law for the island.   
The new school law, published as Civil Order No. 279 on June 30, 1900, 
followed closely the Ohio model favored by Hanna and sought to rectify the problems 
found under the old law by restructuring the administration of public education.  The 
new law continued the office of Superintendent and created a new office of 
Commissioner of Public Schools.  The superintendent dealt exclusively with educational 
issues and served as the president of the newly created board of superintendents.  Each 
province elected its own superintendent and Frye served as the superintendent of schools 
for the entire island.  The board dealt with issues regarding proper teaching methods, 
textbook selection, course design, teacher selection and training, and related educational 
issues. The newly created commissioner functioned as the chief executive officer of the 
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school system charged with the implementation of the new law and responsible for the 
condition of the insular schools.  He dealt with issues of infrastructure, school buildings, 
furniture, repairs and construction, contracts, and salaries for teachers, janitors, etc.   
The restructuring had a tremendous impact upon primary public education.  In 
the first year the military government spent almost three-quarters of a million dollars, 
including an initial order of $150,000 for 100,000 full sets of desks and chairs as well as 
other school material.367  The military government renovated existing schoolrooms and 
refitted existing barracks for educational purposes.  Wood resisted the push to higher 
American teachers, a practice followed in the Philippines, and instead hired Cuban 
teachers at salaries higher than their American counterparts.368  He felt that “to establish 
stable government by the people we must use the people directly concerned, otherwise 
they will be a governed and not a governing people.”369  He also thought it unwise to 
flood “the Island with American teachers ignorant of the language and customs of the 
people, and foreign in religion and sentiment” since to do so would lead to charges that 
“the United States wished to Americanize the children.”370 
Ironically, although Wood resisted the Americanization of the children, he felt it 
best to improve the quality of teachers found in Cuba by sending them to the United 
States for training.   In the summer of 1900, Harvard University raised $70,000 for 1,281 
Cuban teachers to “attend a summer school of instruction at Cambridge, designed to fit 
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them for their duties.”371  Teachers representing 119 of the 128 municipalities in Cuba 
attend the summer session.  Classroom instruction included English, the history of Cuba 
and Latin America, the history of the United States, and geography.  Lectures also 
covered areas such as school and classroom management, civic instruction, and morals.  
To supplement the coursework, the teachers went on extended field trips to Boston, New 
York City, the United States Military Academy at West Point and Washington, D.C.  In 
addition to the cultural and historic sites, they attend grand receptions in their honor by 
the President of the United States and Mayor of New York City.  Teachers unable to 
make the journey attended special summer schools in the provincial capitals.  All the 
participants received pay for the summer.  The military government sent two hundred 
teachers to Harvard University the next year and conducted mandatory summer schools 
for rest.  In 1901 the government also began providing $30,000 in scholarships for thirty 
Cuban teachers to attend the New York State Normal School in New Paltz.  By 1902 
sixty Cuban teachers had enrolled in the program.372  The new elected government of the 
Republic of Cuba discontinued the program after the transfer of sovereignty. 
Alexis Frye resigned as Superintendent of Public Schools in January 1901.  For 
the past year, Frye and Wood had clashed over the details of primary education in Cuba.  
Hostilities began with the hold placed on the expansion of public schools in March, 
continued through the Harvard program, and ultimately came to a head when the new 
school law stripped Frye of much of his responsibility and made him officially 
subordinate to Wood’s representative.   Frye and Wood simply did not work well 
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together.  The superintendent had the enthusiasm but lacked the organizational skills to 
run the public school system to the satisfaction of the military authorities and according 
to the standards of the military government.  Wood characterized Frye as a man with 
“very little executive ability” and complained in his annual report that, when Hanna 
became Commissioner of Public Schools, “he found the affairs of this Department in a 
very unsatisfactory condition.  There had been no systematic supervision of the details of 
the system and affairs were rapidly reaching a condition which, unless he had been 
placed in charge, would have resulted disastrously for the school system and the 
finances.”373  Although Frye resigned on his own initiative, Wood had made it clear to 
Root the previous August that he wished to remove him from the administration.374 
In addition to the reform of primary education, Wood worked closely with 
Enrique Jose Varona, Secretary of Public Instruction, to reform the University of 
Havana.  When Wood took over as governor, the University boasted ninety-six faculty 
and a total of two hundred students.375  In some of the departments, the number of 
faculty outnumbered the number of students.  The faculty contributed little to the 
intellectual life of the island and some even lived in Spain while drawing a full salary 
from the Cuban government.  Like all institutions of public education in Cuba, the 
University lacked basic infrastructure and supplies.  No well defined course of study 
programs existed and certificates and degrees could often be purchased by the pupils 
without completing a systematic program.   
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Wood and Varona moved quickly to reform the institution.  They dismissed 
many of the faculty deemed unworthy of retention and held competitive examinations to 
fill the vacancies.  They reformed the admission requirements and restructured the 
course of study to make it a four year academic program.  They limited access to the 
professional schools to graduates or to those who could pass an examination to 
demonstrate competency.  In addition the military government purchased new furniture, 
equipment, and books while renovating or building new academic facilities and 
specialized laboratories.  Varona extended these reforms to the institutions which fed 
students into the University of Havana and to the secondary schools located in each 
province.  By the end of 1900, the occupational government had substantially remodeled 
the institutions of higher education on the island. 
Wood believed education to be the key to a stable constitutional government and 
as a deterrent to revolution.  His commitment to public education – primary, secondary, 
and higher education – revealed itself in the insular budget and the time and staff he 
dedicated to the issue.  Wood devoted up to 25 percent of total insular revenue to 
reforming and rebuilding public education.  Extensive public works projects, including 
the construction of several modern academic facilities, helped to build the necessary 
educational infrastructure.  At the time of the transfer, the occupation government had 
begun to build and equip an average of one school room per working day.376  Wood’s 
delegation of much of the reform effort to Hanna demonstrated the importance he placed 
upon the success of the reforms.  Hanna, belonged to the small circle of young aides that 
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Wood entrusted to carry out his instructions faithfully.  Other aides like Hugh Scott and 
Frank McCoy served in various capacities but Hanna remained in public education 
throughout the occupation.  At the end of the 1901-1902 academic year, total enrollment 
in public schools numbered 250,000 out of an estimated school population (ages six to 
eighteen) of 395,225.377  The Department of Public Instruction employed 3,476 teachers 
scattered across the island to meet the need.378  (See Table 6:10) 
 
Table 6:10 Expenditure per Appropriation related to Public Education379 
 
            To 
Appropriation 1900 1901 May 20, 1902 Total 
 
Normal State Schools 
   and University 507,647.43 898,068.97 352,030.81 1,757,747.21 
Municipal Schools 2,685,905.17 3,038,943.80 1,134,023.96 6,858,872.93 
Repairs and Supplies 815,907.71 274,470.85 199,142.86 1,289,521.42 
 
Total 4,009,460.31 4,211,483.62 1,685,197.63 9,906,141.56 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Law and Order 
On the very day Wood arrived in Havana to become military governor, Root 
forwarded to him a letter from Charlton Lewis, President of the Prison Association of 
New York, regarding the condition of the legal system in Cuba under both the Spanish 
and Brooke administrations.  Lewis had just completed two weeks “inspecting jails and 
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examining the administration of the penal laws” in Cuba.380  He found the conditions 
deplorable. 
 
Great prisons are overcrowded with men and boys.  Assassins, brigands, 
sodomites, pickpockets, and young men charged with disorderly 
conduct, or merely suspected of slight offences, are herded together, in 
absolute idleness and unrestricted intercourse.  With no change of 
clothing, no blanket or semblance of bed, many hundreds sleep on bare 
stones, where filth and vermin are kept down only by constant sprinkling 
with disinfectants.381 
 
 
To make matters worse, in what Lewis termed a “hell upon earth,” most of the prisoners 
had yet to be tried and were thus held by the state indefinitely while the authorities 
investigated the charges against them.  In many instances, prisoners spent more time in 
prison awaiting trial than their sentence would have been if they had been convicted of 
the offense.  Among these prisoners were twenty-two Americans, some of whom still 
awaited trial five months after their arrest.  Lewis’s appeal for the Brooke administration 
to remedy the situation came to nothing so he wrote directly to Secretary Root and called 
for “prompt interference from the War Department.”382  He warned that if details of the 
abuses became public it would lead to universal condemnation. 
Impressed with a sense of urgency by Root, Wood immediately launched his 
own investigation into the prison and judicial system and confirmed the assessment by 
Lewis.  He found the prisons to be “without proper sanitary arrangements, without 
proper appliances for cooking, lighting, or ventilations; in fact they were simply 
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medieval prison houses.  There seemed to be no system looking toward the reformation 
of the inmates, the whole purpose being to punish, never to correct.”383  The prisoners 
lived in abominable conditions.  In addition to the conditions detailed by Lewis, Wood 
discovered that the inmates at the prison for women in Havana could not appear in mass 
“because they were without clothes to cover their nakedness; and they came before the 
inspector one by one, passing the same garment from one to another.”384  One woman, 
who had been confined for more than seven years, had a three year old child.  Wood 
wrote to Root incredulous that such conditions “could have existed in Havana directly 
under the eyes of our own authorities.”385  He immediately launched steps to correct the 
abuses. 
The structure of the judicial system itself proved the fundamental obstacle to the 
swift execution of justice.  The authorities arrested individuals suspected of a crime and 
placed them in prison.  A court of the first instance conducted by a judge and one 
secretary investigated the charges against the accused and then either dismissed the case 
or took it to trial.  The court of the first instance moved remarkably slow and the rate of 
cases dispensed with by the court remained but a fraction of the new cases brought to the 
court.  Over the course of the war and the first year of the occupation, a considerable 
backlog of cases had developed.  About the only way to receive prompt attention and to 
have a case go speedily to trial was to bribe the judge or his secretary.  According to 
Wood, the Cuban judiciary “had surrounded itself with a cobweb of tradition and 
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conservatism and adopted a procedure so cumbersome and slow of execution as to 
render impossible a prompt administration of justice.  There seemed to be an unlimited 
number of ways of getting man into prison” but few ways of getting him out.386 
To solve the problem, Wood created new ways to empty the prisons and speed 
up the administration of justice.  In January 1900 he created a special board of pardons.  
Although the board visited prisons throughout the island, it focused primarily on 
Havana.  Board members reviewed the cases of individuals still awaiting trial and 
dismissed those cases which lacked sufficient records or in which the accused had 
already served more time than if actually convicted of the alleged crime.  In the first year 
they freed 520 prisoners including one imprisoned for eleven years without trial and 
several for whom no records existed as to the original arresting charge.  To reduce the 
backlog of cases, Wood established police and correctional courts to deal with minor 
offenses in most of the cities.  These courts provided the citizenry with access to prompt 
trials and relieved the case load upon the other courts.  General Ludlow had originally 
created a police court in Havana during the Brooke administration but the governor had 
declared it unconstitutional.  Wood reversed the decision, expanded the jurisdiction of 
the courts, and replicated them in the other cities.  Less than four month into the effort, 
Wood boasted to Root that his judicial reform had reduced the prison population in 
Havana from six hundred to 180 prisoners and that the new system of lower courts had 
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reduced the work load of the other courts by at least 30 percent.387  By the end of the 
occupation, the time from arrest to final action on the case averaged 3 ½ months.388  
Wood also ordered the thorough sanitation and renovation of the existing prisons 
and instituted a systematic inspection of the facilities.  The insular prison system, under 
the direction of the military government, consisted of the penitentiary (presidio) in 
Havana, provisional prisons located in the provincial capitals, and district prisons in 
each of the judicial districts.  General improvements to the prisons within the system 
included the installation of modern cooking facilities, proper sanitation and plumbing, 
ventilations systems, and laundry facilities.  Prisoners received proper bedding and 
clothing.  The authorities provided each jail with a physician and the necessary medical 
supplies.  In the larger facilities, the military government instituted a work program and 
offered basic school instruction to the inmates.  Hanna worked with General Montalvo, 
warden of the Havana penitentiary, to develop a new set of guidelines for governing the 
prison based upon the rules and regulations used at Joliet and Leavenworth in the United 
States.  Instead of placing all prisoners in the general prison population, the government 
separated those convicted of a crime from those still awaiting trial and the adults from 
underage offenders.  Wood placed the whole system under the supervision of General 
Carlos Garcia Velez, son of General Calixto Garcia, as the general Inspector of Prisons.  
Garcia inspected each prison at least three times a year and submitted detailed reports to 
the military government.389  According to Wood, Garcia took “a very intelligent interest 
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in the prison reform movement, and in the establishment of a system tending to the 
reform and education as well as to the punishment of the prisoner.”390  By the end of the 
occupation, Wood compared the prisons favorably to those in the United States. 
As prison reform proceeded, Wood and the Department of Justice, turned their 
attention to reforming the judicial system itself.  The original system, maintained under 
the Spanish and continued under the Brooke administration, favored the government and 
its interests over the rights and interests of the people.  The system allowed for the 
indefinite detention of individuals without trial and in some cases without being 
officially charged.  It denied access to a speedy trial, permitted the taking of evidence 
against the accused in his absence, and allowed hearsay evidence.  The authorities, 
operating under the old system, did not have to inform the accused of the charges against 
him or guarantee that he would receive competent council.  Brushing aside those who 
wanted legal reform to wait until the advent of an elected Cuban government, Wood 
introduced two aspects of American law into the Cuban system in an attempt to address 
many of the problems under the old order.  On December 1, 1900, Civil Order No. 427 
introduced the Writ of Habeas Corpus into the system.  Wood hoped that the practice 
would put a final end to many of the abuse he found when he took office.  To help right 
the balance between the state and the individual, Wood also introduced trial by jury.  
Neither of these concepts had completely taken hold by the end of the occupation. 
The primary hindrance to judicial reform came from popular perceptions of the 
system as corrupt.  For as long as most Cubans could remember, the Spanish regime had 
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used the judicial system as a tool for oppressing the people, silencing dissent, and 
punishing the enemies of those in power.  The system favored the powerful and the 
wealthy.  Corruption and the judiciary had almost become synonymous in the mind of 
the average Cuban.  Therefore, the typical Cuban proved unwilling to suddenly embrace 
a system that had once been the bane of Cuban existence.  Most were reluctant to 
officially file a complaint, to serve as witnesses for the prosecution, or to serve on a jury.  
Wood recognized the fact and, while he argued that the judicial system had improved, he 
acknowledged that it “is difficult to change in a day methods generations old.”391  He 
felt the only hope to changing popular perceptions came from a clear and consistent 
commitment to impartial justice and a fair and honest administration.  To that end the 
military government sought to make examples out of corrupt judges and instituted 
policies designed to isolate them from possible influence peddling. 
As the final element in the system of law and order, Wood restructured the Rural 
Guard and transformed it from a provincial law enforcement organization to an insular 
police force.  Wood had organized the first rural guard units in Santiago during the fall 
of 1898 as a way to extend law and order into the rural districts.  The force combated 
brigandage and tracked down criminals in the interior.  The Rural Guard made it 
unnecessary to employ the U.S. Army in policing actions and arguably made those 
actions more successful.  Composed largely of former members of the Cuban Liberation 
Army, the rural guard enjoyed a close affinity with the Cuban population, understood 
their language and customs as only a native could, and had first hand knowledge of the 
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terrain and circumstances encountered in the field.  Wood held that the force, “being of 
the people and from the people, has operated without causing those feelings which 
would surely have followed had the army of occupation been required to perform this 
duty.”392    Other departmental commanders, with the exception of Wilson in Matanzas, 
adopted a similar organization in their territories.  These provincial rural guard units 
served under the direct command of the departmental commanders and each differed 
from those in other departments in regard to regulations, weaponry, mounts, and details 
of organization. 
Shortly after taking office, Wood moved to consolidate those commands under 
his direct control in Havana.  On January 16, 1900, a board of senior rural guard 
members met to discuss possible schemes of reorganization.  These efforts culminated in 
Civil Order No. 90, issued on February 26, 1900, which provided for the uniform 
organization of rural guard units throughout the provinces.  Over the next year, the 
military government worked to bring the rural guard units up to the standards of the U.S. 
Army and used American military officers as inspectors.  A second reorganization act, 
propagated as Civil Order No. 101 on April 18, 1901, placed these provincial units under 
a single commander stationed in Havana and acting under the direct orders of the 
military governor.  Wood appointed Brigadier General Alejandro Rodriguez, formerly a 
Major General in the Cuban Army, to the position of Chief of the Rural Guard.   
Wood further organized the rural guard along military lines by consolidating the 
various commands into four departments, each under the command of a Lieutenant 
                                                 
392 Ibid., 64. 
  
  205
Colonel:  the Provinces of Havana and Pinar del Rio, the Provinces of Matanzas and 
Santa Clara, the Province of Puerto Principe, and the Province of Santiago de Cuba.  
These commanders each had a number of detachments under their supervision.  The 
military government furnished each detachment with permanent barracks and stables 
and ensured that the guard members were well mounted, armed and uniformed.  When 
the Republic of Cuba accepted control from the United States, the Rural Guard 
employed a total of 1,604 officers and men organized into fifteen troops stationed at 247 
posts scattered throughout the island.393 
In the last year of the occupation, Wood created a Cuban “Cuerpo de Artilleria” 
to garrison the artillery defenses around Havana once the U.S. Army left the island.  
Captain Dwight E. Altman of the U.S. Army trained the Cuban artillery forces in the 
same instructions given to the U.S. Artillery service.  At the time of the transfer, the 
Cuerpo de Artilleria consisted of three companies with arrangements made for a 
fourth.394  It was Wood’s desire to place the artillery units under the command of the 
General Rodriguez of the Rural Guard and together the two organizations would form 
the armed forces of the new republic.395  However, the American occupation ended 
without the merger.  (See Table 6:11) 
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Table 6:11 Expenditure per Appropriation Related to Law and Order396 
 
            To 
Appropriation 1900 1901 May 20, 1902 Total  
 
Jails 490,651.48 511,232.39 219,791.03 1,221,674.90 
Justice 701,288.01 991,656.61 404,608.50 2,097,553.12 
Cuerpo de Artilleria  24,590.81 24,930.67 49,521.48 
Rural Guard 1,789,824.98 929,111.28 356,168.68 3,075,104.94 
 
Total 2,981,764.47 2,456,591.09 1,005,498.88 6,443,854.44 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
On May 20, 1902, Governor Leonard Wood officially handed power over to 
Tomas Estrada Palma, the newly elected President of the Republic of Cuba, in an 
elaborate ceremony.  He then boarded the cruiser U.S.S. Brooklyn and sailed for the 
United States.  The occupation of Cuban had last a little less than four years.  For two 
and half years, Wood had struggled as military governor to rebuild the island after 
decades of war and neglect and then to prepare it for independence and self-government.  
He did so by focusing on five policy areas he considered essential to the survival and 
well-being of any future government – sanitation and public health, public works, 
economic development, public education, and law and order.  The internal programs 
developed in these policy areas were largely his own.  To assist in the first large scale 
effort by the United States at nation building, Wood had created an occupational 
government that was an amalgam of elements of the U.S. Army and Cuban political and 
military leaders.  He felt a sense of relief and satisfaction with the work he had done; yet, 
he thought “it would have been much better for the Cuban people if we had remained 
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several years longer in Cuba and give them a chance to settle down on a much more 
sound basis.”397  In the end he feared the occupation had been too short for the reforms 
and progressive ethos to take hold. 
Wood’s fears came true as most of his progressive agenda did not outlive his 
administration.  The problem however was not with the Cubans but with the style and 
form of governance that he imposed upon the island.  Much of the progressive agenda 
did not originate with the Cubans and, although they benefited from elements of it, the 
reforms never developed institutional legs of their own.  Wood could impose the 
progressive agenda because of the power and authority he possessed as military 
governor and because the people had no legitimate outlet to oppose the administration 
short of active rebellion or passive indifference.  Palma, as the head of the newly elected 
Cuban republic, had neither that power nor authority.  Even if he had supported the 
progressive ethos whole-heartedly, his political will alone was not enough. 
The centralization of power in Havana had negative repercussions as well.  The 
unitary state model exacerbated regional tensions – as it had under the Spanish and 
Brooke administrations.  It also retarded the growth and development of municipal 
government by not allowing those governments the ability to fail.  Despite Wood’s 
contention that a period of tutelage by the insular government would make the municipal 
governments efficient and self-supporting, most municipalities remained depended upon 
the insular government to meet their financial needs.  His Cuban critics had been right.   
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CHAPTER VII 
IN THE MORO PROVINCE 
 
Leonard Wood left Cuba with his professional standing and reputation substantially 
enhanced.  In 1898 he had entered the Spanish-American War as a little known captain 
in the medical department who had, through political influence, received a temporary 
commission as a colonel with one of the volunteer regiments.  He emerged from service 
in Cuba in 1902 as a brigadier general in the regular army with an international 
reputation as the foremost American imperial proconsul.  In the span of two and half 
years, Wood had seemingly taken a devastated former Spanish colony and transformed it 
into an economically developing and independent new republic.  His penchant for self-
promotion and the writings of his progressive friends kept his work in Cuba before the 
public and won him acclaim.  As a brigadier general, Wood stood next in line according 
to seniority to become a major general.  A relatively young general officer at age forty-
one, Wood could expect, barring an untimely demise or scandal, to spend at least twenty 
years in the senior ranks of the U.S. Army and exert significant influence on its 
development at the beginning of the twentieth-century.  His intimate friendship with 
President Roosevelt gave further luster to his rising star. 
Wood’s service as an imperial proconsul did not end with Cuba.  On August 6, 
1903, sixteen months after leaving Havana, he become civil governor of the Moro 
Province and commanding general of the corresponding Department of Mindanao.  In 
the familiar civil-military role, Wood abandoned previous Moro policy, exemplified in 
  209
the Bates Agreement, and aggressive sought to undermine the traditional system of datu 
governance and replace it with direct American rule.  Given a high degree of latitude in 
his actions and policies, Wood adopted the same progressive agenda he felt had worked 
so well in Cuba and relied heavily upon the strength of American arms to enforce 
compliance.  The Cuban model, however, did not work well in the Moro Province and 
military action did not prove as decisive as he hoped.  At the end of his tenure, the 
United States remained no closer to peacefully incorporating the Moros into the 
American empire than before. 
 
Interlude 
On his return from Cuba, Wood and trusted members of his staff – Hugh Scott 
and Frank McCoy - took up residence in Washington D.C., which remained his base of 
operations until he left for the assignment in the Philippines.  Although in Washington to 
complete the reports on the Cuban occupation and to close out the financial and 
administrative records of the military government, Wood found time to lobby for trade 
reciprocity with Cuba, to accept a number of speaking engagements, and to complete 
several small assignments for the army at large.  Residence in the nation’s capital also 
gave him an opportunity to renew his friendship with Roosevelt and the two became 
constant companions. 
Less than a month after returning to the United States, the War Department 
forwarded to Wood an invitation from Wilhelm II, Emperor of Germany, to attend the 
annual maneuvers of the Prussian Army scheduled for September 1902.  Wood joined 
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the official delegation consisting of himself and generals Samuel B. M. Young and 
Henry Corbin. To coincide with the trip, Wood embarked on a continental tour of 
Europe that lasted from July 24 to November 9.  At the beginning of the tour, he joined 
his wife and family in Spain and then traveled through France, Germany, Switzerland, 
Italy, and eventually Great Britain.  Along the way, Wood made it a point to visit not 
only the traditional cultural and historical sites but also many of the major battlefields of 
Europe. 
At the German maneuvers and later in Great Britain, Wood served as an 
unofficial liaison between Roosevelt and the German and British governments.  He met 
not only the German emperor and empress but also members of the German high 
command, including Crown Prince Albert and Baron von Koenig.  He also became 
familiar with the British delegation to the event, which included Lord Roberts, and 
generals Ian Hamilton, John French, and Thomas Killy-Kenny.  On the morning of 
September 10, 1902, Wilhelm II asked Wood to join him for a private interview during a 
lull in the maneuvers.  The emperor strove to impress upon Wood that Germany, the 
United States, and England had to maintain “friendly relations” and that those “who said 
Germany wanted war were absolutely in error.”398  The emperor made a favorable 
impression upon Wood who recorded the conversation in his diary and later reported it 
to the President. 
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In Great Britain, Wood helped to advance the growing Anglo-American 
rapprochement.399  He lunched with the King at Buckingham Palace, attended an awards 
ceremony in honor of Lord Roberts and General H. Herbert Kitchener, and attended state 
dinners where he met Prime Minister Arthur Balfour, Joseph Chamberlain, Lord 
Lansdowne, and Henry Campbell-Bannerman.  On October 30, 1902, he attended a 
dinner at the House of Commons hosted by Arthur Lee, Civil Lord of the Admiralty and 
a close friend of Roosevelt.  At the session of Parliament that followed the dinner, his 
British hosts introduced him as the “absolute ruler of a foreign country,” in reference to 
his governorship in Cuba, and seated him next to the Prince of Wales.400  During the 
twenty days spent in Great Britain, Wood toured the English and Scottish countryside 
and met with numerous military and imperial officials. 
Wood returned to Washington in early November and spent roughly the next 
four months completing Cuban affairs before accepting an assignment to command 
American troops assigned to the Department of Mindanao.  On his way to the 
Philippines, Secretary of War Elihu Root wanted him to make a careful study of the 
methods of colonial government and native constabularies.  Wood left Boston on March 
28, 1903 and traveled through Europe to Egypt where he reviewed English and Egyptian 
troops, visited various schools and sanitation projects, and had several long talks with 
Lord Cromer over imperial policy.  From Egypt he traveled with stops to inspect 
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colonial administration in India, the Dutch colonies, the French in Saigon, and the 
English administration of Hong Kong.  He arrived in Manila on July 19, 1903, almost 
four months after leaving the United States.  Although Wood visited most of the major 
European colonies in Asia during his trip and spent considerable time with imperial 
officials and military commanders, the extent of his study only amounted to observations 
recorded in his diary and in a few letters.   
On his way east, Wood learned his political enemies had renewed their media 
criticism of his administration in Cuba.  The unfavorable publicity complicated 
Roosevelt’s task in securing Congressional support for Wood’s promotion to major 
general.  Republican Senator Mark Hanna led opposition to Wood in the Senate.  Hanna 
personally resented the fact that while in Cuba Wood had arrested and prosecuted Estes 
Rathbone, a political protégé and an influential person in Ohio politics.  Perhaps more 
importantly, Hanna recognized that Wood’s nomination provided him with an 
opportunity to undermine Roosevelt.  A close friend of McKinley, Hanna had opposed 
Roosevelt’s nomination as Vice President and longed to secure the Republican 
presidential nomination in 1904.  Indicative of these inter-Republican party struggles 
was the fact that Senator Joseph Foraker, Hanna’s rival for control of Republican politics 
in Ohio and a firm Roosevelt supporter, managed Wood’s defense in the Senate.401 
The Senate Committee on Military Affairs conducted hearings concerning 
Wood’s nomination from November 19 to December 15, 1903.  Opponents of the 
nomination raised allegations of malfeasance in Cuba and argued that Wood lacked the 
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military experience and background to be a major general.   Some even went so far as to 
openly charge Roosevelt with favoritism.  Rathbone, James Runcie, James Wilson, John 
Brooke and Alexis Frye provided testimony against the nomination.  Support for the 
nomination centered on the testimony of Secretary Root and some who had served with 
Wood in Cuba and wrote to volunteer their testimony.  Root, at the behest of Foraker, 
systematically addressed the charges of wrong doing and placed the War Department 
and his personal reputation squarely behind Wood.  He stressed the fact that Wood came 
up for promotion in his regular order of seniority - the same order designated by 
President McKinley when he promoted Wood to brigadier-general.402  He reminded the 
committee that Wood had exercised an extremely important and responsible command in 
Cuba and that he had under his command 10,000 American troops.  None of those below 
Wood in rank could boast to have ever held such responsibility or to have ever 
commanded such a large force.403  Root questioned why men who had not opposed 
Wood’s nomination to brigadier-general, when McKinley had jumped him over the 
heads of other candidates, now opposed a promotion based on seniority.  In closing he 
stated that “I feel under a debt of the greatest gratitude to General Wood for what I think 
is one of the most conspicuous and meritorious pieces of work ever done by an 
American.”404   The Senate confirmed Wood’s nomination to major general on March 
18, 1904, seven months after his arrival in the Philippines.   
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The Moro Province 
            Since the start of the American occupation, the military Department of 
Mindanao presented a unique challenge to those charged with extending American control 
throughout the Philippines.405  The department primarily consisted of the large island of 
Mindanao and the smaller islands of the Sulu archipelago, with the island of Jolo the 
most prominent of the Sulu chain.    An amalgamation of people groups that differed 
substantially from one another in ethnicity, culture, and religion populated the region.  
These groups consisted of a comparatively small number of Christian Filipinos who 
dwelt largely in the coastal regions, pagan tribesmen – including tree dwellers and 
headhunters - who remained in the interior of the Mindanao, and Moro practitioners of 
Islam who dominated the region but lived mainly in the southern parts of Mindanao and 
the Sulu islands.   
The Moro proved the largest human obstacle to American control of the region.  
The Spanish had named the Muslim inhabitants of the area “Moro” in reference to the 
Islamic Moors the Christians had driven from Spain.   Although usually of Malay 
descent, the Moros were united only by their religion.  Even among themselves they had 
no corporate identity but lived in various clans under the rule of a local chieftain, known 
as a datu.  For almost four hundred years, the Moros had resisted Spanish colonization 
and attempts to curtail their social and religious practices.  Spain’s claim to the region by 
right of conquest was tenuous at best.  Even in times of relative peace, Spain had to 
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maintain large numbers of troops in the region.  When Admiral George Dewey attacked 
Manila, half of the Spanish troops in the archipelago were engaged in military operations 
against the Moros on Mindanao and Jolo. 
The Philippine War, coming shortly after the end of hostilities with Spain, 
initially kept the U.S. Army from any attempt to exert direct control over Moro territory.  
Intent on fighting the war and desirous of avoiding any armed conflict with the Moros, 
Brigadier General John C. Bates negotiated an agreement with the Sultan of Sulu, Jamal-
ul Kiram II on August 20, 1899.  According to the terms of the agreement, the Sultan 
and his principal datus acknowledged American sovereignty over the Moros and their 
territory.  In exchange the United States recognized the jurisdiction of the Sultan over 
intra-Moro affairs and paid a stipend to him and his principal datus for their support in 
maintaining the peace.  The United States promised to respect the authority of the datus 
over their territory.  In case of an incident between Moros and American troops, the 
Bates agreement guaranteed a “careful investigation before resorting to harsh 
measures.”406  Article III specifically guaranteed:  “The rights and dignities of His 
Highness the Sultan and his datos shall be fully respected; the Moros shall not be 
interfered with on account of their religion; all their religious customs shall be respected; 
and no one shall be prosecuted on account of his religion.”407  Since the initial 
agreement only covered the Moros of the Sulu archipelago, Bates concluded similar 
agreements with all the Moros on Mindanao, with the exception of those around Lake 
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Lanao.  While President McKinley never submitted the agreements to the Senate for 
ratification, they served as a general accord between the U.S. Army and the Moros.  
Although not free from incident, the agreements resulted in a period of relative peace 
and stability in the region.  Breaches of the peace remained localized and restricted to 
individual Moros, a few rebellious datus, and overzealous army commanders who o
exceeded their authority.  The agreements governed relations between the United States 
and the Moros from 1899 to 1904. 
ften 
The creation of the Moro Province on June 1, 1903 marked a departure from 
previous attempts by the U.S. Army and the Philippine Commission to deal with the 
problems in the Department of Mindanao.  Prior to its creation, the U.S. Army exercised 
exclusive control in the area and no civil authority existed.  Act No. 787 of the 
Philippine Commission, the product of a joint collaboration between the civil 
commission and the Philippines Division, created a combined civil-military government 
in which the military commander of the region could also serve as the civil governor.  
The act provided for the structure of the provincial government and empowered the 
newly created Legislative Council of the Moro Province to create a judicial system, 
organize public schools, undertake public works, and suppress the slave trade and 
abolish slavery.  The Philippine Commission avoided specificity in how to accomplish 
these objectives and left much to the discretion of the provincial governor.  Root and 
Roosevelt chose Leonard Wood to lead the first civil-military government.   
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Wood assumed command of the Moro Province intent on abandoning what he 
considered the failed policies of his predecessors.408  He had no intention of ruling 
through the Sultan or the local datus, whom he considered responsible for “maintaining a 
state of affairs marked by licentiousness, murder, robbery, slavery, piracy and 
kidnapping, a condition far exceeding in its crimes any which has before come under 
American control.”409  His actions following his arrival in the province made it clear to 
the Moros that he did not feel bound by the terms of the Bates Agreement.  In direct 
defiance of the agreement, he dispatched numerous, heavily armed reconnaissance 
patrols without the accustomed notification of local datus required by Article XII.  On 
August 26, 1903, just twenty days after arriving in the province, he marched a column of 
troops numbering 550 men and officers to the residence of Sultan Jamal-ul Kiram II and 
commandeered a local structure near the royal residence as his personal headquarters.410  
Since the sultan had recently left the island, Wood sent for his brother, the Rajah Muda, 
who ruled in his absence.  When the Rajah Muda declined the invitation due to illness, 
Wood sent Scott, a doctor, and an armed escort of one hundred men to the royal palace 
to investigate.  After humiliating the acting sultan in front of his harem, Scott brought 
him to see Wood at the military encampment.  The whole incident not only violated the 
“rights and dignities” guaranteed the sultan and his datus in Article III but also violated 
Article IV which promised that “encroachment will not be made upon the lands 
immediately about the residence of His Highness the Sultan, unless military necessity 
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requires such occupation in case of war with a foreign power.”411  Wood clearly did not 
feel bound by an agreement concluded by his predecessors and still sanctioned by the 
U.S. Army and the President. 
Wood decided even before he had a chance to assess the situation on the ground 
that the Bates Agreement no longer served American interests in the region – if it ever 
had.  To pave the way for uniform governance under his authority, he encouraged his 
superiors to abrogate the agreement.  He personally lobbied Taft, Root and Roosevelt to 
that end.  In December 1903, he submitted a fifty-four page report to the Philippine 
Commission recommending the same action.412  The first two pages summarized the 
arguments against the agreement.  The remaining fifty-two pages purported to provide 
evidence, in the form excerpts from official reports and interviews with individual 
Moros, that the Moros had failed to honor the agreement from the start.  Wood chose not 
to mention his own violations of the agreement or those of the U.S. Army.  In the spring 
of 1904, the Roosevelt administration authorized abrogation.  Wood informed the sultan 
on March 21, 1904. 
The nullification of the agreements moved Wood one step closer to his ultimate 
goal of abolishing the datu system of governance and replacing it with the direct 
American rule.  Wood did not expect the Moros to acquiesce to the new system without 
a fight and his gunpoint diplomacy seemed designed to provoke Moro opposition and 
provide rationale for a military response.  He expected that a quick, severe lesson 
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demonstrating the prowess of the U.S. Army would quickly bring all the Moros into 
line.413  He wrote to Roosevelt:  “I think one clean-cut lesson will be quite sufficient for 
them but it should be of such character as not to need a dozen frittering repetitions.”414  
Wood proved correct in his assumption that the Moros would fight but he grossly 
underestimated the extent and duration of the resistance.415  Ultimately, Wood launched 
not one but sixty-seven military expeditions during his tenure as departmental 
commander.  The quick decisive blow simply did not work. 
Previous biographers, confronted with Wood’s overt aggression in the Moro 
Province and his tendency to rely on a military rather than administrative solutions, have 
sought to reconcile that aggression with his relatively peaceful administration of Cuba.  
Most have considered the battle over his confirmation, which coincided with the onset of 
new assignment, the pivot in Wood’s imperial career and the key to understanding his 
conduct in the Moro Province.   Jack Lane argued that the Congressional hearings made 
Wood “extremely sensitive to the charges of military inexperience.  In Mindanao he 
found an answer:  he could conduct military expeditions against the Moros and thereby 
allay the charges once and for all.”416  According to Lane, Wood used any excuse to 
launch operations against the Moros in order to build a military reputation and thus 
refute his critics.  Jack McCallum, writing almost thirty years later, agreed with the 
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significance of the confirmation hearings.  “Wood emerged from the confirmation 
hearings a different man.  In Cuba he had been a model administrator, but a year of 
vicious attacks on his record and his character left him cynical and bitter.  If vilification 
was the reward for his Cuban performance, there was no reason to reproduce that 
performance in the Philippines.  Leonard Wood, the most adroit colonial administrator 
America had ever had, went to Zambonga in the Moro province as governor, major 
general, policeman, and enforcer, but not as nation builder.”417  Although the 
confirmation battle undoubtedly impacted Wood, the policies he pursued were not 
simply an attempt to build a military reputation or the product of cynicism.  Instead, they 
reflected longstanding issues of personal character and a prejudice against those who did 
not share his values.  He went to the Moro Province as a nation builder but the nation he 
sought to build had little room for what he considered the barbaric Moros and their 
practices. 
Wood held the Moros and their leadership in contempt.  Even before he met the 
sultan, Wood described him to Roosevelt as “a run down, tricky little Oriental 
degenerate, with half a dozen wives and no children; a state of affairs of which I am sure 
you thoroughly disapprove.”418  He urged repeal of the Bates agreement because he felt 
it sanctioned the sultan and the datu system and thus “stands in the way of the 
establishment of a good government, inasmuch as it recognizes the authority of a class of 
men whom we have found to be corrupt, licentious, and cruel; men whose authority, as a 
matter of fact, is exercised, not through just laws, but through the power of slavery and 
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peonage; through power resulting in the indulgence of unbridled lusts, robbery, forcible 
seizure of property, etc.”419  Wood wanted to eventually abolish the datu system and to 
place the average Moro, whom he considered “semi-savage,” under the control of a 
patriarchal government led by the civil governor.420   He had determined, that by 
necessity, his civil administration would have to build a new Moro society on 
progressive principles as it deconstructed its traditional institutions. 
The lack of a significant check upon his authority and actions proved a 
significant problem as well.  Wood suffered throughout his career from an 
overabundance of self-confidence and a domineering personality.  Once he had decided 
on a course of action, he rarely wavered from that course even when it led to 
insubordination toward a commanding officer or even a president.  In Cuba he had 
clashed with Henry Lawton in Santiago and John Brooke in Havana.  In the Philippines 
he would eventually clash with Secretary of War Taft and even President Roosevelt.  
Secretary of War Elihu Root proved the only person who could consistently keep the 
general in line.  During Wood’s tenure as military governor of Cuba, Root had kept a 
tight rein upon Wood and his actions.  Wood reported directly to the Secretary who 
expected to be informed of all developments in the island.  On certain high-level 
policies, Root dictated to Wood the proper course of action and made sure that he held 
that course.  On numerous occasions he called the general to account for his actions and 
overruled decisions he had made.  The close proximity of Cuba to the United States, the 
openness of its society, and the existence of an independent press on the island assisted 
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in these efforts by allowing Root to keep independent tabs on Wood.  The official 
correspondence between the two men is replete with instances of Root raising issues or 
calling Wood to account for actions that the governor would have rather left alone. 
Assignment to the Moro Province removed Wood from direct oversight and 
buried him in a bureaucracy where he easily carved out an independent fiefdom.  As the 
civil governor and military commander, he reported to the larger civil and military 
bureaucracy governing the Philippines.  The Moro Province was just one of thirty-nine 
provinces reporting to the Philippine Commission.  The Department of Mindanao 
existed as one of three departments – Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao - which ultimately 
made up the Division of the Philippines under the command of a major general.  Wood 
reported to the Philippine Commission, the Governor General of the Philippines who led 
the commission, and to the military commander of the Division of the Philippines.  
Rather than receiving the scrutiny needed, his reports simply became part, sometimes 
just an appendix, to the larger reports of the Philippine Commission and the Division of 
the Philippines.   
Wood’s dual role as civil governor and military commander contributed to the 
lack of accountability.  In other provinces the civil governor had to make a formal 
written request for American troops and certify that the problem exceeded the capacity 
of the civilian-controlled Philippine Constabulary and the Philippine Scouts to handle.  
The military commander then had to concur and both develop a plan of action.  The 
civilian and military leadership in Manila then had to approve the request and the plan in 
consultation with one another.  Since Wood served as both civil and military commander 
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in the province, a potential check on his authority and judgment did not exist.  Civilian 
leadership in Manila largely considered the Moro Province a military problem and 
abandoned any attempt at oversight.  The three general officers who commanded the 
Philippines Division during Wood’s tenure in Mindanao did little better.  All were senior 
officers on their way to retirement and they often served as a rubber stamp for the 
younger, politically connected, general.  Even when Wood violated standing orders by 
launching military expeditions without prior approval, he received permission after the 
fact.  The geographic isolation of the province and the lack of a robust free press meant 
that the reports submitted by Wood and his subordinates served as the only reliable 
source of information.  In some cases, as with the military action on Bud Dajo, Wood 
used his control of the cable service to censure and delay press reports that contradicted 
his own narrative. 
The potential for oversight from the War Department weakened even further 
when Elihu Root resigned as Secretary of War on January 31, 1904.  William Howard 
Taft, former Governor General of the Philippines, replaced Root.  Although Wood had 
served for a few months under Taft, the two had a tenuous relationship at best.  
Governor Taft had resented comparisons in the press between his work in the Philippines 
and the work of Wood in Cuba.  He had written directly to Root in January 1903 to 
question the wisdom of sending Wood to the Philippines.  When Roosevelt decided to 
send Wood to the Moro Province, the President wrote to assure Taft that Wood respected 
him and would respect his authority as governor.421  Wood went out of his way to meet 
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with Taft in Manila and reassure both him and the President “that the co-operation 
between military and civil authorities will be cordial and sincere so far, at least, as I am 
concerned.”422  Although the working relationship between Wood and Taft remained 
cordial, the two never developed the partnership that work so well between Wood and 
Root in Cuba. 
 
The Civil Administration 
In the civil administration of the Moro Province, Wood sought to replicate the 
success he had in Cuba by adopting the same progressive agenda and pursuing the same 
administrative policy areas as in his previous command.  He failed to recognize that the 
Moro Province differed significantly from Cuba and lacked the three most important 
factors that lent to success in the former command – municipal governments, financial 
resources, and a certain degree of urbanization.  Municipal government in Cuba served 
as the foundation for the unitary state Wood set out to create and provided the local 
structure needed to make his progressive agenda a success.  The Moro Province had few 
municipalities.  The progressive agenda and the civil programs it spawned were highly 
expensive and only possible in Cuba due to the substantial revenue generated by the 
customs service.  The Moro Province had few ports, almost no international trade, and 
thus very little customs revenue.  Urbanization lent itself to progressive reforms and to 
the administrative policy areas pursued by Wood.  In Cuba the administration targeted 
municipal areas for extensive programs in public works, public education, and economic 
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development.  These programs made little sense in the predominately rural areas of the 
Moro Province.   
Act No. 787 of the Philippine Commission created the basic outline for the civil 
government of the Moro Province.  It authorized the civil governor of the Philippines, 
with the consent of the commission, to appoint a governor, attorney, secretary, treasurer, 
superintendent of schools, and engineer for the province.  The governor and the other 
five appointees constituted the Legislative Council of the Moro Province and bore 
responsibility for developing the government of the province and subsequent districts, 
creating a judicial system to govern the various tribes, organizing a system of public 
schools, undertaking public works, and abolishing slavery and the slave trade.423  After 
his arrival in Manila, Wood spent the better part of two weeks in consultation with 
Governor Taft about the structure of the new government and candidates for the various 
positions on the council.  Wood reserved the right to appoint, with the approval of the 
commission, the military members of the Legislative Council.  He left the appointment 
of the three civil members of the council – attorney, treasurer, and superintendent of 
schools – entirely up to Taft.  The Legislative Council of the Moro Province met for the 
first time on September 2, 1903. 
The Philippine Commission divided the Moro Province into five districts upon 
its inception: Zamboanga, Sulu, Cottabato, Davao, and Lanao.  Mindanao encompassed 
all the districts with the exception of Sulu, which included all of the Sulu chain and had 
its headquarters on Jolo.  The Governor of the Moro Province, with the consent of the 
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Legislative Council, appointed a governor, secretary, and treasurer for each of the 
districts.  The governor of each district served as the chief executive of the district and 
implemented the instructions and orders of the provincial government.  Wood appointed 
army officers as governors to command each district.  Colonel Hugh Scott, a trusted aide 
to Wood, took charge of the Sulu district, which many considered the most volatile.  He 
was the only district governor to also command the troops stationed in his district. 
Wood spent the first few months establishing the provincial and district 
governments outlined by the Philippine Commission.  After he had completed the 
organization of the districts, he turned his attention to the municipalities.  In his 
administration of Cuba, Wood had regarded the municipalities as the key to revitalizing 
Cuban society and the foundation of a stable insular government.   Although in need of 
reform and supervision, the municipal governments in Cuba played a large role in 
everything from the establishment of public schools and the implementation of public 
works to improvements in public health and the judicial system.  The problem in Cuba 
had been too many municipalities and Wood had had to consolidate from 128 to 82 
municipal governments.  In the Moro Province, he inherited no organized municipalities 
and during his entire governorship could only organize fifteen municipal districts:  
Siassi, Cagaya de Sulu, Jolo, Zamboanga, Dapitan, Iligan, Malabang, Cottabato, Davao, 
Mati, Makar, Baganga, Caraga, and Cateel, and Parang.424  Even some of these only 
existed on paper “for want of suitable personnel to assume charge of affairs.”425  Most of 
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these municipalities existed in the predominately Christian areas, which meant that the 
municipality, the beachhead of the progressive agenda, did not extend significantly into 
Moro territory.   
Since most of the population lived outside of the municipal areas, Wood created 
tribal wards “to provide for the government and control of the Moro and other 
uncivilized peoples” throughout the province.  Act No. 39 of the Legislative Council of 
the Moro Province authorized the district governors, in consultation with the provincial 
governor, to create tribal wards consisting of one tribe or related tribes and then to 
appoint a headman from among the tribal datus to oversee the tribal ward.426  Like the 
district governor, the headman acted as the chief executive of the tribal ward.  He 
implemented the laws and instructions of the civil government and generally served as 
an extension of the American government into the tribes.  He could, with the approval of 
the district governor, divide the tribal ward further into districts and appoint deputies 
from among the other datus.  The headman received an annual salary of between 240 to 
1800 pesos (hereafter $P).  His deputies received an annual salary of between $P96 to 
$P600.427  In the long run, the incorporation of the datus into the American system, their 
use as agents of imperial governance, and the loss of their independent authority, 
undermined the datu system even as the Americans sought to use.   
Wood considered the decline in the status and authority of the datu a positive 
accomplishment.  He viewed the tribal ward system a temporary expedient at best.  He 
hoped that as the municipalities grew the members of the tribe would abandon the tribal 
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system to become “full citizens of the municipality.”428  He encouraged district 
governors and other officials to induce the tribes to settle into villages and adopt an 
agrarian lifestyle.  The establishment of villages made it easier to extend the benefits of 
American rule – public education, law and order, etc. – to the people.  Initially Wood 
organized the municipalities created in Act No. 21 of the Legislative Council along the 
lines prescribed by Philippine Commission Act No. 82 but the dual system of 
municipalities and tribal wards forced a revision.  In Act No. 35 of the Legislative 
Council, Wood modified the municipal code then in effect to recognize and incorporate 
the tribal system and other circumstances unique to the Moro Province.  Act No. 35, 
enacted on February 9, 1904, became the municipal code of the province.429  Act No. 
787 called for the “creation of local governments among the Moros and other non-
Christian tribes, conforming as nearly as possible to the lawful customs of such peoples, 
and vesting in their local or tribe rues as nearly as possible the same authority over their 
people as they now exercise.”430  Wood ignored the mandate and organized his local 
governments as close as possible to the model existing in the rest of the Philippines.   
Act No. 787 also called for the recognition of tribal distinctions and a due 
reference to the “customary laws” of the Moros and pagan tribes when the civil 
government established a legal and judicial system for the province.431   In effect the 
initial plan was to govern the Moro Province according to several different legal 
                                                 
428 “Annual Report of the Governor of the Moro Province,” 1 September 1904, 575. 
429 “Legislative Acts enacted by the Legislative Council of the Moro Province, 1903-1906,” Box 216, 
Wood Papers. 
430 War Department, Bureau of Insular Affairs, Philippine Commission, Acts of the Philippine 
Commission: Acts Nos. 425-949, inclusive (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1904), Section 
13h, 551. 
431 Ibid., Section 13j, 552. 
  
  229
systems.  Christian Filipinos on the coast, mostly living in the municipalities, came 
under the civil and criminal code propagated by the Philippine Commission throughout 
the Philippines.  Cases involving the pagan tribes of the interior and the Moro tribes 
would be dealt with under individual tribal law.  A separate set of provisions would 
govern cases between tribes or between the Filipinos and the tribes.432   
The Philippine Commission ordered, through a provision in Act No. 787, the 
collection and codification of Moro laws as a basis for the development of a distinct civil 
and criminal code for the Moros.  Dr. Najjeb M. Saleeby, the provincial superintendent 
of schools and an Arab familiar with the Moro language, undertook the study and 
codification of those laws shortly after the creation of the province.  While allowing 
Saleeby to proceed, Wood had already determined by October 1903 that “no native laws 
worthy of the name” existed.433   “What is wanted in the way of new laws and 
procedure,” Wood told Taft, “is not a codification of existing Moro laws, but the putting 
in force of a simple system of procedure to enforce such simple code of laws as may 
with advantage, now, be put in force, and this code should bear a general resemblance to 
the present Philippine code, so that as time goes on it will become one with it.”434  Not 
surprisingly, when Saleeby completed the project, Wood concluded in his annual report 
that “nothing has been found worthy of codification or imitation, and little or nothing 
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which does not exist in better form wherever humane, decent, and civilized laws are in 
force.”435  The civil authorities in Manila echoed Wood’s findings. 436 
Subsequent legislations by the Legislative Council placed the entire province 
under the general system of laws in effect throughout the Philippines with some minor 
modifications to suit local conditions.437  The government eventually adopted a judicial 
system which included two courts of first instance, justice of the peace courts, and 
municipal courts.438  Although authorization existed for tribal courts to deal with strictly 
tribal matters, Wood never implemented the tribal courts because he did not trust the 
datus to govern impartially.  Nor did he trust them to act as officers of the court.  
Instead, he relied upon army officers and district governors to serve as local justices of 
the peace. 439  In the course of his judicial reform, Wood nullified traditional Moro law 
and usurped the authority of the datus to govern their people.  In short, Wood imposed a 
strictly military government on the Moros in direct defiance of Act No. 787. 
 
Financing the Civil Government 
As he had in Cuba, Wood enjoyed great discretion in how he spent the revenues 
collected by the civil government of the Moro Province.  As long as projected expenses 
stayed within provincial revenue, and the provincial treasurer could certify as much, 
Wood could freely pursue the same progressive ends as he had in Cuba.  If possible, the 
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potential scope of the progressive agenda appeared even more limitless in the Moro 
Province as, by any measurement, it lagged behind Cuba in every one of the five major 
administrative policy areas pursued by Wood in his previous command:  sanitation and 
public health, public works, economic development, education, and law and order.  In 
most of these administrative areas, public policy simply did not exist.  Or, if it did exist, 
did not extend beyond the coastal towns.  The need and the potential for development 
appeared immense.  Yet, the financial resources did not exist as they had in Cuba.   
Scarcity of revenue proved one of the largest prohibiting factors upon Wood and 
the civil government.  For the first fiscal year, the Moro Province lived hand to mouth as 
it gathered customs revenue and internal taxation for the first time.440  During that time 
Wood kept a tight rein on expenditures as no financial reserve existed and expectations 
on monthly revenue remained untested.  The initial frugality paid off as the government 
started the next fiscal with a reserve of $P472,980 in the treasury.441  For the roughly 
three fiscal years Wood oversaw the Moro Province, from July 1, 1903 to June 30, 1906, 
the provincial civil government received $P1,721,643 in revenue and spent $P1,642,930, 
or 95 percent of revenue.442  When Tasker Bliss succeeded Wood as civil governor, the 
treasury of the Moro Province held $P78,714.443  The amount would have been $P8,638, 
if all the liabilities contracted by the province during the 1906 fiscal year, amounting to 
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about 99 percent of revenue, had come due before June 31, 1906.444  Governor Bliss felt 
uncomfortable with the level of spending as compared to revenue and immediately 
moved to curtail spending and establish a $P100,000 reserve.445   
In proportion to revenue, the level of expenditures Wood oversaw in the Moro 
Province almost matched the level of expenditure by Wood in Cuba.  In Cuba he 
routinely spent more than collected because of an existing reserve in the treasury and the 
reliability of future customs revenue.  In the Moro Province, neither the reserve nor 
reliable customs revenue existed.  The point of discrepancy between Cuba and the Moro 
Province was not the proportion of revenue expended but the amount of revenue.  For 
the two and a half years Wood oversaw the insular government of Cuba, insular revenue 
totaled $44,132,111.  Financial resources in the Moro Province amounted to less than 2 
percent of what had existed in Cuba.  (See Table 7:1) 
 
Table 7:1 Provincial Revenue and Disbursement446 
 
Fiscal Year Revenue Disbursements Total  
 
Cash on hand July 1, 1903   0 
 
1904 662,895.05 189,914.55 472,981.50 
1905 517,960.62 583,484.35 -65,523.73 
1906 540,788.30 869,531.72 -328,743.42 
 
Cash on hand July 1, 1906   78,714.35 
     
 
The Philippine Commission provided a small amount of funding each year to the 
general fund of the province.  During the three years of Wood’s tenure, the Commission 
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allocated $P25,517 for fiscal year 1904, $P28,053 for fiscal year 1905, and $P17,861 for 
fiscal year 1906.447  The Commission provided an additional $P300,000 to the province 
in fiscal year 1904 but that funding came from the Congressional Relief Fund and had 
been designated for improvements on the Iligan-Lake Lanao Road.  The non-designated 
funds provided by the Philippine Commission proved insufficient to the meet even the 
basic administrative costs of the provincial government.  Wood and the civil government 
had to depend on customs revenue and internal taxation to fund his progressive agenda.  
Customs revenues provided most of the funding for the provincial government.  
In an attempt to make the province self-sufficient, the Philippine Commission had 
designated for its financial support the customs revenues from the three principal ports 
of the province:  Jolo, Zamboanga, and Bongao.  These three ports, according to 
estimates by the Philippine Commission, would collect about $130,000 a year in 
customs revenues.448  By comparison, the military government of Cuba collected 
$16,136,523 in customs revenue from sixteen customs houses during the first year of 
Wood’s tenure as governor.  During Wood’s tenure in the Moro Province, the civil 
government collected a total of $P803,882 in customs revenue.449  Total customs 
revenue collected under Wood in Cuba amounted to $37,568,552, or roughly 
$P76,000,000.  (See Table 7:2) 
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Table 7:2 Customs Revenue Compared to Total Revenue Collected by the Province450 
 
 Customs Revenue Percentage of 
Fiscal Year Total Total Total Revenue 
 
1904 222,664.39 337,378.05 65% 
1905 262,826.24 489,907.15 54% 
1906 318,391.10 522,927.22 61% 
 
Total 803,881.73 1,350,212.42 60% 
       
 
 
 
Wood pursued several initiatives in an attempt to garner more customs revenue 
for the province.  He estimated that three-fifths “of the dutiable articles consumed in the 
province are imported through the port of Manila and distributed from there to 
merchants in this province.”451  Since the articles came through Manila, the importers 
paid the customs duties due on the articles to the customs house there and not to the ones 
in the Moro Province.  To rectify the situation, Wood sought to bypass Manila and 
import directly to provincial ports.  On March 16, 1905, Wood and the Legislative 
Council contracted with the China Navigation Company to have at least one of their 
steamers operating between Hong Kong and Australia stop each way at Zamboanga.452  
The civil government subsidized the cost for the company by guaranteeing at least 
$P1000 for each stop.453  On March 30, 1905, the Legislative Council contracted with 
the South Philippines Steamship Company to operate the Borneo, a ninety-ton 
steamship, from Zamboanga to various ports in Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago at 
least four times a month.  The Borneo ensured that goods landed at Zamboanga could 
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reach the other ports of the province.  The government paid these costs from the customs 
revenue.  The rise in trade from opening Zamboanga to international shipping increased 
customs revenue and by 1906 the new revenue more than paid for the expenditure.454  
During the 1906 fiscal year, the North German Lloyd began operating a steamer between 
Zamboanga and various Chinese ports.  It did so without government subsidies.  (See 
Table 7:3) 
 
Table 7:3 Value of Imports and Exports per Fiscal Year455 
 
Fiscal Year Imports Exports    
 
1904 696,252.00 317,961.00  
1905 746,771.00 385,153.00 
1906 - 2,000,000.00  
 
       
 
 
 
Wood also experimented with opening up customs houses at several other ports 
within the province.  In 1904 he expanded the customs service to include Cotabato and 
Siassi.  He abandoned the ports the next fiscal year because the collections did not 
exceed operating expense.  In fiscal year 1906, he extended the customs service to Jurata 
and Sitanki but once again operating expense exceeded collections.  Even collections at 
Bongao, one of the principal ports established by the Philippine Commission, failed to 
exceed operating expenses in 1905 and 1906.  Only the primary ports of Zamboanga and 
Jolo paid for themselves.  (See Table 7:4) 
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377.  Provides export but not import data for the 1906 fiscal year. 
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Table 7:4 Customs Revenue Collected at Each Customs House and Expense Entailed456 
 Collected Collected Expense Collected Expense 
District 1904 1905 1905 1906 1906 
 
Zamboanga 77,143.19 109,584.01 17,171.55 178,766.86 16,643.55 
Jolo 141,992.77 150,509.68 20,636.19 134,262.39 23,756.90 
Bongao 2,406.86 3,088.71 4,172.53 2,913.57 9,496.53 
Cotabato 858.12 49.30 476.00 - - 
Siassi 58.48 11.20 450.79 - - 
Jurata - - - 2,228.96 2,671.96 
Sitanki - - - 209.32 567.80 
 
Total 222,459.42 263,242.90 42,907.06 318,381.10 53,136.74 
        ___ 
 
 
 
Along with the customs revenue, the Philippine Commission designated the 
proceeds collected from “the internal-revenue tax, the forestry tax, together with the 
usual municipal and other local forms of taxation” for the support of the province.457  
Shortly after the organization of the province, Wood and the Legislative Council 
imposed new internal fees and taxes including:  fees for property registration, firearms 
permits, and shellfishing licenses, industrial and stamp taxes, and an ad valorem tax on 
land.  Municipalities, organized under the provincial government, collected fees 
associated with the ownership and transfer of cattle, and various local licenses including 
those on carts, latrines, and fisheries.  The provincial civil government collected 
$P465,583 in internal taxation for the three fiscal years of Wood’s governorship.  (See 
Table 7:5)  The municipal governments collected $P202,077 through municipal taxation.  
                                                 
456 “Report of the Governor of the Moro Province,” 22 September 1905, 335.  Provides customs revenue 
data for fiscal year 1904 and customs revenue and expense data for the 1905 fiscal year.  No expense data 
given for fiscal year 1904.  “Report of the Governor of the Moro Province,” 27 August 1906, 360. 
Provides customs revenue and expense data for the 1906 fiscal year. 
457 “Annual Report of the Governor of the Moro Province,” 1 September 1904, 579. 
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Revenues collected by the municipal governments remained largely in the 
municipalities.  (See Tables 7:6 and 7:7) 
 
Table 7:5 Source of Provincial Revenue for Fiscal Year458 
 
Source 1904 1905 1906  
 
Insular Funds 325,517.00 28,053.47 17,861.08 
Refunds collected  
      by insular treasurer 0 80,747.24 0 
Provincial Revenues 114,713.66 146,333.67 204,536.12 
Customs Revenues 222,664.39 262,826.24 318,391.10 
 
Total 662,895.05 517,960.62 540,788.30 
            
 
 
 
Table 7:6 Municipal Revenue for Fiscal Year459 
 
District 1904 1905 1906  
 
Zamboanga - 27,131.11 27,989.84 
Cotabato - 22,131.18 17,010.25 
Sulu - 22,395.50 16,518.00 
Lanao - 14,937.07 29,567.47 
Davao - 10,946.92 13,450.00 
 
Total - 97,541.78 104,535.56 
      
 
 
 
                                                 
458 “Report of the Governor of the Moro Province,” 27 August 1906, 359. 
459 “Report of the Governor of the Moro Province,” 22 September 1905, 333.  Provides municipal revenue 
data for fiscal year 1905.  “Report of the Governor of the Moro Province,” 27 August 1906, 359. Provides 
municipal revenue data for fiscal year 1906.  No data given in reports for municipal revenue collected in 
fiscal year 1904. 
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Table 7:7 Municipal Revenue and Disbursements460 
 
Fiscal Year Revenue Disbursements Total  
 
Cash on hand July 1, 1903   0 
Cash on hand July 1, 1904   0 
 
1905 97,541.78 58,048.25 39,493.53 
1906 113,137.19 125,455.92 -12,318.73 
 
Cash on hand July 1, 1906   27,174.80 
         
 
 
 
While most of the aforementioned revenue schemes did not affect those living in 
tribal wards, the civil government imposed a cedula – or head tax – upon all Moros 
living in the province.  Each Moro male between the age of eighteen and fifty-five had 
to pay one peso to the district government in exchange for a certificate of registration 
that acted as identification papers for the individuals.  The government made the 
payment of the cedula mandatory and a certificate of registration necessary to transact 
business with the government or to vote.  A military officer or a representative of the 
civil government could demand to see the certificate of registration at any time 
following the deadline for compliance.  The Spanish had first instituted the cedula but 
had never been able to force the Moros to pay.  Many of the Moros resisted the tax 
because it “implied a recognition of superior authority” and “a token submission to the 
government.”461  Several denounced it on religious grounds as they felt payment 
acknowledged Christian overlordship.  Wood understood the Moro opposition but 
wanted the money to fund his progressive agenda and thus willingly risked an uprising.  
                                                 
460 “Report of the Governor of the Moro Province,” 22 September 1905, 333.  Provides data on  municipal 
revenue and disbursements for fiscal year 1905.   “Report of the Governor of the Moro Province,” 27 
August 1906, 359. Provides data on municipal revenue and disbursements for fiscal year 1906. 
461 “Report of the Governor of the Moro Province,” 27 August 1906, 347. 
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As with several other governmental policies, forced compliance with the cedula tax 
contributed to the military problems in the area. 
 
Economic Development 
Wood considered agricultural development the key to increased trade and 
internal economic growth within the province.462  Agricultural development however 
required access to profitable markets, which the Moro Province simply did not have in 
1903.  Therefore, Wood had to find or create those markets if he hoped to spur economic 
activity.  On June 14, 1904, he took a large step in that direction with the creation of 
what became known as the Moro Exchange.  Act No. 55 of the Legislative Council 
appropriated funds from the provincial treasury to build a public market at Zamboanga.  
Following the completion of the market, the government encouraged Moros and other 
tribes in the interior to bring their produce to the market where the government then 
advised the sellers as to the local market price for their goods.  The government also 
provided the seller a place to stay and a secure location to store their goods until they 
could be sold.  According to Wood, these efforts eliminated “the practice so common 
among the Chinese [merchants] and others of refusing to buy until the native was forced 
to sell at their price, usually a ruinous one, or carry his produce back to the 
mountains.”463  The exchange fell under the direct supervision of the district governor 
and a representative of the district government frequented the exchange to ensure “fair 
                                                 
462 “Report of the Governor of the Moro Province,” 27 August 1906, 350. 
463 Ibid., 340. 
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treatment to all concerned.”464  Wood reported in 1906 that the exchange had grown 
“beyond expectation and is transacting a very large amount of business with great 
satisfaction to the Moros and other non-Christian tribes as well as to the business 
community of Zamboanga.”465  Ultimately, the products flowing into Zamboanga 
reached an international market when Wood opened the port to international shipping.  
Hoping to duplicate the success, the government established similar exchanges in the 
districts of Cotabato and Lanao and, at the time of Wood’s departure, had others planned 
for Sulu and Davao.466 
In addition to the Moro Exchange, Wood worked to create a new market for 
provincial commodities by encouraging the U.S. Army to become a chief buyer of local 
goods.  When Wood assumed command of the military Department of Mindanao, the 
U.S. Army imported draft, cavalry, and artillery horses, pack animals, and the forage to 
sustain those animals from the United States.  Wood sought to persuade the army to buy 
local feed supplies rather than incurring the additional shipping charges that raised the 
cost of the occupation and consumed much of the transportation budget.  He set aside a 
small portion of the military budget each year to conduct experiments to determine the 
value of native forage for military livestock and to introduce new types of forage into the 
islands.467  He encouraged the army bureaucracy to establish a stock farm in Mindanao 
to meet the needs of the service and to develop the industries of the island.  Although 
                                                 
464 Ibid. 
465 Ibid. 
466 Ibid. 
467 “Report Department of Mindanao,” 30 June 1905, 59th Cong., 1st sess., H. Docs., vol. 3, 303. 
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Wood made the same suggestions in all of his annual reports, the advice fell upon deaf 
ears while he remained in Mindanao.468 
From his initial inspection tour, Wood recognized the economic potential of 
Mindanao, the abundance of natural resources like native timber, and the ability of the 
region to produce other stable crops that could fuel economic development.  He wrote to 
a supporter in the United States that the “country is healthy; the climate excellent and the 
land rich and productive.  It is difficult to conceive of a better country for the growing of 
hemp, cocoanuts, and other tropical products.”469  However, as in Cuba, economic 
development in the region suffered from a scarcity of capital investments.  American 
investors had, up until that time, proven reluctant to invest in the region.  Wood blamed 
the strict laws regarding land ownership, which limited the amount of land individuals 
and corporations could own.  The Philippine Commission and the United States 
government had enacted these restrictions to prohibit the economic exploitation of the 
islands by American businesses.  Wood considered them extreme and urged the 
commission to loosen restrictions so that an individual could purchase up to 5,000 acres 
and corporations up to 20,000 acres.470  He further recommended that the homestead 
allowance for land be increased from 40 acres to 200 acres.471  Stable crops required lots 
of land to be profitable and Wood felt the ability to acquire that land would bring in 
more capital investment. 
                                                 
468 “Report Department of Mindanao,” 1 July 1904, 58th Cong., 3d sess., H. Docs., vol. 3, 273. 
469 Leonard Wood to D.A. Willey, 29 November 1903, Box 32-33, Wood Papers. 
470 “Report of the Governor of the Moro Province,” 27 August 1906, 356-357. 
471 Ibid. 
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To help attract settlers and other investors, the civil government advertised for 
needed industries and other potential opportunities for enterprising entrepreneurs willing 
to invest in the province.  It established a lending library with information on the Moro 
Province and the tropics in general.  Under Wood’s direction, the provincial government 
even sponsored trips for provincial and district officials to other foreign colonies such as 
British North Borneo, the Celebes, and the Moluccas.472  Wood hoped the trips would 
bring new ideas about economic development and governance into the province.  During 
his first year in office, Wood sent Captain George T. Langhorne, his aide-de-camp and 
Provincial Secretary, to Sarawak, Java, and the Federated Malay States to gather data on 
the political, military, and economic developments of those colonies.  Wood made 
Langhorne’s report, as well as all of the other economic data gathered, available to the 
public.473  Captain John P. Finley, district governor of Zamboanga, opened a 
commercial museum for “merchants and others seeking investment in the Moro 
Province, and for the instruction and guidance of natives in gathering jungle produce, 
searching for minerals, and opening the way for progressive development in various
branches of industrial economy.”
 
vao 
attracted 
her the 
                                                
474  The efforts soon bore fruit in the District of Da
which, due to the availability of land and the lack of a large Moro population, 
“a very considerable influx of American and foreign settlers.”475  Although neit
commission nor the American government had eased land restrictions, these immigrants 
settled upon public lands, cleared away the jungle, and planted cash crops like cocoanuts 
 
472 “Report of the Governor of the Moro Province,” 22 September 1905, 330. 
473 “Annual Report of the Governor of the Moro Province,” 1 September 1904, 671-701. 
474 “Report of the Governor of the Moro Province,” 22 September 1905, 342. 
475 “Report of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands for the Fiscal Year 1905 and Other Stated 
Periods,” 1905, 59th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 10, pt. 1, 85. 
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and abaca.  Wood not only tolerated but actively encouraged these settlers in their 
violation of Philippine law. 
To support agricultural development and to help the natives and new settlers 
establish local farms, the Moro Province acquired possession of the San Ramon 
agricultural farm from the insular government in November 1905.  Wood planned to 
maintain the facility as a working farm to train and educate local farmers “in the proper 
methods of agriculture and illustrates to them the advantages to be gained by the use of 
improved tools and implements.”476  The farm included nurseries that cultivated hemp, 
cocoanut, cacao, and rubber plants as well as a variety of fruit and other trees.  The farm 
sold the seeds, seedlings, and more mature plants gathered from the nurseries to local 
planters to assist them in developing their own crops.  The proceeds helped to keep the 
farm self-sufficient and allowed the provincial government to introduce potential new 
crops to the island.   
In addition to liberal land laws, Wood recommended the Commission revise its 
forestry restrictions and timber rights to allow more harvesting of the valuable native 
timber.  Wood worked with the Secretary of the Interior to simplify the “application of 
the forestry regulations” in the Moro Province and even accommodated the local forestry 
representatives with an office in each district government building.477   In November 
1905 the civil government hired an American forester, a former employee of the U.S. 
Forest Service and a graduate of the Yale Forest School, to oversee the forestry efforts in 
                                                 
476 “Report of the Governor of the Moro Province,” 27 August 1906, 376. 
477 “Report of the Governor of the Moro Province,” 22 September 1905, 329. 
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province.478  These efforts resulted in an increased amount of timber that could be cut.  
The government responded by establishing small sawmills and contracting with the 
natives for lumber.  Much of the lumber went to public works projects in the province 
and to the construction of military encampments. 
 
Public Works 
The program of public works Wood pursued in the Moro Province mirrored the 
one implemented in Cuba but on a smaller scale due to the limited revenue.  Once again 
Wood focused on projects designed to facilitate the civil-military occupation and “the 
transaction of public business, commerce, and agriculture.”479  He placed great emphasis 
on road construction, municipal improvement projects, and other infrastructure 
improvements such as harbors and wharfs.  The complete lack of almost any existing 
infrastructure compounded the funding problem because many of the projects involved 
entirely new construction.  In Cuba the military government had at least an existing 
baseline with which to work and on which to build.  Although it often engaged in new 
construction, the military government of Cuba funded the repair and rehabilitation of 
existing facilities to serve the needs of the occupation.  In the Moro Province few 
adequate facilities existed prior to the American administration.  Those that did exist had 
fallen into disrepair since the Spanish had evacuated the island following the Spanish 
American War.   
                                                 
478 “Report of the Governor of the Moro Province,” 27 August 1906, 368. 
479 “Annual Report of the Governor of the Moro Province,” 1 September 1904, 583-584. 
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The need for new construction at the outset of the civil government placed a 
heavy burden on the budget at a time when Wood sought to minimize expenditures.  In 
his first civil report, Wood stressed the needs of the province but then cautioned that 
until revenues improved “road construction must necessarily be very limited and 
confined to the vicinity of the principal towns” and even the “water systems and 
extensive municipal public works … required at Zamboanga, Cottabato, and Iligan … 
can only be undertaken gradually.”480  By his own admission, the civil government 
accomplished little in the area of public works during the first year due to the demands 
in organizing the province, the lack of funding and the need to purchase necessary 
equipment.481   
Road construction proved particularly challenging as the roadways required 
constant maintenance to repair the damage done by the tropical climate, inclement 
weather and the ever encroaching jungle.  Wood rejected temporary roads as a waste of 
money and pushed for permanent ones with accompanying bridges and culverts of 
masonry construction.482 The roads themselves had to be of the Telford macadam type, 
which required extensive labor and continual upkeep.  To meet these demands, Wood 
adopted the caminero system in which the state employed a man to live along a section 
of road and to maintain it daily.  Wood had seen the caminero system practiced in 
several of the colonies he visited on the way to the Philippines and he had adopted it to a 
certain extent in Cuba.483  He considered it “the most effective and cheapest method of 
                                                 
480 Ibid. 
481 Ibid. 
482 Ibid., 584. 
483 “Report of the Governor of the Moro Province,” 27 August 1906, 347.   
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keeping up roads.”484  Initial efforts to implement the system in and around Zamboanga 
proved successful. 
Outside the municipalities Wood confined the scope of public works to building 
a system of wagon roads to connect coastal towns with military encampments in the 
interior.  The most important of these wagon roads included those from Malabang to 
Camp Vicars and from Iligan to Camp Overton and eventually the Lake Lanao district 
and Camp Keithley.  Wood expended a lot of time and resources on the road from Camp 
Overton to Camp Keithley.  He hoped to eventually turn Camp Keithley into the primary 
U.S. Army base in the Moro Province and one of the principal bases in the 
Philippines.485  In his first report as military commander of the department, Wood 
described the location as “one of the most healthful spots in the Philippine Islands, at an 
elevation of 2,400 feet above the sea, situated on the shores of Lake Lanao, overlooking 
the oceans, and comparatively near the western shore line of the Philippines; in other 
words, on the line of ocean traffic from Manila south.  Troops can be maintained here in 
excellent condition and ready for service anywhere that they may be needed.”486  
Although principally constructed for military usage, Wood diverted civil funds to the 
project and justified the expenditure as a way to open up the interior of Mindanao to 
economic development.487  He further recommended the construction of a narrow-gauge 
railroad from Overton to Keithley and applied to the Philippine Commission, the War 
                                                 
484 Ibid. 
485 “Report Department of Mindanao,” 1 July 1904, 272. 
486 Ibid. 
487 “Report Department of Mindanao,” 30 June 1906, 59th Cong., 2d sess., H. Docs., vol. 3, 309; and 
“Report Department of Mindanao,” 1 July 1904, 272-273. 
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Department, and Congress for funding, but, the project never moved beyond the 
planning stage.  
Wood used public works to further economic development of the province by 
creating job opportunities for the local residents.  The civil government hired laborers 
for the construction and renovation of public buildings, for road construction, and for the 
various municipal projects.  Most of the labor force consisted of unskilled manual 
laborers and Wood had to look to the ranks of his own occupation force for skilled labor.  
To increase the economic impact of local projects, Wood purchased as much native 
material as possible from local suppliers, who contracted with the government to furnish 
timber, sawed lumber, thatch, crushed stone, and other needed material for the 
construction of civil projects and military installations.  The government then contracted 
with individual Moros and datus to have the material transported to the job sites. 
While the execution of public works projects created employment and other 
opportunities for the Moro, the completed projects mainly benefited the existing 
municipalities -usually populated by Christian Filipinos - the civil government, and the 
U.S. Army.  With the exception of interior roads designed primarily to facilitate the 
military occupation, few public works actually penetrated into the heart of Moro 
territory.  Focused on the municipalities, Wood never adopted rural projects designed to 
reach the local Moros.  In regards to public works, the occupation had a lot of stick and 
little carrot.  (See Tables 7:8 – 7:10) 
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Table 7:8 Public Works in Zamboanga and Surrounding District for Fiscal Years 1904 to 1906488 
 
Reconstruction of the Provincial Building at Zamboanga 
Construction of a new Provincial Building at Zamboanga 
 Designed to house all provincial, district, and insular offices as well as a court room  
Reconstruction of the Streets and Roads about Zamboanga 
Construction of a Provincial Jail – “the Calarian Prision” – of concrete and iron 
Repair of Wharves at Zamboanga 
 Replacement of wooden pilings and structure with cement and steel construction 
Extension of the wharf at Zamboanga 
Construction and Placement of concrete gutters and curbs in Zamboanga 
Construction of the Moro Exchange 
Construction of an Isolation Corral at Zamboanga 
Construction of two substantial steel girder bridges with concrete abutments in Zamboanga 
Construction of a bridge on the concrete steel method in Zamboanga 
Construction of two wooden bridges Zamboanga 
Road Building in Zamboanga (16 miles) 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Table 7:9 Public Works in Jolo and the Surrounding District for Fiscal Years 1904 to 1906489 
 
Repair of Wharves at Jolo 
 Replacement of wooden pilings and structure with cement and steel construction 
Extension of the existing Wharf at Jolo 
Construction of a new Wharf at Jolo 
Construction of the Asturias and Tullai bridges in Jolo 
Road Building in Jolo 
Improvements on the Jolo-Asturias road 
Construction and installation of street curbs and gutters in town of Jolo 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
                                                 
488 “Annual Report of the Governor of the Moro Province,” 1 September 1904, 583-584; “Report of the 
Governor of the Moro Province,” 22 September 1905, 335-338; and “Report of the Governor of the Moro 
Province,” 27 August 1906, 346-347 and 363-364. 
489 “Annual Report of the Governor of the Moro Province,” 1 September 1904, 583-584; “Report of the 
Governor of the Moro Province,” 22 September 1905, 335-338; and “Report of the Governor of the Moro 
Province,” 27 August 1906, 346-347 and 363-364. 
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Table 7:10 Public Works in the Moro Province for Fiscal Years 1904 to 1906490 
 
Furnishing and Care for Supplies of All Branches of Government 
Repairs to District and Municipal Buildings at all Principal Towns 
Purchase of Road Building Equipment (traction engine, stone crushers, etc.) 
Construction of School Houses 
 At Manicahan, Mati, Davao, Baganga, and Iligan 
Reconstruction of the Suspension Bridge over the Agus River 
Road Building in Davao 
Davao-Beach road completed 
Construction of the Matina bridge at Davao 
Construction of the Santa Cruz telephone line 
Beacons placed on the Rio Grande 
Work on the Iligan-Lake Lanao Road 
Road Construction between Camp Overton and Lake Lanao 
Road Construction between Camp Overton and Iligan 
Partial Construction of five bridges on Overton-Iligan Road 
Partial Construction of four bridges on Overton-Keithley Road 
Construction of a Customs House at Jurata 
Construction of new Barracks for Constabulary at Calaian 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Public Education 
Wood placed a high value on public education at the primary level and 
considered it essential to the development of the province.  During his three years in 
Zamboanga, Wood worked with Dr. N.M. Saleeby, the superintendent of schools, to 
establish a system of public schools under the control of the provincial government.  The 
two faced several obstacles.  As in all other policy areas in the province, lack of funds 
proved the largest hurdle.  Wood initially hoped to devote 25 percent of all revenue to 
the support and extension of public education, however, budgetary restrictions and the 
needs in other policy areas kept that goal beyond his reach.491  The small number of 
municipalities also proved a problem.  Outside of the coastal and a few interior towns, 
                                                 
490 “Annual Report of the Governor of the Moro Province,” 1 September 1904, 583-584; “Report of the 
Governor of the Moro Province,” 22 September 1905, 335-338; and “Report of the Governor of the Moro 
Province,” 27 August 1906, 346-347 and 363-364. 
491 “Annual Report of the Governor of the Moro Province,” 1 September 1904, 581. 
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most of the population lived scattered as individual families or in small settlements in 
the interior.  The educational model pursued by the occupation government – a 
centralized schoolhouse and teacher - required a certain degree of urbanization.  Under 
Wood administration, public education extended little beyond the Filipino settlements on 
the coasts and a few of the larger Moro and native settlements in the interior.  Tasker 
Bliss estimated the population of the province to be 450,000 with a corresponding 
30,000 school age children.492  Since public school enrollment never exceeded 4,235, 
most of the Moros and other natives living in the tribal wards remained untouched. 
The first year of the civil government witnessed a rapid expansion of public 
education into the existing municipalities.  Wood characterized the provincial schools 
established during the initial push as “necessarily rather crude affairs, as everything had 
to be started from the bottom, schoolhouses built or repaired in most places, and children 
induced to come to school.”493  During that year the civil government established and 
operated fifty-two public schools in forty-nine separate facilities.494  The lack of 
educational facilities throughout the province proved a problem and the government 
resorted to using abandoned municipal buildings and privately owned facilities as 
schools.  As time and funding permitted, the civil government slowly began to build 
independent facilities operated by the province.   
To staff the facilities and teach the children, the civil government hired a mixture 
of American and predominantly Filipino Christian teachers.  Teachers from the United 
                                                 
492 “Report of the Governor of the Moro Province,” 27 August 1906, 373. 
493 “Annual Report of the Governor of the Moro Province,” 1 September 1904, 582.   
494 Ibid. 
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States fell under the civil service laws enacted by the Philippine Commission and 
required a salary of $P200 a month.  In contrast, native teachers came cheaper at a 
yearly salary of between $P180 and $P600.  The high cost of American teachers limited 
the number the province could employ.  The number of American teachers never exceed 
one-third of the total number of teachers contracted by the province during Wood’s 
tenure.  He felt it imperative to train the Filipino teachers in English and to improve their 
teaching methods.495  In 1905 the civil government conducted a normal school to train 
native teachers in Zamboanga, during January and February, and in Davao in April.  Dr. 
Saleeby organized Saturday teacher’s classes and instructed all the American teachers 
serving outside of Zamboanga “to give their native assistants daily and regular 
instruction in all branches they are expected to teach.”496 
In Cuba Wood had refused to hire American teachers because he thought it 
unwise to flood “the Island with American teachers ignorant of the language and 
customs of the people, and foreign in religion and sentiment” since to do so would lead 
to charges that “the United States wished to Americanize the children.”497  He had no 
such qualms in the Moro Province.  In fact, from the outset of his administration, Wood 
actively sought to use the schools as an Americanizing force to reform the province and 
the residents therein.  He began by making English “the principal study … wherever it is 
possible to obtain teachers who have a sufficient knowledge of the language to instruct 
                                                 
495 Ibid., 583. 
496 “Report of the Governor of the Moro Province,” 22 September 1905, 339. 
497 “Civil Report of Brigadier General Leonard Wood, USA, Military Governor of Cuba,” 5 July 1902, 
57th Cong, 2d Sess, H. Docs, Supplementary Material, Department of Cuba, vol. 1, pt. 1, 17-18. 
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in it.”498  Wood planned for English to become “the main language and the medium of 
transacting all official and most business affairs in the comparatively near future.”499  He 
rejected Spanish because the natives had never adopted it as the common language.  Not 
surprisingly, he regarded the native dialects as “limited and crude and is not believed to 
present any features of value or interest other than as a type of savage tongue.”500  He 
considered their preservation “unwise.”501 
In subsequent years, Dr. Saleeby mitigated Wood’s drive to repress the native 
dialects.  During the 1904-1905 school year, Saleeby wrote and the province published 
two Moro readers in the dialects common to Sulu and Maguindanao.  The following 
year, the civil government furnished the schools serving the Moro population with 
textbooks printed in Arabic “in order that they may learn to read and write their own 
tongue.”502  Saleeby believed that learning Arabic would not only improve Moro 
literacy but allow them to pursue their own cultural and literary heritage.  It is unclear 
whether these publications and their use by the civil government represented a change in 
Wood’s view of the native dialects or whether he simply considered them an expedient 
along the way to his original goal of English as the common language. 
                                                
Rather than a continued expansion of the school system after the first year, 
Wood worked to improve the existing structure.  By the end of the 1904-1905 school 
year, the government saw “encouraging signs of progress, the general evidence of which 
are uniform and well-adapted course of instruction, the establishment of several 
 
498 “Annual Report of the Governor of the Moro Province,” 1 September 1904, 582. 
499 Ibid. 
500 Ibid.  
501 Ibid. 
502 “Report of the Governor of the Moro Province,” 27 August 1906, 346. 
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additional primary schools, one secondary and one trade school, a marked increase in 
enrollment, more efficiency in the teaching force, and the construction of several new 
buildings.”503  Since Wood wanted the system of education under provincial and not 
municipal control, the construction of new schools allowed the government to rely less 
on municipal facilities.  Zamboanga became the center of the provincial system of public 
education and Wood located both a secondary school and a manual training school 
(trade school) there. 
 
It is believed that this type of school [manual training school] should be 
encouraged to the greatest possible extent.  Too many boys are attending 
school with the idea earning their living by some other means than 
manual labor.  Few of them have any idea of becoming skilled artisans or 
agriculturalists.  The country is exceedingly rich, but undeveloped.  
Opportunities in agriculture and some of the mechanical arts are very 
great, whereas in the professions and the clerical branches they are 
exceedingly limited.  Every effort should be made to impress upon the 
Filipino youth that his greatest opportunity lies in the development of the 
resources of his country; the policy of public education should be to 
prepare him to the greatest possible extent for this work.504 
  
The manual training school reflected Wood’s conviction that economic growth in the 
province depended upon agricultural development.  Opportunities for native Filipinos 
and Moros, at least in Wood’s mind, were limited in the American empire.  (See Table 
7:11) 
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Table 7:11 Statistics on Public Education505 
 
 1904 1905 1906   
 
Public Schools in Operation 52 - 67 
American Teachers 15 27 27 
Native Teachers (non-Moro) 50 58 56 
Moro Teachers 9 6 11 
Total Enrollment 2,114 3,617 4,235 
Actual Attendance 1,582 3,100 - 
Average Attendance   2,021 
Moro Children in Attendance 240 - 570 
Bagobos Children in Attendance - - 79 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Unlike the system adopted in Cuba, public education in the Moro Province did 
not extend beyond secondary education and, in most cases, not beyond primary 
education.  The only attempt made at higher education in the province was a plan 
proposed by Wood to build a school to train civil servants and teachers for the province.  
He planned to bring two to three hundred children between the ages of ten and fourteen, 
representing all areas of the province, to Zamboanga “for the purpose of putting them at 
school under first-class supervision and giving them a course of about six years, which 
will include primary school, manual training, and, for those who show capacity, normal 
training; the children to be returned to their homes for vacation at regular intervals.  If 
this can be carried out, and it is believed it can, it will give the province a large number 
of well-trained natives as assistants in the various departments of the government and 
especially as teachers among their own people.”506  Although the civil service academy 
remained only on paper, Wood believed it viable because the future of the Philippines 
                                                 
505 “Annual Report of the Governor of the Moro Province,” 1 September 1904, 581-583; “Report of the 
Governor of the Moro Province,” 22 September 1905, 338-339; and “Report of the Governor of the Moro 
Province,” 27 August 1906, 345-346 and 373-376. 
506 “Annual Report of the Governor of the Moro Province,” 1 September 1904, 583. 
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and the Moro Province lay with the United States and its larger world empire.  His 
system of public education reflected that belief. 
 
Public Health 
The policy areas pursued by the civil government least resembled those of Cuba 
in the area of public health.  No civil hospitals or department of charities existed in the 
province.  Nor did Wood attempt to create any.  Public health policy consisted of the 
provincial government purchasing supplies, medicines, and vaccinations which the 
military hospitals and army doctors then dispensed to the general population.  The civil 
government did not even provide for the establishment of provincial, district, and 
municipal boards of health until March 29, 1905, almost two years after the creation of 
the civil administration.507  The primary reason for so small an effort ironically stemmed 
from the knowledge gained in Cuba.  The discovery that mosquitoes carried yellow fever 
brought an end to many of the extensive and expensive sanitation programs previously 
undertaken by the army.  Instead, troops learned to use mosquito bars and to boil water 
prior to drinking.  Wood claimed that these two efforts alone kept the army healthy in 
the field.   The fact that only a few municipalities existed and that the U.S. Army often 
resided in isolated reservations, even when in the vicinity of a municipality, also helped 
to minimize the cost. 
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Table 7:12 Expenditures per Appropriation for Fiscal Year 1904 in pesos508 
 
   Percentage of 
Appropriation Amount Expended                    Provincial Revenue 
 
Government of the Moro Province  62,077.56  18.4 
 Governor’s Office  (5,060.67)  1.5 
 Secretary’s Office  (11,470.85)  3.4 
 Treasurer’s Office  (13,157.74)  3.9 
 Attorney’s Office  (9,446.59)  2.8 
 Engineer’s Office  (11,133.48)  3.3 
 Superintendent of School’s Office  (11,808.23)  3.5 
 
District Governments  45,546.04  13.5 
 
Public Education  45,546.04  13.5 
 
Public Works  21,929.57  6.5 
 
Customs Expenses  54,317.87  16.1 
 
Financial Reserve  107,960.97  32 
 
Total  337,378.05  100 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 7:13 Expenditures per Appropriation for Fiscal Year 1905 in pesos509 
 
Executive Offices (provincial and district governors and secretary)   60,564.01 
 
Treasury   
 Office of Provincial Treasurer  13,534.53 
 All Offices, District Treasurers  25,657.50 
     39,192.03 
Public Works and supplies 
 Office of Provincial Engineer  11,819.99 
 Construction, Repair, Supplies  249,562.30 
     261,382.29 
Judiciary   
 Office Attorney Moro Province and Assistant 11,946.56 
 Other Expenses  10,827.92 
     22,774.48 
Schools 
 Office Superintendent  12,302.61 
 Salaries, Rents, Supplies, Misc.  102,644.95 
     114,947.56 
Health    3,553.70 
Guaranties and Subsidies – Steamships    6,993.13 
Bates Treaty Subsidies    19,402.00 
Collecting Customs    52,409.40 
 
Total    581,218.60 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Table 7:14 Expenditures per Appropriation for Fiscal Year 1906 in pesos510 
 
   Percentage of 
Appropriation Amount Expended   Provincial Revenue  
 
Administration  59,090.78  11.3 
 
Public Works, Economic Development  263,032.39  50.3 
 and Agricultural Development 
 
Public Education  111,906.43  21.4 
 
Financial Reserve  88,897.62  17 
 
Total  522,927.22  100 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Conclusion 
In his governance of the Moro Province, Leonard Wood moved well beyond the 
role of simply an executor of imperial policy.  Emboldened by a weak command 
structure and empowered by his dual role as civil-military leader, Wood determined and 
implemented American imperial policy for the province.   Shortly after his arrival, he 
dispelled four years of diplomacy and relative stability by violating the Bates Agreement 
and marching against the sultan and the datus in a blatant attempt at intimidation.  He 
then advocated the president repeal the agreement he violated and reverse course to 
allow direct American control of the Moros.  In establishing the civil administration, 
Wood ignored the instructions contained in Act No. 787 of the Philippine Commission 
and substituted his own policy – guided by a mixture of prejudice and prior experience.  
He even went so far as to ignore and then violate laws passed by the U.S. Congress 
regarding public lands and standing orders issued by the War Department regarding the 
conduct of military operations.  Rather than a civil servant implementing imperial policy 
developed in Washington D.C., Wood dictated imperial policy in the Moro Province free 
from accountability.  
During his tenure in the province, Wood created a functional civil 
administration, brought a degree of economic development to the region, and extended 
American control throughout the entire province.  He also saddled the new provincial 
government with an expensive progressive agenda that primarily benefited the few 
municipalities in existence and ignored the predominately rural population of Moros and 
pagan tribesmen.  Along the way he managed to undermine the stability of datu rule and 
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embitter most Moros to American rule.  His actions created regional problems that still 
exist and had large implications for imperial defense at the time.  
  260
CHAPTER VIII 
IMPERIAL DEFENSE IN THE PHILIPPINES 
 
While Wood labored to build a civil government in the Moro Province, he 
simultaneously dealt with issues of imperial defense as the commanding general of the 
Department of Mindanao.  The two were not unrelated enterprises.  The creation of a 
civil government and the exercise of a civil administration depended upon the ability of 
that government to impose its will upon the populace and insure their compliance.  
Wood understood that the Moros would not consent willingly to his version of American 
rule.  He knew, perhaps even hoped, they would resist attempts to undermine their 
traditional leadership, to change their culture through Americanization, and to force 
alterations in their religious practices.  To enforce compliance to his civil policies, he 
relied almost exclusively on the U.S. Army as the instrument of law and order outside of 
the municipalities. 
Wood’s promotion to Commanding General of the Philippines Division on 
February 1, 1906, did not significantly alter his basic mission but it did broaden the 
scope of his work and the contingencies he faced.  In the Department of Mindanao, the 
largest threat to the American empire came from internal resistance to American rule.  
As head of the Philippines Division, Wood continued to struggle with instances of native 
resistance but he also had to contend with larger issues of imperial policy in the region 
and possible military threats from other conventional powers.  Since Roosevelt had 
promised the promotion in 1903, Wood had given serious thought to the military policy 
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and organization he would pursue in command of the division while he served as a 
departmental commander.   Once in Manila he adapted key elements of the program 
developed in Mindanao to the larger command. 
 
The Department of Mindanao 
Wood came to the Moro Province intent on extending American control and the 
benefits of progressive rule to the Moros.  He expected a certain degree of armed 
opposition at first but believed the Moros would eventually recognize the futility of 
resistance and come to accept the blessing of American tutelage.  Instead armed 
opposition continued throughout his entire tenure and the Moros never seemed to learn 
the lesson Wood strove to teach them.  Nor did they accept his progressive vision for 
their society or their homeland.  He responded to their continued opposition by simply 
repeating the same lesson – the battlefield superiority of the U.S. Army – and pressing 
the progressive reforms.  When queried by superiors about the lack of progress and 
continued Moro resistance he offered various excuses.  What Wood failed to realize was 
the all encompassing role of religion in the life of the Moro, which meant that almost all 
political and cultural issues were religious issues.511 
Prior commanders in the department had pursued “a policy of conciliation.”512  
They left local government to the datus, quietly suppressed the slave trade while blurring 
the issue of existing slaves, and responded to attacks upon American soldiers as a matter 
                                                 
511 Robert A. Fulton, Moroland: The History of Uncle Sam and the Moros, 1899-1920 (Bend, OR:  
Tumalo Creek Press, 2009), 35.  Fulton defined the term as Islamism, “the political role of Islam in 
everyday life.”     
512 Linn, Guardians of Empire, 37. 
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of law enforcement rather than a full-scale military problem.  Brigadier General Samuel 
S. Sumner, whom Wood replaced, understood the inherent dangers involved in 
tampering with Moro society.  In his annual report for 1903, he cautioned against any 
such an attempt. 
 
If it is contemplated to change the customs and habits of these people 
and bring them to an intelligent understanding and appreciation of our 
methods of government, it will be necessary to eradicate about all the 
customs that have heretofore governed their habits of life.  They are 
essentially different people from us in thought, word, and action, and 
their religion will be a serious bar to any efforts toward Christian 
civilization.  So long as Mohammedanism prevails Anglo-Saxon 
civilization will make slow headway.513 
 
 
Sumner understood the centrality of Islam to the Moro world.  Wood, who dismissed 
most of what his predecessors did, considered “all the talk which I have heard … about 
Moro laws, fixed customs, strong prejudices, etc. etc., is for the greater part, rubbish.”514  
His dismissal of lessons learned in the previous four years created many of the problems 
he faced. 
Many of his initial problems came from his failure to understand the datu system 
and the religious underpinnings of leadership in Moro society.  In a letter to John St. Loe 
Strachey, editor of The Spectator, Wood dismissed the British reliance on native 
leadership:  “You are quite content to maintain Rajahs and sultans and other species of 
royalty, but we, with our plain ideas of doing things, find these gentlemen outside of our 
scheme of Government, and so have to start at this kind of a proposition a little 
                                                 
513 “Appendix III,” 30 June 1903, 58th Cong., 2d sess., H. Docs., vol 3, 302. 
514 Leonard Wood to William H. Taft, 7 October 1903, Box 32-33, Wood Papers. 
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differently.  Our policy is to develop individualism among these people and little by 
little, teach them to stand upon their own feet independent of petty chieftains.”515  Wood 
failed to appreciate the religious significance these “petty chieftains” had in the Islamic 
system.  Sultans were not simply a form or royalty but claimed direct lineage from the 
Prophet and, on that basis, received authority and power as head of the state and as a 
religious figure.  Although the average datu lacked the physical lineage to the Prophet, 
the office itself combined both religious and political authority and allowed the datu to 
act with immense power.516  Wood’s public embarrassment of the Rajah Muda and the 
harsh treatment meted out to other datus had religious implications of which Wood was 
totally unaware.  In seeking to demonstrate American power, he insulted Islam.   
In abrogating the Bates Treaty and extending civil government throughout the 
territory, Wood made it clear that the United States intended to rule the people directly.  
The establishment of civil districts, municipalities, and tribal wards and the eventual 
extension of the Philippine legal code to the province challenged the power and 
authority of the sultans and datus.  His attempt to supplant traditional leadership with 
American appointees inadvertently raised a religious issue and made a clash with the 
Moros a foregone conclusion.  Wood foresaw the conflict but attributed it to a traditional 
power struggle as the “datos and headmen, who practically exercised the power of life 
and death over their people, were unwilling to abdicate their powers and become 
                                                 
515 Leonard Wood to John St. Loe Strachey, 6 January 1904, Box 34-35, Wood Papers. 
516 Fulton, Moroland, 33. 
  
  264
subordinate to any superior authority.”517  He did not realize that, as a non-believer, the 
Moros did not and could not consider him, or any non-believer, a superior authority. 
The progressive policies Wood championed further threatened the religious 
foundations of Moro society.  Many of the policies sought to restructure social 
institutions, the economic system, and even intertribal and interpersonal relationships.  
Compounding its attack on the datus system, the central government at Zamboanga 
inflamed Moro resentment by asserting itself as the final arbiter of clan and personal 
differences.  The clearest case in point involved Wood’s heavy-handed attempt to 
abolish Moro slavery.  Propagated on September 24, 1903, Act No. 8 of the Legislative 
Council, An Act Defining the Crimes of Slave Holding and Slave Hunting, and 
Prescribing the Punishment Therefor, made it illegal to own slaves or to engage in any 
part of the slave trade – hunting, buying, selling, or recapturing.518  Those convicted of 
violating the prohibition could be imprisoned for up to twenty years and received a fine 
of up to ten thousand pesos.   
Slaves in Moro society existed in two categories – those taken in war or by raid 
and those who had fallen in debt and thus came into a form of economic bondage as a 
bond slave.  Article X of the Bates Agreement had tacitly recognized slavery among the 
Moros:  “Any slave in the archipelago of Jolo shall have the right to purchase freedom 
by paying to the master the usual market value.”519  Although McKinley and Roosevelt 
both officially repudiated the article – one reason they did not send the agreement to the 
                                                 
517 “Annual Report of the Philippine Commission,” 1904, vol. 11, 10; and “Report Department of 
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Senate for ratification – it remained in effect.  While the army prior to Wood had moved 
quietly to suppress slave-taking, it had done little about existing slaves or the practice of 
bond slavery.  Previous military administrations had discussed monetary compensation 
for the loss of slaves, a point touched on in the Bates Agreement.  Wood refused to 
consider the option. 
  The abolition law struck at the core of the datu system.  The slave trade had 
long been a staple of Moro economy and slave hunters had once ranged as far as Manila 
and British Borneo in search of slaves.  In a system without hard currency, slaves served 
for barter and as an indication of a datu’s value and worth. Bond slavery reinforced the 
authority of the datu as it served as a punishment to his followers and a way of retaining 
loyalty.  Wood understood that Islamic law sanctioned slavery but argued that “the Moro 
must yield to humanity and progress.”520  He increased the efforts to end the slave trade 
and stationed his troops accordingly.  While he did not force the emancipation of the 
slaves, he issued a proclamation guaranteeing their freedom if they chose to leave their 
masters.  The civil administration, by governmental fiat, had inserted itself and the U.S. 
Army into the very fabric of Moro society. 
Wood grossly underestimated the extent of Moro opposition to these policies.  In 
an attempt at enforcement, the Department of Mindanao, under his direction, launched 
thirty-nine expeditions in fiscal year 1904, twenty in 1905, and eight in 1906.  Each of 
the sixty-seven expeditions served to extend the power of the civil government, to 
uphold the civil laws of the province, and to demonstrate to the Moros that he United 
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States had the power to enforce its policies.  Wood characterized the expeditions as 
“undertaken for the purpose of quelling armed uprisings, bringing to an end continuous 
disorder destructive to life and property, and for the purpose of preventing slave trade 
and kindred abuses, contrary to and in open defiance of law.  In short, to bring to an end 
conditions of utter lawlessness, which had existed for a long time.”521  He did not 
recognize that his policies and dictatorial leadership had contributed to the societal chaos 
and loss of property that he bemoaned.   
In the first year as department commander, Wood personally led seven 
expeditions into the three central areas of Moro settlement and power – the Lake Lanao 
region, the Rio Grande Valley, and the island of Jolo.522  He led eight expeditions out of 
the sixty-seven conducted by the department during his three years as commander.  In 
September 1903, shortly after his arrival in the department, Wood led an expedition to 
Lake Lanao to demonstrate to local datus that the United States had the strength and 
resources to enter their territory.  While in the field, he received word of an uprising on 
the island of Jolo.  In response he shifted operations and launched what became known 
as the First Sulu Expedition.  He returned to Lake Lanao in November but again had to 
shift operations after only a week to launch the Second Sulu Expedition.  In March of 
1904, he led troops up the Rio Grande Valley in the First Rio Grande Expedition.  In 
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April 1904, troops under his command entered the Taraca valley near Lake Lanao to 
quell resistance in that area.  The Second Rio Grande Expedition followed a month later 
in May of 1904.  He led the Third Sulu Expedition in May of 1905.  These expeditions 
gave Wood a first hand knowledge of the terrain, the tactics used by the Moro, and the 
key players involved in each region.  The expeditions did not give him the decisive 
victory that he felt would bring peace and stability to the province. 
The duration of Moro resistance surprised Wood.  He expected resistance to end 
quickly after a clear and decisive demonstration of American power against one or two 
of the recalcitrant datus.  Although American military prowess easily defeated the Moros 
in open battle and even battered them into submission in their cottas, none of these 
victories ultimately brought an end to resistance.  Resistance sprung anew almost every 
time the government instituted a major new policy or set of regulations.  During his 
tenure as commander, Wood had to counter armed opposition against the slave law, the 
collection of internal taxation, the implementation of the cedula tax, and numerous other 
actions considered provocative by the Moros.  Most Moros had no respect for the law 
imposed upon them by an alien civil government so to them it only existed if the army or 
the agents of the civil government were present and capable of enforcing it.  The defeat 
of a datu on Jolo meant nothing to a datu living in the Lake Lanao region and very little 
to another datu living on Jolo.  Wood complained to Roosevelt that “whipping them is 
not a serious proposition, but to stop this slave hunting and acts of piracy, is going to 
require diligence and a great deal of activity.”523 
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Service in the Philippines placed Wood on the horns of a dilemma.  On the one 
hand, he agreed with army reformers who considered conventional warfare against 
another modern power, or the preparation for such warfare, to be the purpose of the 
army.  He felt the most efficient way to prepare for conventional warfare was to 
assemble large numbers of troops at a post and then drill them to fight as larger military 
units.  Service on the imperial frontier against non-conventional forces distracted from 
that purpose and posed a danger to army effectiveness because it scattered the troops 
into small post throughout the countryside.  In his annual report for 1904, Wood 
complained that the “expeditions against very inferior people, are not of great value in 
preparing soldiers for the exigencies of actual war with an intelligent, well-equipped, 
thoroughly instructed enemy.”524  On the other hand, Wood supported the American 
empire and the projection of American power abroad through colonies like the 
Philippines.  He considered his work in the Moro Province, the Department of 
Mindanao, and eventually with the Philippines Division to be extremely important.  As 
the commander of military troops at an imperial outpost surrounded by rival 
conventional powers, Wood had to find a way to strike a balance between the two 
demands. 
Wood eventually settled upon a system that he hoped would allow the army to 
prepare for conventional war while meeting the immediate demands of imperial service.  
The solution relied upon a method for troop deployment that allowed the commanding 
officer to concentrate troops during times of relative peace and to rapidly disperse those 
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same troops to meet any contingency that might arise in the department.  At the outset of 
his command, troops in the department remained dispersed as Wood sought to assert 
American governance and bring compliance with the law.  As the Moros grew more 
accustomed to an American presence and resistance to the slave law dwindled, he began 
to contract the number of posts and concentrate his command in larger camps.  Once 
assembled in large number, the troops could train and drill in large formations like other 
conventional armies.  When Wood needed to deploy American troops to assert American 
authority, oppose Moro resistance, enforce the law, or to simply demonstrate the reach 
and power of the U.S. Army, troops from these large bases could rapidly expand 
outward to temporarily constructed posts in the troubled area to meet the particular need.  
After the situation had been resolved and with opposition quelled, the troops could 
abandon the temporary posts and once again contract into the larger bases.  Through this 
system, Wood hoped to meet the existing demands placed on a frontier army while 
allowing that army to train and equip itself for conventional warfare. 
The system depended upon the existence of several large posts specifically 
located to cover the major centers of Moro settlement.  Wood established permanent 
brigade and regimental size posts at Zamboanga, Jolo, Parang, Camp Overton, and 
Camp Keithley.  He also maintained smaller but still permanent posts at Camp Vicars, 
Malabang, and Cotabato.525  Zamboanga served as headquarters for the department and 
allowed the army to cover the Zamboanga peninsula and the large island of Basilan.  The 
post at Jolo bore responsibility for that island and the entire Sulu archipelago.  Camp 
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Overton, Camp Vicars, and Camp Keithley provided access and control to the districts 
around Lake Lanao.  Troops at Malabang, and Cotabato covered the Rio Grande Valley.  
Although many of these posts predated Wood, he worked to increase their size to 
accommodate more troops and to replace their temporary structures with permanent 
construction.  By 1906 these eight bases allowed the army to maintain significantly large 
garrisons in the heart of Moro country. 
As the centerpiece of his departmental system of imperial defense, Wood 
planned to construct the largest, permanent army post in the southern Philippines at 
Camp Keithley.  Located on the shores of Lake Lanao at an elevation of 2,400 feet 
above sea level, Camp Keithley offered a cooler and healthier climate for troops 
stationed in the tropics.  Wood estimated that troops could be maintained there year 
round “in excellent condition and ready for service anywhere that they may be 
needed.”526  Although Wood made Camp Keithley a top priority and began to build on a 
permanent scale, the isolated location and the difficulty of moving supplies over a poorly 
constructed wagon trail, the only means of getting supplies to the camp, slowed 
construction significantly.  In an attempt to solve the problem, Wood invested significant 
portions of his budget for public works into improving the road from Camp Overton and 
requested funding from Congress for the construction of a narrow-gauge railroad to the 
location.  Even with the support of Secretary of War Taft, Wood failed to make his 
vision for Camp Keithley a reality during his tenure in the Philippines.   
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Troop deployments remained constantly in flux throughout Wood tenure.  To 
help alleviate the strain on American troops, Wood turned the Philippine Constabulary 
and the Philippine Scouts.  Creations of the Philippine Commission and the Philippines 
Division, the constabulary and the scouts were designed to serve as the first responders 
to any civil disturbance in the archipelago.  Although trained and led by officers detailed 
from the U.S. Army, the constabulary, then under the command of Colonel James G. 
Harbord, operated as the chief law enforcement arm of the civil government outside of 
major municipal areas.   Harbord began the organization the Moro corps of the 
constabulary on September 29, 1903, shortly after Wood’s arrival.  As the constabulary 
grew in strength, Wood relied more and more upon it to handle local police matters and 
even transferred control of the provincial jail from the military to the constabulary.527  In 
some areas the constabulary garrisoned the posts abandoned by the American troop.528 
If the situation proved beyond the ability of the constabulary, then the civil 
government could call upon the Philippine Scouts.  The Scouts were a military 
organization composed of native Filipinos and led by officers of the U.S. Army detailed 
especially for that purpose.  They served as light infantry and cavalry troops and could 
live off the land to a large extent.  Fifty companies of Philippine Scouts existed in the 
archipelago but only six companies served in the Department of Mindanao.529  The 
relatively small number of Scout companies available to Wood meant that, in the Moro 
Province,  the U.S. Army still served as the primary responder if a situation exceeded the 
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capability of the constabulary.  The development of more constabulary and scouts units 
over time meant that Wood could increasingly concentrate American forces and 
relinquish control of many of the temporary stations to these other units. 
The concentration of American troops into larger posts brought additional 
benefits as well.  Wood explained in his first annual report that these enlarged garrisons 
would make general administration, maintenance, and the instruction of troops more 
efficient. 530  It would also allow commanding officers to detach troops for field service 
without significantly weakening the garrison.  He felt small isolated posts, although 
essential at times, led to disciplinary problems because not enough troops existed at the 
post for proper instruction and field training.  In addition the smaller posts were more 
expensive to maintain and unnecessarily duplicated administrative and sanitary services 
that could be concentrated at the larger garrisons.  To meet the training needs of these 
large garrisons, Wood and his staff worked hard to ensure that most of the larger posts 
had adequate facilities to conduct large scale drill and for target ranges.  The target range 
at Malabang ranked as the best in the Philippines and one of the best in the entire 
army.531 
The department also worked hard to increase the efficiency and prowess of the 
soldier in the field.  Much to the dismay of his men and officers, Wood prescribed a 
regiment of “daily drills and semiweekly marches under full field equipment.”532  Wood 
considered training under such conditions essential to conditioning the troops and 
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familiarizing them with the equipment they would use in time of war.  “Mobility is one 
of the greatest factors, and unless we are counting on always meeting an enemy as 
unprepared as we are more attention should be paid to the instruction of the soldier in 
marching and shooting with the full field equipment on.”533  To help the soldier prepare 
for conditions in the field, especially in the Philippines, Wood had instructors teach 
almost all of the men how to swim and insisted that the men be able to swim at least fifty 
yards in full field equipment if possible.534  By 1906 the department had even begun to 
conduct systematic bayonet practice with the new Springfield rifle. 
In the midst of training for conventional warfare, Wood did not neglect training 
and improvements designed to better equip troops for service on the imperial frontier.  
While practice marches and target practice had universal application, Wood also took 
great pains to have his troops taught the art of mobility in a country without a significant 
degree of infrastructure.  Due to the lack of roads beyond the major municipalities, 
Wood relied almost exclusively upon pack trains to supply his troops in the field.  He 
worked hard to keep these trains at the peak of efficiency and personally experimented 
with saddles type, with load design, and with the arrangement of the trains.535  He 
reminded his superiors that this “important branch of army transportation should be 
carefully kept up throughout the army at large, and the art of packing retained and 
thoroughly taught.  At present the old pack-masters are rapidly disappearing, and no one 
is coming up to take their place, and there is danger of serious deterioration in the branch 
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of transportation.”536  To assist in the training of his troops and to keep the pack rains at 
a high state of efficiency, Wood hired several packmasters from the United States and 
brought them to the department. 
Wood provided the troops with additional field training by dispatching over forty 
reconnaissance patrols throughout Mindanao and the Sulu islands during his command.  
These reconnaissance patrols were in addition to those that accompanied the military 
expeditions launched by the department.  Each patrol left form a designated point and 
proceeded by either a trail or general direction to another designated point.  Along the 
way the officer in charge gathered details, data, and illustrations to contribute to the 
progressive mapping of the island underway at departmental headquarters.  The 
command provided these officers with a template report showing the data to be gathered 
along the way such as number of streams crossed, trails, villages, and population.  The 
patrols also gathered non-military data on crops, natural resources, economic 
development, etc.  The practice had become standard operating procedure during the 
Philippine War and Wood put it to good use in Mindanao.  In his annual report for 1905, 
Wood boasted that our “knowledge of the Moro country is now comparatively thorough, 
and there is no section which is not well covered by information concerning the 
character of the country, etc.”537 
In his final report as departmental commander, Wood boasted of bringing peace 
to the province.  “While it is not expected that all disturbances are at an end in the 
Department of Mindanao it can be asserted with reasonable confidence that resistance to 
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the government on a large scale is a thing of the past.”538  Although he expected minor 
disturbances, Wood claimed that the department had turned a corner.  If he truly 
believed his own report, then he seriously misjudged the level of discontent in the 
province as Moro resistance continued long after his departure.  It is also unclear if 
Wood understood the extent to which his own policies had created many of the 
disturbances he lamented.  As resistance persisted beyond his initial expectations, he 
cast the blame completely on the Moros and presented more and more reasons for their 
defiance.  In his report for 1905, Wood blamed resistance not just on the abolition of 
slavery but to “the actions of fanatical Arab priests, of a class which is a disturbing 
element throughout the East.”539  Rather than taking Moro religious concerns seriously 
and adjusting policy accordingly, Wood simply characterized religious opposition as 
fanatical and proceeded.  In his correspondence and reports, Wood often claimed to be 
just one campaign away from peace, whether it was Datu Ali in 1905 or the “robbers” on 
Bud Dajo in 1906.540  The assault on Bud Dajo revealed the fragility of the peace Wood 
had imposed and pointed to larger concerns that did not bode well for the department. 
On March 4, 1906, the U.S. Army launched an assault against a large group of 
Moros who had entrenched themselves on Bud Dajo, a volcanic cone rising 2,100 feet 
near Jolo.  These Moros had gathered there in the months following the Third Sulu 
Expedition in direct defiance of the civil government.  They resented American rule and 
especially the recent application of the cedula tax to their island.  Over the course of four 
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days the army steady advanced along three trails up the mountain to the crest.  The Moro 
defenders – men, women, and children - contested every bit of ground and fought to the 
bitter end.  Figures range between four and six hundred Moros killed in the action.  The 
U.S. Army suffered fifteen enlisted and three constabulary killed.  News of the battle 
caused a brief firestorm in the United States as critics of the administration charged 
Wood with the intentional slaughter of women and children.  Official explanations soon 
followed from Wood, Taft, and Hugh Scott, then on leave in Washington, D.C.  Taft and 
Scott crafted the administration’s response to the charges and the controversy died 
almost as quickly as it flared up.   
Although the bloodiest battle in the Department of Mindanao and one of the 
bloodiest in the Philippines, Wood and the military establishment considered the battle 
to be simply the most recent in a long line of actions against hostile Moros.  Wood saw 
nothing discerning about the incident and dismissed those killed there as simply outlaws 
who “had banded together to prey in common upon the inhabitants of the island, and to 
resist the authority of the Government.”541  Secretary of War Taft referred to the incident 
as “the taking of the robber fastness at Mount Dajo” and compared the battle to the 
action taken against Datu Ali in the Rio Grande Valley.  The battle on Bud Dajo, 
however, proved to be much more than simply another effort to maintain law and order.  
In many ways it pointed to flaws within American imperial policy and with the accepted 
wisdom that had governed the actions in the department since Wood’s arrival. 
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Bud Dajo clearly demonstrated that the datu system of government had crumbled 
more than anyone expected and that the Americans had been unable to provide anything 
to replace it.  In previous actions against hostile Moros, a datu or group of datus often 
led their followers in opposition to American authority.  The battle of Bud Dajo stood 
out because the insurgents gathered there lacked that traditional leadership.  The Moros 
on Bud Dajo had no established datu and in fact had rejected the leadership and 
authority of their own datus in order to defy the civil government.  Many of the 
insurgents belong to clans governed by the Sultan of Jolo, Datu Jokanein, Datu Kalbi, 
Maharajah Indinan, and a number of other friendly datus.  Prior to the military assault, 
the civil government had spent months trying to get the people on Bud Dajo to disperse 
peacefully.  Part of that effort involved using the peaceful datus to try and convince the 
insurgents to return to their homes.  The insurgents not only refused to listen to their 
former chiefs but openly mocked them for their subservience to the Americans.  Such 
open defiance would have been unheard of three years earlier. 
The framework of much of the civil government depended upon the institution 
of the datu and his ability to exercise authority and influence over his people.  Datus 
were the key to the success of the tribal wards and played a substantial role in 
establishing municipalities in the interior.  Wood had expected the datu to be a transitory 
institution that would pass over time as the municipalities and other governing structures 
assumed more and more of their authority and power.  But, he did not expect it to 
disintegrate so quickly.  Nor were the civil and municipal governments prepared to step 
in and fill the void.  The presence of insurgents, without traditional leadership, on Bud 
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Dajo was not the progression of governmental evolution that Wood had in mind.  
Brigadier General Sumner had warned back in 1903 that “to remove their natural leaders 
[the datus] and leave them without any control would add to, rather than decrease, the 
already existing anarchy.”542  Wood had underestimated the destructive affect American 
control would have on the native institutions. 
Bud Dajo also challenged Wood conviction that the common Moro, free from 
what he saw as the self-serving dominance of the datu, would welcome the benefits and 
American rule.  Wood reported in 1904: 
 
The lower classes have more confidence in us, but the sultan and the 
chiefs are obstructive factors in all our efforts for the betterment of the 
condition of the Moro people.  They have no honest desire for American 
methods of honest administration, when the whole people will be 
benefited unless there is some consideration in it for them.  They are as 
overbearing toward their people as ever, and do not seem inclined to 
change their arbitrary methods or aid the people to better themselves.  
They act as if they though the people were created to be their slaves or 
for their own aggrandizement.  The lower class seem to be peaceable and 
as law-abiding as they can be under the circumstances.543 
 
 
Even in 1906, a few months after Bud Dajo, Wood argued that with the “end of the datto 
system, with all its attendant evils, … it is believed that in a few years the great bulk of 
the Moro Province will be living as independent freemen recognizing no head except 
such as is duly appointed by the government, a condition which is the only practicable 
one under out system of government and control.”544  Bud Dajo demonstrated that the 
rejection of datu rule did not necessarily mean the peaceful acceptance of American rule 
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and its supposed benefits.  Since reality differed from his preconceptions, Wood found it 
easier to classify the insurgents as robbers than to deal with the implications of their 
insurgency. 
 
The Philippines Division 
As the Commanding General of the Philippines Division, Wood commanded 
roughly one-fifth of the U.S. Army, the largest single command of American troops at 
the time.  The Philippines Division consisted of three separate geographical departments 
– the Department of Luzon, the Department of the Visayas, and the Department of 
Mindanao – each overseen by their own commanding officer who reported to division 
headquarters.  Wood bore responsibility for the training, deployment, and the general 
welfare of the American troops and the Filipino scouts under his command.  As the chief 
military officer in the Philippines, he played a large role in determining military and 
imperial policy in the region. 
At division headquarters Wood confronted the same dilemma he had faced in 
Mindanao, namely, how to prepare for conventional warfare while meeting the 
immediate needs of service on the imperial frontier.  The consequences of how Wood 
solved that dilemma were much greater at division level than at the departmental level.  
As the senior officer in the region, Wood took the lead in preparing for possible military 
contingencies that might involve the United States throughout the area.   During his two 
years as division commander, Wood witnessed a lot of change in the region with the 
division of China by the major power and the rise of Japan following the Russo-
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Japanese War.  Action against China had already become a distinct possibility when a 
Chinese boycott of American goods in the fall of 1905 had led to increased tensions 
between the two countries.  Wood, working in close conjunction with President 
Roosevelt, had even readied one regiment for deployment.  Another crisis, this time with 
Japan, arose in 1907 when the San Francisco School Board provoked a diplomatic crisis 
with the segregation of Japanese children from their schools.  The diplomatic crisis soon 
blossomed into full-fledged war scare as rumors abounded in the Philippines and even 
Hawaii about a possible Japanese attack.  Although diplomacy eventually resolved both 
of these situations, they drove home to Wood the gravity of his responsibility as 
commanding general to protect the Philippines and to prepare for possible military 
action in Asia. 
Wood took several measures in preparation for a possible attack upon the 
Philippines.  He pushed heavily for the engineer corps to finish the progressive mapping 
of the island as quickly as possible so that potential landing beaches and invasion routes 
into the interior might be identified and a defensive plan adopted.  To spur that endeavor 
along, he coordinated the efforts of the engineers with the Military Intelligence Division.  
He also asked that the four members of the General Staff on duty in the division be 
relieved of all routine duty and instead assigned to work on plans for the defense of the 
archipelago.  He requested the War Department establish an official fortification board 
for the archipelago.  In the interim, while he awaited official action, Wood created his 
own fortification board and charged it with “making all preliminary reconnaissances and 
surveys, and submitting recommendations concerning the fortifications at such points as 
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it may be determine to fortify in these islands.”545  The board began work on a report for 
the landward defenses of Manila, Cavite, and Subig Bay.  When the War Department 
created an official fortification board with General Orders No. 255, on December 30, 
1907, the unofficial board had already served for over a year and a half.  Under his 
direction the construction of coastal artillery advanced on Grande Island and Corregidor 
Island.  In September 1907 the first company of seacoast artillery arrived and took their 
position on Grande Island.  Wood requested two more companies of sea coast artillery to 
man the guns already being mounted and two more companies of engineers to accelerate 
further construction.546 
While preparing for a possible attack by a conventional force, Wood also had to 
deal with a lingering insurrection by Pulajanes on the island of Samar in the Department 
of the Visayas.  The outbreak began under Wood’s predecessor on July 21, 1904.   The 
civil authorities quickly dispatched the constabulary to deal with the disturbance but the 
situation soon outstripped the resources and the ability of the civil government.  Even 
the infusion of Philippine Scouts failed to end Pulajane attacks on coastal towns or to 
break their control of the interior.  On June 22, 1906, the governor general made formal 
application for the use of U.S. troops to restore order.  In consultation with the civil 
governor of Samar, the military divided the hostile territory into seven districts and 
assigned an officer with a sufficient number of troops to each district.  Each officer 
received orders “to push the campaign against them [the hostiles] vigorously.”547  The 
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command then coordinated the movement of all the troops “with the object of keeping 
the enemy moving, preventing his gathering at any time in large numbers; destroying his 
supplies and means of subsistence in the mountains and forcing him into the valleys and 
inhabited parts, where he could be more easily proceeded against by other troops, the 
constabulary, and volunteers.”548  The effort to restore peace took over a year and 
engaged about 4,000 troops, scouts, and constabulary.549  The army handled a 
simultaneous outbreak on Leyte in the same way.550 
As a former civil governor, Wood recognized the larger implications of what 
other officers regarded as simply a military operation. 
 
These disturbances, as military matters, are of little significance, but they 
are very vital to the welfare of the islands, in that they disturb the 
economic life of the people and thereby prevent the investment of capital 
and the extension of industry, and give rise to serious doubts as to the 
possibility of establishing any large measure of local self-government at 
present.551 
 
 
According to Taft the outbreaks jeopardized the forthcoming election of a popular 
assembly designed to function alongside the Philippine Commission “as the legislature 
of the Christian Filipino provinces.”552  Wood moved quickly to end the insurrection and 
thus insure the continued civil development of the islands.  He assured Taft that the 
restoration of peace was only a matter of time.   
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To assist in the economic development of the islands, Wood continued to urge 
the army and the War Department to purchase local materials and to hire local labor 
whenever possible.  Within areas of his discretion, Wood purchased native products 
including forage for animals, lumber for construction projects, and wood for fuel.  By 
1908 the War Department gave way and, under the authority of the Secretary of War, 
Wood authorized “the use of native materials in all instances where they could be used 
economically.”553  The authorization led to the development of a coal mine on Bataan, 
the manufacture of khaki clothing in Manila, and the hiring of native teamsters. 
To enable the division to prepare for a conventional enemy while meeting the 
needs of imperial service, Wood adopted the same program of troop concentration and 
expansion that he had perfected in Mindanao.  Eventually Wood hoped to establish 
permanent posts throughout the division and he instructed departmental commanders to 
report on which posts to make permanent and which to regard as temporary. 554  After 
determining the location of these posts, he planned to proceed with the installation of 
modern water and sewage systems and with the construction of permanent facilities, 
including a type of barrack “adapted to climatic conditions, and architecturally 
creditable.”555  Despite his best efforts, continued disturbances in the Department of the 
Visayas limited what he could do in that command and the lack of Congressional 
funding curtailed his planned improvements.  Undaunted, Wood still manage to 
consolidate many of the troops into centralized posts. 
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Ironically, opposition to the concentration of troops into large garrisons came 
from Brigadier General Tasker H. Bliss, who had replaced Wood as commanding 
general and civil governor in the Department of Mindanao.  In his first annual report 
submitted only a couple of months after replacing Wood, Bliss argued “that our 
concentration of the troops and their withdrawal from the constant observation of the 
natives result in an actual temptation for … outbreaks.”556  He recommended the large 
garrisons be broken up into small detachments and “be so widely distributed throughout 
the Moro country as to enforce a continued respect for law, with the probability that 
there would never be occasion for military operations at all.  Armies have before been 
used in this way, resulting in a civilizing and peace-producing effect, and it could be so 
done here.”557  Bliss maintained his opposition to Wood’s policy throughout his tenure 
in Mindanao.  Although he could not completely overrule the policy, he resisted as much 
as possible. 
Bliss also broke with Wood’s insistence on using the U.S. Army as the chief arm 
of law enforcement in the Moro Province.  He used his position as civil governor to 
declare overt instances of Moro opposition a civil offense and thus subject to the civil 
authorities.  In doing so, he removed these instances from the military sphere and thus 
out of the jurisdiction of Wood as commander of the Philippines Division.  As a civil 
matter, law enforcement fell largely to the constabulary which Bliss directed without 
needing the approval of Wood.  Since he reported to the civil authorities in Manila, 
                                                 
556 “Report Department of Mindanao,” 30 June 1906, 314. 
557 Ibid. 
  
  285
whose oversight was as lax as when Wood commanded the department, Bliss enjoyed 
wide discretion in handling these events. 
At the division level, Wood planned to turn the Philippines into the best school 
in the army for training troops for conventional and imperial service. As he had in 
Mindanao, Wood emphasized drill, marksmanship, swimming, and physical fitness.  He 
earned the ire of his troops and the vocal objections of his subordinate commanders by 
insisting on extended marches in full field gear.  In response to their complaints, Wood 
stressed the need for mobility and urged them to find interesting ways to engage the 
troops by incorporating a field problem to be solved with the equipment they carried. 558  
In an attempt to foster an active and creative interest in physical fitness and even field 
work, Wood sponsored a division wide field meet in February 1907.  In addition to the 
normal competitive events one would expect, officers and men “were encouraged to 
present modifications of the pack and method of carrying it, to present devices for using 
the equipment as an aid in crossing streams, etc.  ….  In short, the whole spirit of the 
meet was in the line of military improvement.”559 
Wood credited the general health of his troops and the low death rate in the 
division to the intense training.  He reported to the War Department that it had “been 
repeatedly remarked that troops leaving the Philippine Islands present a far better 
appearance than on their arrival.  There is nothing whatever in the medical reports to 
indicate that any bad effects have resulted from practice marches or from the present 
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system of instruction.”560  In response to the carping from his junior officers, he urged 
the army to retire officers who were either too old for the physical regime or simply did 
not take an active interest in the physical development of their command. 
To maintain a high degree of military proficiency in his command, Wood 
worked hard to ensure his troops received the latest equipment and instruction available.  
In light of developments in the Russo-Japanese War, Wood requested machines guns so 
that he could development rapid fire squads and incorporate those into existing tactics.  
He eagerly adopted the new 1903 Springfield and pressed the War Department to send 
training material and instructors so the troops could learn bayonet drills.  He even 
recommended the development of hand grenades.  To better equip his troops for service 
in the Philippines, he urged the adoption of a .45-caliber revolver, a significant increase 
in stopping power over the standard .38-caliber.  He also recommended the issuing of 
automatic shotguns to assist the troops in brush fighting and the creation of a service 
bolo to help in the cutting of trails.  In an effort to maintain a high degree of readiness 
and mobility, Wood secured over one thousand replacement mounts for his cavalry and 
enough pack mules to bring his pack trains to full strength.561 
Wood also took an active interest in the Philippine Scouts under his command.  
He coordinated with the civil authorities to station the scouts where the civil government 
felt they would do the most good.  Whenever possible, he consolidated scout troops into 
larger posts where they could receive the same benefits of training and instruction as 
American troops.  To make training easier and to eliminate tribal conflict, Wood 
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reorganized scout battalions on a tribal basis as of January 1, 1907.  He encouraged 
officers to learn the dialect of his company to make training and discipline easier.  Wood 
recommended that scouts be given parity with American troops in regard to rewards and 
retirement.  He even recommended the construction of a retirement facility for the scouts 
in the island.  He urged the War Department to add an additional fifty scout companies, 
including two companies trained as engineers and one as a signal company. 
 
Conclusion 
As military commander of the Department of Mindanao, Wood failed to end 
Moro resistance to American rule and to bring them peaceably into the American 
empire.  His reliance almost exclusively upon the force of American arms and his 
inability to understand the religious implications of the policies he championed 
contributed directly to that failure.  Although he derided the martial ability of the Moros, 
opposition from rebellious datus and their followers outlasted Wood’s tenure as 
departmental commander.  Operations against these hostile datus consumed both men 
and resources and disrupted Wood’s plan for the civil and military administration of the 
region. 
As head of the Philippines Division, Wood proved an apt administrator and 
eager to address larger issues of imperial defense.  Under his direction, the U.S. Army 
made significant progress toward preparing a plan for the defense of the archipelago 
from external threats.  He also attempted to strike a balance between the demands 
imposed by imperial service and the need to prepare for a possible conflict with another 
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conventional power.   His decision to concentrate troops into larger garrisons where they 
could train for conventional warfare while equipping them for rapid dispersal to meet 
imperial needs was not perfect but it did strive to answer the dilemma facing the U.S. 
Army.  When Wood relinquished command of the Philippines Division on February 20, 
1908, his service for the past two years had earned him promotion to command of the 
Department of the East and eventually appointment as Chief of Staff. 
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CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSION 
 
Leonard Wood served as the primary agent of American imperial rule from 1898 to 
1908.  As one of the first imperial proconsuls, he left an undeniable stamp upon imperial 
policy and upon the role of the U.S. Army in colonial administration.  His service in 
Cuba began in 1898 with the liberation of the island from Spain and ended in 1902 when 
the military government he led transferred sovereignty to the newly created Republic of 
Cuba.   In 1903 he assumed command of the Moro Province of the Philippines where he 
served until his promotion to commanding general of the Philippines Division in 1906.  
In both of these commands, Wood presided over a civil-military administration, which 
not only implemented but developed and shaped imperial policy. 
In Cuba, first as a departmental commander and then as military governor, Wood 
crafted and implemented a progressive agenda designed to rehabilitate the island after 
decades of Spanish misrule and revolutionary upheaval.  He focused consistently on five 
major policy areas:  sanitation and public health, public works, economic development, 
education, and law and order.  Although Wood’s progressive imperialism contradicted 
McKinley’s minimalist approach to the occupation, Wood aggressively lobbied for his 
policies and eventually attained the administration’s endorsement with his elevation to 
the military governorship.  In the process he overcame – sometimes ruthlessly – the 
opposition of his commanding officer and his fellow departmental commanders. 
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As the Military Governor of Cuba, Wood worked closely with Secretary of War 
Root to address high level policy issues such as the structure of the Cuban state, creating 
and then accomplishing the benchmarks for Cuban independence, and determining the 
nature of future relations between the United States and the Cuban Republic.  Although 
Root allowed no deviation from administrative objectives on these issues, he granted 
Wood great freedom on strictly insular issues and in colonial administration.  In these 
areas Wood continued to pursue his progressive imperialism and to expand these 
programs on the insular level. 
As civil governor and military commander of the Moro Province, Wood 
implemented the same progressive imperialism that he had in Cuba.  However, in the 
Philippines he faced armed resistance from the Moros who regarded much of the 
progressive agenda as a violation of their Islamic faith.  Undeterred, Wood used the 
military might of the U.S. Army to enforce compliance and break the resistance.  In the 
process, he destroyed much of the Moro social order without providing a replacement.  
The progressive agenda, which Wood felt had succeeded in Cuba, did not work as well 
in the Moro Province. 
As an imperial proconsul, Wood had a lot of influence in determining and 
implementing American policy in the colonial possessions he governed.  His influence 
came from two factors common to all proconsuls.  First, the proconsul functioned as the 
onsite representative of the imperial administration and thus determined to a large degree 
how a policy objective was to be implemented in the field.  The ability to determine 
implementation of policy often determines the outcome of the policy.  Second, the 
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imperial proconsul, as the representative in the field, had the ability to shape the reality 
of any situation presented to Washington.   
Wood’s performance in the Moro Province proves an excellent case in point.  
The administration’s objective was to create a civil administration for the Moro 
Province.  It assigned Wood the task of implementing that administration.  Wood made 
the decision to pursue that objective by abrogating the Bates Agreement and attempting 
to undermine the traditional authority of the datus in favor of an appointed civil 
government.  He chose not to govern through traditional leadership or to continue the 
policies of his predecessors.  His decision on how to implement the objective, not the 
objective itself, determined the outcome of the policy and then influenced the 
development of subsequent policy.  He made a similar decision in his direct attack on 
Moro slavery and his enforcement of the cedula tax.  In each case he could have chosen 
to pursue his ultimate objectives through less confrontational means.  Instead Wood 
chose an approach designed to provoke conflict.  His reports to the Philippine 
Commission and to his superiors in Washington presented a reality in stark contrast to 
the situation in the province.  According to Wood, Moro opposition resulted, not from 
American policy, but from hostile datus bent on exploiting their people, a corrupt sultan, 
radical imams, and bandits on Bud Dajo. 
Wood’s reports on Cuba show a similar willingness to impose his own 
prejudices upon a situation and a tendency to confuse his wishes with reality.  During the 
Cuban elections and the subsequent discussion over the Cuban constitution, Wood 
continually claimed the support of a conservative majority.  When municipal elections 
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repudiated candidates he favored and elected men that opposed his policies, he dismissed 
the results with an appeal to the conservative majority who did support him.  Although a 
conservative faction existed in Cuban politics, at no point did it command majority 
support among the populace in the electoral process.  Wood simply speculated that the 
faction represented a non-voting conservative majority and cited their support to justify 
his own policies and actions to the administration. 
Secretary Root demonstrated the effective counterbalance to Wood’s egotism 
and ambition – an informed and determined superior.  On matters he considered a 
priority to the administration, Root kept a tight reign on Wood and held the line on 
exactly what the administration wanted.  When Wood wanted to stall the elections for 
the constitutional convention because the conservative majority had not been elected in 
the municipal elections, Root forced him to proceed.  When Wood wanted to forestall 
independence because the conservative majority supported his continual rule as 
governor, Root forced him to proceed.  During Cuban deliberations over the Platt 
Amendment and the nature of relations between the two countries, Root made it clear 
that he would determine not only the policy but the implementation.  Stuck between the 
Cubans and Root, Wood argued several times that the administration should concede to 
Cuban demands or modify certain points.  In some cases Wood actually exceeded his 
authority and made concessions.  Root, however, knew what he wanted the policy to 
achieve and he held Wood to the task.  Wood lacked that sort of supervision in the Moro 
Province. 
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Since imperial proconsuls have a large influence over policy and are responsible 
for its implementation, it is not surprising that a proconsul would want a greater voice in 
determining policy.  Such a voice required a degree of political influence and an ability 
to leverage that influence into policy decisions.  Wood’s started his imperial career in the 
city of Santiago as the most junior officer of the occupational command structure in 
Cuba.  Yet, within eighteen months, he assumed command of the entire island and his 
progressive imperialism became the accepted policy in Cuba.  Important political 
connections and an ability to publicize his efforts had as much to do with his remarkable 
rise as did the agenda he touted.  Progressives in the United States had an invested 
interest in Wood’s success and helped to advance his career.  Without their active and 
vocal support, Wood would have remained the progressive governor of Santiago.   
The progressive occupation of Cuba and the Moro Province also revealed much 
about the nature of progressivism.  Two of the prominent themes in the progressive 
program pursued by Wood were a willingness to allow government involvement in all 
areas of life and the concentration of power within a centralized government.  Wood 
adopted individual elements of the progressive agenda to respond to a number of factors 
but these two themes remained constant throughout the entire agenda.  He was an 
authoritarian who believed a centralized government holding absolute authority could 
more intelligently and efficiently govern a territory than power dispersed through a 
federal system (Cuba) or exercised through native leaders (Moro Province).  Good 
government, according to Wood, was honest, effective, and efficient.  It was not 
necessarily responsive to the people or reflective of their social and political values. 
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Wood’s governance clearly demonstrated the darker side of his progressivism.  
According to Wood, progressivism meant progress, a willingness to move forward and 
advance as a people, a society, and a government.  In Wood’s view the major problems 
he faced was how to deal with people who rejected progressivism and thus seemed to 
reject progress.  Since Wood believed all rational people would embrace progress, those 
that did not must either be irrational, childlike, or evil.  Leaders who opposed his 
policies in Cuba and the Moro Province did so because they wished to exploit the 
people.  He often characterized the people themselves, especially those who did not 
recognize the benefits of his rule, as children in need of a patriarchal government to take 
care of them.  According to Wood, these people needed a firm hand to punish the evil 
and to discipline and teach the children a lesson.  His reports and correspondence are 
replete with such references. 
 The progressive program adopted by Wood also had its limitations.  The model 
he developed in Cuba depended heavily upon the existence of strong and centralized 
1municipal governments and the availability of financial resources to cover the cost of 
1the progressive reforms.  Local governments acted as training grounds for 
progressivism and thus the incubators of good government.  The municipalities 
themselves served as the foundation for the centralized authority and the focal point of 
the progressive reforms.  The program worked well in Cuba, which had an abundance of 
both municipalities and revenue.  When Wood transferred the model to the Moro 
Province, it failed.  The province had little more than a dozen municipalities and a 
chronic shortage of funds.  Most of the municipalities existed in areas controlled by the 
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Christian Filipinos and thus a progressive program that naturally targeted the 
municipalities had little impact upon the Moros who lived predominately in rural areas.  
Wood never developed a progressive program for the rural areas. 
The United States has often been accused of going forth to recreate the world in 
its own image.  In his ten years as imperial proconsul, Wood never attempted to recreate 
his homeland in the territories he governed.  Instead, he attempted to remake those areas 
into his own progressive vision for the United States.  His colonial administration 
revealed much about that vision and about what he considered the heart of 
progressivism.  It also highlighted the dangers inherent in the exercise of unchecked 
authority.  For good and bad, the American empire in 1908 bore Wood’s personal stamp. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
STATISTICAL TABLES FOR CHAPTER VI 
 
 
Table A:1 Amount Collected at each Customs House562 
 
 Year Ending Year Ending Year Ending  
Customs House Dec. 31, 1900 Dec. 31, 1901 May 20, 1902 Total 
 
Baracoa        27,707.81  25,081.47 8,760.71 61,549.99 
Batabano          3,139.92 2,049.56 654.02 5,843.50 
Caibarien      201,598.53 228,537.73 79,651.22 509,787.48 
Cardenas      301,463.73 332,326.67 111,666.13 745,456.53 
Cienfuegos   1,168,473.54 1,406,015.97 451,411.30 3,025,900.81 
Gibara      237,716.81 346,651.92 72,472.89 656,841.62 
Guantanamo      127,543.87 146,514.00 40,718.78 314,776.65 
Habana 12,068,399.05 10,877,984.78 4,148,294.89 27,094,678.72 
Jucaro   54,154.73 54,154.73 
Manzanillo      175,741.05 277,351.71 90,587.51 543,680.27 
Matanzas      456,923.30 499,059.98 194,125.46 1,150,108.74 
Nuevitas      180,363.69 209,800.25 73,549.28 463,713.22 
Sagua la Grande      204,617.53 174,747.16 41,247.18 420,611.87 
Santa Cruz del Sur          4,547.38 7,149.70 992.72 12,689.80 
Santiago      951,914.82 1,085,794.08 395,748.86 2,433,457.76 
Trinidad        22,128.00 18,603.68 7,409.19 48,140.87 
Tunas de Zaza          4,244.25 19,948.18 2,967.06 27,159.49 
 
Total 16,136,523.28 15,657,616.84 5,774,411.93      37,568,552.05 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
562 “Report of Lieutenant Frank R. M’Coy, Aide-De-Camp,” 1 January 1901, Exhibit V, 258; “Report of 
Lieutenant Frank R. McCoy, 1901,” Exhibit S; and “Report of Lieutenant Frank R. McCoy,” 8 December 
1902, Exhibit F. 
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Table A:2 Works Executed in the Province of Havana by the Department of Public Works 
January 1, 1899 to May 19, 1902563 
 
Statement of the Work   Extent of Work 
 
Buildings Repaired   Repairs 
 Jail at San Antonio de los Banos    
 Building “Monte de Piedad” 
 Building “School of Painting” 
 Treasury Building 
 Gen. Intervention of Treasury 
 Public Works Building Cerro 440B 
 University Building 
 Building occupied by Principal Treasury Administration 
 Section occupied by Departments of Treasury Building 
 Post Office of Bejucal     
 Building at Anton Recio, No. 86 
 Building at Cardenas, No. 40 
 Building at Someruelos, No. 27 
 Houses Paula, Nos. 69 to 77 
 Room for General Archives in the Fuerza Barracks 
 Madera Barracks 
 House at Maximo Gomez No. 3 in Sancti Spiritus 
 Building, Cuba, No. 1 
 Building, Cuba, No. 40 
 Hut for Workmen along road to Bejucal 
 Hut for Workmen along road to San Cristobal 
Water Closet in Building in Botanical Garden of the University  New Construction 
School of Arts and Trades   New Construction 
Building Academy of Sciences   Reconstruction 
Repair of Existing Roads   26.6 K 
 Cotorro to Santa maria del Rosario   2.2 K 
 Havana to San Cristobal   4 K 
 Havana to Bejucal   7 K 
 Havana to Managua   6.4 K 
 Havana to Guines (kms. 20 to 21)   2 K 
 Havana to Guines (kms. 25 to 27)   1.5 K 
 Punta Bravas to Cangrejeras   3.5 K 
 Arroyo Apolo to Managua 
Construction of New Roads   73.7 K 
 Rinco to San Antonio de los Banos*   13.5 K 
 Vento to Insane Asylum*   1.8 K 
 Managua to Batabano*   4 K 
 Cuatro Caminos to La Canoa*   Lengthening 
 Camp Columbia to Vedado   .48 K 
 Bejucal to tomb of General Maceo   1.52 K 
 San Antonio de las Vegas to Duran   5 
 Havana to San Cristobal   3.1 K 
 Batabano to the Surgidero   4.2 K 
                                                 
563 “Report of the Secretary of Public Works for the Period from July 1, 1901 to May 20, 1902,” 30 
November 1902, 57th Cong, 2d Sess, H. Docs, Supplementary Material, Department of Cuba, vol. 6, pt. 2, 
5-14.  * denotes project uncompleted at the time of transfer. 
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Table A:2 Continued         
 
Statement of the Work   Extent of Work 
 
Cuartro Caminos to La Canoa   3.5 K 
 Luyano to La Gallega   9.6 K 
 Havana to San Cristobal*   17.8 K 
 Guanabacoa to Cojimar   4.5 K 
 Havana to Guines   2 K 
 Mariano to La Playa 
 Maceo and Carmen streets in Surgidero of Batabano   
Preservation of Existing Roads   262.1 K 
 Havana to San Cristobal   30K 
 Havana to Bejucal   26K 
 Arroyo Apolo to Managua   14K 
 Havana to Guines   48K 
 El Luyano to La Gallega   14K 
 General Road Preservation   130.1K 
Repair of Existing Bridges 
 Almendares (on Managua Road) 
 Two Bridges on San Cristobal Road 
Construction of Guanabo Bridge (on Guanabo Road)  New Construction 
Construction of New Steel Bridges   73.15 meters 
 Canongo Bridge 
 Bridge on Culebra Creek 
 San Nicolas Bridge 
 Guanabacoa Bridge* 
 Cristina Bridge* 
 Verde Bridge on San Cristobal Road* 
 Manaqua Bridge 
Construction of Wood Bridge   36 meters 
 Guanabo Bridge (on Titotivo Road) 
Stables and Corral at 440B Cerro   New Construction 
Plaza Santiago de las Vegas (Stone Wall 109 meters)  New Construction 
General Warehouse and Shops in Cerro   Improvements 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table A:3 Summary of Work Executed under the Direction and Supervision of the Chief Engineer, 
Department of Cuba, Since the Military Occupation in 1898, Harbor Works of the Port of Havana564 
 
Statement of the Work 
 
Acquisition of Two Tugs (Clio and Natalie) 
Acquisition of a water-boat, steam drill, and two rowboats 
Construction and repair of wharves, bulkheads, etc. 
Dredging in the harbors of Havana and Matanzas 
Removal of wrecks 
Cleaning and maintenance of harbor front 
Cleaning of Moro and Cabana fortresses 
Construction of pontoon bridge over Chorrera River 
Construction of plaster model of Havana harbor 
Removal of refuse out to sea 
Relocation of the disinfecting plant of the Marine Hospital 
Construction of a building for the disinfecting plant 
Tidal observations and compilation of a tidal table for the harbor 
 
Total Expenditures in Harbor Works:  $356,060.12 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Table A:4 Summary of Work Executed under the Direction and Supervision of the Chief Engineer, 
Department of Cuba, Since the Military Occupation in 1898, Department of Surveys565 
 
Statement of the Work 
 
Survey of Fortifications in and around Havana 
 Temporary Fortifications erected by Spanish 
 Sea Coast Batteries 
 Permanent Fortifications 
 Land Defenses 
Topographical Survey of the vicinity of Havana 
Survey of the Department (Island of Cuba) 
 Departmental Surveys 
 Photographs to Accompany Survey 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
                                                 
564 “Report of Major H.F. Hodges, Corps of Engineers, Chief Engineer, Department of Cuba, for the 
Period of January 1, 1902 to May 20, 1902,” 1 August 1902, 57th Cong, 2d Sess, H. Docs, Supplementary 
Material, Department of Cuba, vol. 6, pt 1, 19-20. 
565 Ibid., 21-24. 
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Table A:5 Summary of Work Undertaken by the Engineer Department, City of Havana, and of 
the Chief Engineer, Department of Cuba, in Havana, from January 1, 1899 to May 19, 1902566 
 
Statement of the Work 
 
State and Government – Hospitals and Charities 
 Purchase and Installation of Furniture and Office Material for Cuban National Library 
 Repairs to Compostela Street barracks for Orphan Asylum 
 Repairs to Widow’s Home 
 Repairs to Quintade Sta. Venia 
 Repairs to Reina battery for use by inmates of San Jose Asylum 
 Installation at SanJose Asylum (Reina battery) of part of cooking and boiling apparatus 
 Installation of electric lights and emergency closets at San Jose Asylum 
 Renovation of the Beneficencia 
 Construction of operating room and installing plumbing at Reina Mercedes Hospital 
 Installation of electric light plant at Reina Mercedes Hospital 
 Paving with cement tiles he wooden floor of small-pox ward at Las Animas Hospital 
 Repair to ambulances 
 Replacement of crematory closets with dry closets for Reform School for Girls at Aldecoa 
 Repairs and additions at San Lazaro Hospital 
 Renovation and installation of plumbing and laundry in Aldecoa Hospital 
 Repairs to building at Sagua la Grande, owned by Procural Hospital 
State and Government – Jails 
 Repairs to infirmary of Presidio 
 Conversion of Cabana into a Presidio 
 Renovation and repairs to Recojidas Prison 
 Repairs to hospital Militar for use as carcel 
 Construction of bunks at Fort Atares 
 Acquisition of materials needed for cleaning and whitewashing walls of Carcel 
 Renewing gas pipe and fixtures at Presidio and Presidio Hospital 
 Fort Vivac – addition for use as court room 
 Marde Castle – for repairs and additions to fit it for use as a prison 
 Laying cement walks at the Presidio Hospital 
State and Government – Public Buildings 
 Renovation of general public buildings 
 Renovation and repairs to Department of Havana Headquarters 
 Renovation and repairs to office of Military Governor of Havana and Lt. Governor’s Palace 
 Renovation and repair to offices of the Chief Engineer 
 Renovation and repairs to Custom House 
 Renovation and repairs to Cuartel de la Fuerza for sanitation and quartering troops 
 Renovation and repairs to Cuartel de la Fuerza for storage of archives of Cuba 
 Purchase and installation of electric Lighting Plant at La Fuerza 
 Installation of wiring at La Fuerza and Palace of Governor General Segundo Cabo 
 Installation of wiring at house of Captain of the Port 
 Conversion of Dragones Barracks into correctional court 
 Renovation and repair of old Post Office 
 Repairs to Belasecain Barracks for Medical Department 
 Plants for Governor-General’s Palace 
 Repairs to Governor-General’s summer residence 
                                                 
566 “Report of Lieutenant W.J. Barden, Corps of Engineers, Late Chief Engineer, City of Havana for the 
Period ending May 20, 1902,” 9 August 1902, 57th Cong, 2d Sess, H. Docs, Supplementary Material, 
Department of Cuba, vol. 5, pt. 1, Tables following p. 52. 
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Table A:5 Continued         
 
Statement of the Work 
 
 Repairs to Audencia and Carcel 
 Construction of passenger landing 
 Moving of two barrack buildings to Quarantine station and equipping of same 
 Demolition of Monserrate street houses, Nos. 1 to 14 
 Repair and paint fence enclosing Quinta de los Melinos 
 Enclosing sheds located in the moat of La Fuerza 
 Construction of portable shelving and purchase and erecting awnings at Auditor’s office 
 Repairs to first floor of Hospital Militar to fit it for use of tenant 
 Repair of floors of the Post Office of Havana 
 Alterations to military stable or use as vaccination station 
 Renovation, sanitation, and repairs to general public buildings 
 Renovation of Castillo de la Punta as office for the Commander of the Rural Guard 
 Renovation at Havana Post Office 
 Installation of shelving at La Fuerza for use of National Library and Museum 
 Removal of toilet room and boiler shed from sea wall outside of Maestranza building 
 Installation of closet fixtures in basement of Maestranza building 
 Preparation of plans for renovation and repair of state buildings 
 Repair of Cuartel de la Fuerza to provide storage archives for island of Cuba 
 Furnishing criminal chamber of the Supreme Court 
 
State and Government – Cuerpo do Artlleria 
 Improvements to Cabana Fortress for occupancy by the Cuerpo de Artlleria 
Public Instruction – University and State School 
 Erection of two studios at the Havana School of Painting and Sculpture 
 Repairs to “General Wood” Laboratory, University of Havana 
Public Instruction – Public Buildings 
 Renovation of Quartermaster’s store room No. 6 for three laboratories 
 Repairs to top floor of Havana Institute 
 Additions to School of Painting and Sculpture 
 Repairs to roofs of University of Havana laboratories 
 Conversion of Piroteenia Militar into a University 
Finance – Customs Service 
 Construction of Custom House platform 
Agriculture, Industry and Commerce – Expositions 
 Construction of relief map of Morro and Cabana 
Public Works – Construction and Repairs 
 Survey of Fortifications 
 Operation of dredging plant, care and repair of wharves 
 Cleaning harbor front and removal of refuse to sea 
 Dredging for United Railways of Havana 
 Dredging for Almacenes de Deposito de la Habana 
 Dredging for Empresa de Almacenes Hacendados 
 Boring for Havana Electric Railway Co. 
 Dredging site of dry dock of Krajewski-Pesant Co 
 Dredging at Belot in the Ensenada de Marimelena for Krajewski-Pesant Co. 
 Dredging for R. Truffin and Co. 
 Dredging Slaughter-house creek 
 Repairs to Luz wharf 
 Repairs to dredge “Comercio” 
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Table A:5 Continued         
 
Statement of the Work 
 
 Improvements of Cortina de Valdes 
 Improvements to La Fuerza – moat restoration 
 Advertising, printing specifications, forms, etc. 
 Purchase of implements and supplies for the Isle of Pines 
 Construction of a new pontoon bridge across the Almendares river 
 Construction of new bridge over Agua Dulce Creek on Concha road 
 Repair of retaining wall at Battery 5 in Vedado 
 Repair of the Paula water supply pier 
 Repairs to tug “Catalina” 
 Repairs to 5 iron dump scows 
 Dredging in Matanzas harbor 
 Repair to Cantarranas bridge 
 Survey of the Department 
 Dredging for Ladislao Diaz y Hno 
 Construction of band stand at La Punta park 
Municipalities – Instruction 
 Repairs to Jesus de Monte school 
 Repairs to school, 75 7th street Vedado 
 Repairs to Estevez street school 
 Preparation of plans for Santiago school 
 Remodeling second floor of Hospital Militar for school purposes 
 Alternations to cuartel at Guines for school purposes 
 Repairs school building at Guines 
 Alteration to cuartel of Santiago de las Vegas for school purposes 
 Construction of three room school building at La Salud 
 Construction of five school houses at La Guira de la Melena 
 Construction of two 3 room and one 2 room school building at Guanajay 
 Alterations to the Orphan Asylum at Cienfuegos  to be used as a public school 
 Construction of frame school building at Calabazar and Marianao 
 Conversion of cuartel at Cardenas into a school building 
 Construction of frame school building at Bolondron, Jaguey Grande and Agramonte 
 Fitting the Casa de Mendigos, Beneficencia, for school building 
 Construction of one 8 room school house at Sagua la Grande 
 Repair to school building at Mariel 
Municipalities – Sanitation 
 Street Cleaning 
 Operation of street cleaning repair shops 
 Operation of City Engineer Department repair shop 
 Operation of Stable No. 1 and Fosos shops 
 Operation of city Stable No. 2 and No. 3 
 Street sprinkling 
 Transportation 
 Collection of Refuse 
 Disposal of refuse by removal to sea 
 Disposal of refuse by cremation 
 Preservation, care, and security of parks 
 Street cleaning for Regla 
 Sanitary cleaning and repairs to streets and roads for Guanabacoa 
 Grading and cleaning lots around Old City Wall 
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Table A:5 Continued         
 
Statement of the Work 
 
 Extension of sewer on Tacon street 
 Purchase of 3 sprinkling wagons 
 Repair of tug “Narciso Deulofeu” 
 Construction of sea wall at La Punta and extending same  
 Repair of streets in Havana and Regla 
 Construction and operation of stone crushing plant and quarry for Vento 
 Survey for establishment of street grades 
 Asphalt block pavement for C. G. Mendoza 
 Asphalt block pavement for North American Trust Co. 
 Laying asphalt block pavement at Aguiar and Amargura streets 
 Asphalt block pavement in vicinity of Custom House and Governor’s General Place  
 Asphalt block pavement in vicinity of Supreme Court building 
 Repairs to streets and changes of grades necessitated by the street railroad work 
 Brick paving through gateways to general wharves of Havana 
 Cross sectioning and profiling of streets 
 Operation of Sewer Department 
 Repairs to sewer at Reina Mercedes Hospital  
 Removal of night soil 
 Construction and operation of Electrozone plant 
 Operation of Water Department 
 Maintenance of Palatino Pumping Station 
 Maintenance of Palatino and Zanja Real 
 Installation of water supply to Quemados, Camp Columbia and Principe 
 Purchase and installation of 5-ton scale at Cerro Pumping Station 
 Purchase and installation of 2 new boilers at Cerro Pumping Station 
 Improvement of Albear canal 
 Improvement of Almendares River and Aqueduct at Vento 
 Connection of water supply to Rela and Luyano 
 Connection of water main to Aldecoa Hospital and City Farm  
 Connection of water main to Military Hospital and Mercedes Hospital  
 Connection of water supply to Casa Blanca, Morro and Cabano 
 Construction of fences at Vento and Palatino 
 Laying of water pipe on Zequeira street 
 Installation of water pipe at Tamarindo Station 
 Installation of public fountain at Casa Blanca 
 Installation and removal of water meters for Havana Electric Railway Co. 
 Water Department work for Havana Electric Railway Co. 
 Repairs to urinals at Olavarrieta School 
 Installation of water pipe at Tacon Market 
 Installation of 4 inch water mains on 13th street Vedado 
 Installation of water pipe for Havana Brewery 
 Laying pipe line at Auditor and Falgueras streets 
 Replacing wood floors with tiles and enlarging porch, Tacon 3 
 Repairs to ambulances Nos. 2 and 8 
 Renovation and sanitation of buildings (general) 
 Razing commissary buildings at La Punta 
 Experiments in paving 
 Improvements in the Prado 
 Construction of Pilar street 
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Table A:5 Continued         
 
Statement of the Work 
 
 Construction of a shed over well at Caivario 
 Moving disinfecting plant and installation at Machina wharf 
 Connection of water supply at Arroyo Naranjo 
 Construction of road parallel to Celzeda de Cerro 
 Improvement of grounds occupied by Los Fosos 
Municipalities – Hospitals and Charities 
 Construction of stables at House of Succor, Amistad 78 
 Repairs to Hospital de Rigiene 
 Repairs to 24 House of Succor 
 Reconstruction of House of Succor at Casa Blanca 
 Repairs at Municipal Hospital No.  
 Repairs to ambulance House of Succor, 2nd district 
 Fitting part of Municipal Hospital No. 1 for tuberculosis patients 
Municipalities – Miscellaneous 
Municipalities – Administration 
Municipalities – Public Buildings 
 Repairs to Intendencia Militar (police headquarters) 
 Renovation and repairs to Paula street barracks for destitute widows and police station 
 Repairs to Municipal Vivae 
 Installation of iron closets at Vivae 
 Renovation and repairs of Governor-General’s Palace (for Ayuntamiento) 
 Repairs to police station No. 4 
 Repairs to Colon Market 
 Repairs to Tacon Market 
 Repairs to pavement of Tacon Market 
 Urgent work at Tacon Market 
 Repairs to Estevez street police station 
 Repairs to Cuartel de Bomberos 
 Repairs to construction of stalls, Cuartel de Bomberos 
 Repairs to beef slaughter house and removal of swine slaughter house to same 
 Repairs to ceiling of Mayor’s office 
 Repairs to skylight, police department buildings 
 Work at Dog Pound 
 Repairs to lightening rods at Maestranza 
 Work at 3d Police station 
 Painting general office at Colon Market 
 Work at 11th Police station 
 General repair and superintendence of Municipal buildings 
 Municipal Architect’s Department 
Military Department – Barracks and Quarters 
 Renovation and repairs to Batteries 3, 4, and 5 
 Renovation and repairs to Rena and Santa Clara batteries 
 Renovation and repairs to Maestranza de Artilleria 
 Renovation and repairs to La Punta 
 Renovation of Morro and Cabana 
 Repairs to powder magazines, Santa Barbara and San Telmo 
 Renovation and repairs to Batteries 1, 2, and Velasco 
 Renovation and repairs to Castillo del Principe 
 Renovation and repairs to Dragones barracks (for quarters for troops) 
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Table A:5 Continued         
 
Statement of the Work 
 
 Renovation and repairs to Belascoain barracks (for quarters for troops) 
 Construction of military stable 
 Repairs to Morro Castle for reception of prisoners 
 Addition to band barracks at Santa Clara battery 
Military Department – Administration 
Military Department – Miscellaneous 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Table A:6 Expenditures according to Policy Areas Undertaken by the Engineer Department, 
City of Havana, and of the Chief Engineer, Department of Cuba, in Havana, 
from January 1, 1899 to May 19, 1902567 
 
Assistance Provided to Policy Areas   Expenditures 
 
State and Government 
 Central Office 337.00 
 Hospitals and Charities 136,839.00  
 Jails 81,120.00 
 Public Buildings 417,542.00 
 Cuerpo de Artilleria 75.00 
Public Instruction 
 University and State Schools 6,274.86 
 Public Buildings 74,467.24 
Finance 
 Customs Service 576.54 
Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce 
 Exposition 1,714.48 
Public Works 
 Construction and Repairs 436,509.73 
Municipalities 
 Instruction 189,228.20 
 Sanitation 5,186,705.73 
 Hospitals and Charities 6,492.50 
 Miscellaneous 4,439.80 
 Administration 219,529.93 
 Public Buildings 193,935.08 
Military Department 
 Barracks and Quarters 68,685.20 
 Miscellaneous 110.55 
 Administration 3,438.60 
 
 Total 7,028,021.44 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                                 
567 Ibid. 
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Table A:7 Works Executed in the Province of Matanzas by the Department of Public Works 
January 1, 1899 to May 19, 1902568 
 
Statement of the Work   Extent of Work 
 
Construction of New Roads    
 Matanzas to Canasi   8 km, 2 bridges 
Repair of Existing Roads 
 Matanzas to Cidra   3 km 
Construction of New Bridges 
 Conclusion Creek   60 m steel 
Repair of Existing Bridges 
 Bridge San Luis over San Juan River   Repair – wood 
Buoyage port of Cardenas    
Dredging port of Cardenas   Removal 146,148 cubic 
    meters of sand and mud* 
Lighthouse Punta Maya in Matanzas   Repairs 
State wharf in Matanzas (including warehouse and railway)  New Construction 
Market in Matanzas   New Construction 
Flooded lands in El Roque   Studies Conducted 
Municipalities, hygiene, street cleaning and drainage  Routine Service 
 
 
 
Table A:8 Summary of Work Undertaken by the District Engineer, District of Matanzas, and of 
the Chief Engineer, Department of Cuba, in the Vicinity of Matanzas,  
Since the Military Occupation in 1898569 
 
Statement of the Work 
 
Preparation of a military sketch map of the province 
Repair of the Fire Department building in Matanzas 
Construction of road from Trinidad to Casilda (3.5 miles) 
Construction of the drainage ditch at Cienfuegos 
Sanitation at San Jose de los Ramos 
Construction of two bridges at San Jose de los Ramos 
Extension of water supply system in Bolondron 
Construction of a temporary water supply in Trinidad 
Survey of Matanzas harbor 
Sanitation and street repair in Matanzas 
Sanitation, street cleaning and repair in garrisoned towns in the area 
Plans developed and contract made for deep-water pier at Matanzas 
Construction of a sea-wall in the San Juan River 
Street cleaning, repair, and sanitation of the City of Matanzas 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
                                                 
568 “Report of the Secretary of Public Works,” 30 November 1902, 5-14.  * denotes project uncompleted at 
the time of transfer. 
569 “Report of Major Hodges,” 1 August 1902, 27-28. 
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Table A:9 Works Executed in the Province of Santiago by the Department of Public Works 
January 1, 1899 to May 19, 1902570 
 
Statement of the Work   Extent of Work 
 
Construction of New Roads    
 Boniato to El Cristo   9.05 km* 
 Santiago de Cuba to San Luis 
 Caney Road 
Repairs to Existing Roads 
 Manzanillo to Bayamo   6.34 km - light wood bridge 
 Bayamo to Baire   4.55 km - light wood bridges 
 Santiago and Caney to Sevill   2.5 km 
Construction of New Bridges 
 Mao Bridge (Boniato to El Cristo)   13.2 m – steel 
 Aguacate Bridge (Boniato to El Cristo)   18.5 m – steel 
 Paso de la Virgen Bridge   32 m – steel* 
 El Deposito Bridge (Guantanamo to Palenque)  26 m – wood 
 Ulloa and Naranjo Bridges 
 Purgatorio Bridge 
 San Juan Bridge 
Repairs to Existing Bridges 
 La Bomba Bridge (Guantanamo to Palenque)  26 m – wood 
 Palmarejo Bridge (Guantanamo to Palenque)  11.5 m - wood 
Caimanera Wharf in Guantanamo   Repairs 
Gibara Wharf   New Construction 
Dredging Port of Santiago de Cuba   Transferred to Military 
Sewerage – City of Santiago de Cuba   Transferred to Military 
School House in Veguitas   Transferred to Military  
Gutters in City of Santiago de Cuba   Transferred to Military 
Lodging for laborers, Manzanillo School   Repairs 
School House in El Cobre   Transferred to Military 
Court of First Instance of Manzanillo   Repairs 
School House at Songo   Transferred to Military 
Lodging for laborers, Mayari School   Transferred to Military 
Model School House of Santiago de Cuba   Transferred to Military 
Streets in Holguin   Transferred to Military 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                 
570 “Report of the Secretary of Public Works,” 30 November 1902, 5-14.  * denotes project uncompleted at 
the time of transfer. 
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Table A:10 Summary of Work Undertaken by the District Engineers in the Province of Santiago,  
and of the Chief Engineer, Department of Cuba, in the Vicinity of Santiago, Since the Military 
Occupation in 1898571 
 
Statement of the Work 
 
Improvements to water supply at Santiago 
Construction of a lighthouse at Guantanamo 
Repair of the lighthouse at Morro Castle, Santiago 
Contracts for sewage and water system 
Contracts for extension of Pier No. 51 by 150 feet 
Repair of Santiago aqueduct 
Installation of a pumping plant 
Construction of a water supply system for Guantanamo (including a dam on Guaso River) 
Contract for construction of a wharf at Nispero Bay 
Installation of a dredge at Santiago 
Filling along bay front 
Renovation of the Santiago jail 
Studies undertaken for a new water system of Santiago 
Installation of a water supply system at Morro Castle 
Installation of a water supply system for Palma Soriamo 
Road construction and repair in Santiago for sanitation purposes (90% of roads improved) 
Preparation of a map of the City of Santiago 
Construction of New Roads 
 Road from Santiago to San Luis 
 El Caney Road* 
 Road from Santiago to Cobre  (12 miles) 
 Road from San Luis to Dos Caminos 
Construction of Santiago Schoolhouse 
Construction and repair of streets and sidewalks in San Luis 
Construction and repair of streets and sidewalks in Palma Soriano 
Construction and repair of streets and sidewalks in Dos Caminos 
Repair and remodeling of the Castle of Seboruco in Baracoa for use of barracks 
Conversion of Spanish barracks into stables 
Draining of two large lagoons in Baracoa for sanitation purposes 
Construction of a government wharf 
Construction of stairs from wharf to custom house 
Street cleaning and sanitation in Baracoa 
Repair and drainage improvements to Manzanillo-Bayamo Road 
Repair and improvements to Manzanillo-Campechuela Road 
Repair and improvements to Bayamo-Baire Road 
Construction of four bridges on the Bayamo road 
Construction of two bridges on the Cauto road 
Construction of four bridges on the Compechuela road 
Construction of one bridge on the Yara road 
Repair and fitting buildings for schoolhouses 
Construction and repair of roads near Bayamo 
 Repair and reconstruction of streets in Holguin 
 Street cleaning and sanitation in Holguin and Gibara 
 Construction of sewers for Holguin Barracks and jail 
 Improvement of two public parks in Holguin 
                                                 
571 “Report of Major Hodges,” 1 August 1902, 31-40. 
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Table A:10 Continued         
 
Statement of the Work 
 
 Improvements to water supply at Holguin and Puerto Padre 
 Improvement to water supply at Gibara failed 
 Improvements to cemeteries t Holguin, Puerto Padre, and Las Tunas 
 Repairs to hospitals at Holguin, Puerto Padre, and Gibara 
 Repairs to jail at Holguin 
 Reconstruction of school houses at various points 
 Construction and/or restoration of 79 miles of telephone lines 
 Repairs to turnpike between from Holguin to Aguas Claras (6 miles) 
 Improvement of country roads 
 Construction of 47 new bridges around Holguin (mostly of timber construction) 
 Repairs to Holguin barracks and hospitals 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Table A:11 Source and Value of Cuban Imports during American Occupation572 
 
Article Imported United States % Other Countries % Total 
 
Animal / Animal Products 11,146,526 28 29,218,217 72 40,364,743 
Foodstuffs 40,656,444 54 34,577,006 46 75,233,450 
Liquors and Beverages 1,902,096 18 8,531,901 82 10,433,997 
Cotton, silk, vegetable fibers 
   wool, etc 3,458,212 10 30,278,566 90 33,736,778 
Metals / Metal manufactures 14,777,502 71 5,988,188 29 20,765,690 
Chemicals, drugs, dyes, 
   paints, etc. 2,281,297 46 2,723,053 54 5,004,350 
Clay, earth, & manufactures 719,348 46 869,562 54 1,588,910 
Marble and stone 178,842 40 274,898 60 453,740 
Glass & glassware 676,309 37 1,163,148 63 1,839,457 
Paper & manufactures 1,076,391 29 2,636,136 71 3,712,527 
Wood & manufactures 5,364,453 82 1,168,323 18 6,532,776 
Oils 2,118,134 92 205,614 8 2,323,748 
Misc. 13,434,756 57 10,012,213 43 23,446,969 
 
Total 97,790,310 43 127,646,825 57 225,437,135 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
                                                 
572 “Report of the Secretary of War,” 1 December 1902, 279. 
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Table A:12 Destinations and Value of Cuban Exports during American Occupation573 
 
Article Imported United States % Other Countries % Total 
 
Tobacco & manufactures 45,400,671 55 37,596,444 45 82,997,115 
Sugar & molasses 77,648,819 100 50,822 0 77,669,641 
Wood, unmanufactured 1,752,451 58 1,266,516 42 3,018,967 
Iron & manganese ore 2,587,715 97 70,608 3 2,658,323 
Fruits and nuts 2,547,392 100 3,828  2,551,220 
All other articles 5,479,092 47 6,204,709 53 11,683,801 
 
Total 135,416,140 75 45,192,927 25 180,609,67 
 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                                 
573 Ibid., 281. 
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Table A:13 Expenditure per Appropriation in Cuba during American Occupation574 
             To 
Appropriation 1900 1901 May 20, 1902 Total 
 
Administration  1,139,911.67 632,102.78 1,772,014.45 
Agriculture 207,963.83 172,519.36 38,244.79 418,727.98 
Barracks and Quarters 946,854.77 360,709.97 124,234.33 1,431,799.07 
Bills of Lading 
   and Transportation 175,685.00 105,014.99 45,000.00 325,699.99 
Captains of Ports 64,582.67 72,127.87 29,653.31 166,363.85 
Customs Houses 1,016,374.23 975,732.75 384,039.91 2,376,146.89 
Charities and Hospitals 1,757,697.08 1,589,459.13 547,337.66 3,894,493.87 
Census 118,088.91   118,088.91 
Elections 81,273.94 69,565.38 123,195.86 274,035.18 
Expositions 19,729.85 103,536.07 12,659.76 135,925.68 
Finance 285,870.25 318,130.61 141,047.36 745,048.22 
Jails 490,651.48 511,232.39 219,791.03 1,221,674.90 
Justice 701,288.01 991,656.61 404,608.50 2,097,553.12 
Light Houses 120,586.97 284,938.98 71,916.62 477,442.57 
Miscellaneous 7,885.82 6,328.97 2,092.83 16,307.62 
Municipalities 58,896.06 1,486.00 20,000.00 80,382.06 
Police 988,077.61 367,614.89 2,921.60 1,358,614.10 
Postal Service 571,070.07 440,901.00 176,705.88 1,188,676.95 
Public Buildings 191,974.58 913,123.07 602,493.27 1,707,590.92 
Public Instruction 
Normal State Schools 
     and University 507,647.43 898,068.97 352,030.81 1,757,747.21 
Municipal Schools 2,685,905.17 3,038,943.80 1,134,023.96 6,858,872.93 
Repairs and Supplies 815,907.71 274,470.85 199,142.86 1,289,521.42 
Public Works 1,895,256.07 1,692,754.41 740,252.14 4,328,262.62 
Quarantine Service 275,228.56 209,797.90 62,015.35 547,041.81 
Immigration Station   19,558.72 19,558.72 
Cuerpo de Artilleia  24,590.81 24,930.67 49,521.48 
Rural Guard 1,789,824.98 929,111.28 356,168.68 3,075,104.94 
Sanitation 3,018,903.50 2,787,093.16 1,035,808.40 6,841,805.06 
State and Government 267,496.43 399,240.53 102,558.77 769,295.73 
Settlement Warrants Issued 90.66 375.69 17,114.82 17,581.17 
 
Total 19,060,811.64 18,678,437.11 7,621,650.67 45,360,899.42 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                 
574 “Report of Frank M’Coy,” 1 January 1901, Exhibit W, 259-260; “Report of Frank McCoy, 1901,” 30 
January 1902, Exhibit T; and “Report of Frank McCoy,” 8 December 1902, Exhibit H. 
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